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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores Charles Peirce’s reception of Dmitri Mendeleev’s periodic arrangement 
of the chemical elements, the further impact of chemistry on Peirce’s philosophy, such as 
his phenomenology and diagrammatic reasoning, and the relations between Peirce's theory 
of iconicity and Mendeleev's periodic table. It is prompted by the almost complete absence 
in the literature of any discussion of Peirce’s unpublished chemistry manuscripts and the 
lack of attention given to the connections between Peirce’s early study of chemistry and his 
later philosophy. This project seeks to make a contribution to this otherwise neglected area 
of Peirce scholarship. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
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volume and paragraph number, separated by a full stop. 
Example: CP 4.123.  
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The Essential Peirce, 2 vols., ed. Peirce Edition Project. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1991, 1998. Referenced by EP followed by the volume and page number. separated 
by a colon. Example: EP 1:39.  
 
NEM 
The New Elements of Mathematics. 4 vols. Edited by Carolyn Eisele. The Hague: Mouton, 
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Example: NEM 4:39. 
 
PPM 
Turrisi, P. 1997. ‘Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking’ in Turrisi, P (Ed.) 
The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism Charles Sanders Peirce. State University of New 
York Press . Referenced by PPM followed page number separated by a colon.  
Example: PPM:19. 
 
MS 
Manuscript numbers correspond to Annotated Catalogue of the Papers of Charles S. Peirce. 
Richard S. Robin. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1967. 
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Introduction 
 
It has been generally acknowledged for the last half century, at least, that no man’s 
philosophy can be well understood until one knows how he came by it.  
[Charles Peirce. MS 619: 1, 1909] 
 
A cursory glance at the biographical details of Charles Sanders Peirce and Dmitri Ivanovich 
Mendeleev reveals that both lived at approximately the same time during the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Peirce was born in 1839 some five years after Mendeleev 
who, dying in 1907, predeceased Peirce by seven years. Both trained in science but whilst 
Mendeleev’s contribution to chemistry is well documented and widely celebrated it takes 
more than a cursory glance at Peirce’s details to discover that he too both trained and 
published in chemistry. Scholars readily refer to Peirce’s achievements in areas such as 
mathematics, logic and metaphysics. Less well known is that in 1869, the year of 
Mendeleev’s first published arrangement of the chemical elements in order of their atomic 
weight, Peirce too published a similar attempt. These are no doubt serendipitous 
discoveries. So too is that Peirce formulated a theory of iconicity as part of his wider 
semiotics and that Mendeleev’s periodic table is often proclaimed as an icon of science, 
such as this from the historian and philosopher of science Eric Scerri (2006:xii),  
 
The periodic table of the elements is one of the most powerful icons in science: a 
single document that captures the essence of chemistry in an elegant pattern. 
Indeed, nothing quite like it exists in biology or physics, or any other branch of 
science, for that matter. One sees periodic tables everywhere: in industrial labs, 
workshops, academic labs, and of course, lecture halls. (emphasis added) 
 
This integrated project in the history and philosophy of science began with such seemingly 
coincidental connections between the works and research interests of Peirce and of 
Mendeleev. Whilst Peirce knew of Mendeleev’s achievement of the periodic table in detail, 
Mendeleev as far as I can tell had no knowledge of Peirce - they neither met nor 
corresponded. This inquiry seeks to explore the fruitful relations between the works of 
these two philosopher-chemists bonded, among other things, by their common work on 
the periodic table. To borrow an analogy from photography, this thesis is not an attempt at 
a ‘double exposure’ where aspects of Peirce and Mendeleev’s writings are brought together 
as a single image. Quite the contrary; I believe the individual images of their respective 
12 
 
work and practice are both illuminated and brought into sharper focus by the (unintended) 
insights of the other. Take for example these two approaches from the literature that will 
feature later in this thesis. 
 
Andrea Woody (2014:143) argues that the periodic table ‘is valuable because of its ability to 
reveal, or make perspicuous, certain relations [between the chemical elements]’. I will 
argue that by viewing the periodic table from the perspective of Mendeleev’s 
representational practice and as a dynamic constituent of his  inquiry, Peirce’s formulation 
of iconicity offers a coherent account of how the ‘relations’ between the chemical elements 
were ‘revealed’ and made ‘perspicuous’.  
 
Secondly, many scholars, when considering Peirce’s construction of diagrammatic 
reasoning, focus on the foundational importance of mathematics and of logic to his 
approach. For example Frederik Stjernfelt (2007:xiii) argues that for Peirce logical 
understanding is not devoid of observation but is ‘the meticulous observation of general 
diagrams. As Peirce puts it: all mathematical reasoning is diagrammatic, and that all 
necessary reasoning is mathematical reasoning, no matter how simple it may be…’(NEM 
4:47, 1902). Whilst not seeking to contradict Stjernfelt (or Peirce!) I will show how Peirce’s 
study of chemistry also made an important contribution to his formulation of diagrammatic 
reasoning. This connection to chemistry, like much of Peirce’s work in this subject, is rarely 
commented on in the literature. Part of this project is to demonstrate the importance of 
Peirce’s early study of chemistry to his later philosophy.  
 
Whilst Mendeleev’s connection to the periodic table is well characterised, the periodic 
table also featured prominently in Peirce’s writings – often by way of analogy to illustrate 
his philosophy but also, and in common with Mendeleev, as a chemist inquiring into the 
relations between the chemical elements. I will show that Charles Peirce’s own early and 
published attempt at ordering the chemical elements by atomic weight was independent of 
Mendeleev’s original work. I will draw on Peirce's unpublished chemistry manuscripts and 
contextualise Peirce's writings in the broader history and historiography of chemistry. In 
particular I will argue that Peirce’s continued writings on in the periodic table were in direct 
response to Mendeleev’s original attempt and motivated by a belief that, in common with 
the laws of physics, it was underpinned by an exact mathematical foundation.   
 
Peirce and Mendeleev built and reworked the periodic table in a way that would make the 
relations between its chemical objects visible. More broadly the works of these two 
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philosopher-chemists were concerned with making clear the relations between the world’s 
material elements and between its cognitive elements. I will also show that Peirce adopted 
this chemical model – with its very emphasis on visualising relations – in developing his 
form of diagrammatic reasoning. I will argue for the foundations of Peirce’s diagrammatic 
reasoning as stemming from his time as a graduate chemistry student at Harvard’s 
Lawrence Scientific School under Josiah Cooke. I will show that the concept of relations was 
important to both Peirce and to Mendeleev in setting out their respective positions. It is the 
language of relations that connects Peirce to his study of chemistry at Harvard and to his 
methods of diagrammatic reasoning. Relations and diagrammatic reasoning later proved to 
be two of the essential pillars on which Peirce built his philosophical system. For example 
the Peirce scholar Mats Bergman (2009:72) states that ‘Peirce’s analysis of relations and 
phenomenological categories…is a highly complex issue full of false leads and outright 
contradictions’ (emphasis added). I will show that it was to his background in chemistry and 
the periodic table that Peirce returned many times in order to exemplify his analysis of 
relations and his metaphysical categories.  
 
Having considered the impact of chemistry on Peirce’s thought I will consider how Peirce’s 
philosophy illuminates Mendeleev’s inquiry into the chemical elements and his 
representation of their physiochemical relations - the periodic table. I will demonstrate the 
epistemic merit of viewing Mendeleev’s periodic table – his practice of representation - 
from the perspective of Peirce’s theory of iconicity. At its early inception Mendeleev’s 
representational practice can be identified in the two-fold way he engaged with the 
construction of the periodic table both as means of directing and also of projecting his 
thought processes. That is firstly directing the process whereby the sixty or so known 
elements might be accommodated in atomic weight order into a scheme whereby natural 
families of elements with similar chemical properties are grouped together. And secondly in 
enabling Mendeleev to project his thought processes towards previously unknown 
elements such as the three now famous eka-elements: eka-boron, eka-aluminium and eka-
silicon. I will argue that a coherent account of Mendeleev’s representational practice, as 
encapsulated by his construction and use of the periodic table as just described, is captured 
in Peirce’s formulation of iconicity. I will argue that a major factor in choosing iconicity as 
an interpretative framework is Peirce’s emphasis on the potential for making of new 
discoveries by an inquirer experimenting on the (iconic) sign itself – thought experiments 
on the periodic table. I will show how the periodic table played just such a role in 
Mendeleev’s inquiry – the periodic table as an iconic sign. 
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During Mendeleev’s lifetime the veracity of the periodic table came under some pressure. 
For example Mendeleev’s initial arrangement was unable to accommodate a number of 
newly discovered elements such as the noble gases. Furthermore, whilst Mendeleev used 
his periodic arrangement of the elements successfully to project towards a number of new 
discoveries, there were also a number of erroneous predictions such as ether and 
coronium. I will show that during these times Mendeleev’s table retained its capacity to 
promote creative thoughts in the minds of chemists and will introduce the term iconic 
robustness to account for its continued epistemic value and productivity. In addition I will 
argue that such an approach to Mendeleev’s representational practice, illuminated by 
Peirce’s account of iconicity, offers an alternative perspective to the current and long-
running ‘accommodation-prediction’ debate around the periodic table and to be found in 
the literature. 
 
Positioning Peirce’s chemistry manuscripts within the wider framework of his history and 
historiography of chemistry I will show how he changed his view on Mendeleev’s 
achievements and how this is linked to Peirce’s own and unsuccessful search for an exact 
mathematical foundation to the periodicity of the chemical elements. In an article for The 
Nation on The Periodic Law  Peirce (1892) pays fulsome tribute to Mendeleev’s 
‘wonderfully vivid conception’ and his ‘clear perception of its evidence’ demonstrated ‘by 
the formal and audacious descriptions he gave of the properties of several elements then 
undiscovered, but required to fill blank spaces’. He concludes that ‘very few inductions in 
the whole history of science are worthy of being compared with this as efforts of reason’ 
(W8:285). I will show how a number of Peirce’s unpublished manuscripts are punctuated by 
failed attempts to discover an exact mathematical key to unlock the periodic table’s 
foundational structure. This lack of success is reflected in a later and more nuanced view of 
Mendeleev’s scheme where Peirce laments its lack of mathematical exactitude, 
commenting ‘that the time has yet come when it is worthwhile to take up that question for 
its own sake’ (EP2:110, 1901). The successful discovery of Mendeleev’s eka-elements, 
which Peirce earlier praised, he later describes as useful support only by having ‘proved 
that there is some truth in one part of Mendeleéfs theory’ although it is ‘founded on pretty 
superficial characters’ (EP2:111, 1901). Three years later and after a further search for the 
periodic table’s ever elusive mathematical key, Peirce comments, ‘I need not point out the 
tantalising appearance of relations among the atomic weights which are wanting in 
exactitude, for this speaks for itself; and the more it is studied the more perplexed it shows 
itself to be’ (MS694, 1904). 
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In developing this thesis I will also show that Peirce’s research interests and methods as a 
chemist were common to others of his time and stand in stark contrast to the sometimes 
heroic rhetoric that accompanies commentaries on his philosophy. Towards the end of 
their lives Mendeleev and Peirce each responded differently to the ‘new chemistry’ of early 
twentieth century; Peirce accepted the impact on chemistry of the discovery of the electron 
whilst Mendeleev did not.  
 
An overview of the coming chapters 
As has been suggested already in this introduction, chemistry and the periodic table 
connect Charles Peirce both with Dmitri Mendeleev and more broadly, as I will argue later, 
with aspects of his philosophy. In chapter one I set out the context of Peirce’s educational 
experience as a postgraduate student at Harvard’s Lawrence Scientific School between 
1861 and 1863. I will establish that Peirce was taught by the highly regarded teacher and 
chemist Josiah Parsons Cooke who rejuvenated the chemistry curriculum by introducing a 
programme much influenced by the French chemists Jean Baptiste André Dumas and Henri 
Victor Regnault as well as the German chemist Justus Liebig. I will set out how Cooke 
increased the mathematical demands made of his students and, in common with 
Mendeleev, framed chemistry in terms of the relations between substances and their 
empirically determined properties. In one of his early papers, Cooke (1854), Peirce’s tutor, 
developed his own system for the chemical elements and one based on the relations 
between the elements and their atomic weights.  What is important to appreciate at the 
beginning of the project is that by studying chemistry under Cooke’s direction, Peirce was 
immersed in the language of relations that was later to feature so prominently in his later 
philosophy. But there was more to be gained by Peirce in studying under Cooke’s direction. 
 
As part of his reforms to the chemistry curriculum at Harvard, Cooke introduced several of 
his own texts, one in particular being Chemical Physics (1860). In chapter one we see how 
by using this particular text Cooke encouraged his students to develop a form of 
diagrammatic reasoning where, by engaging with the printed diagrams of crystallographic 
structures, Cooke’s students came to an understanding of the structural relations 
underpinning the whole range of different crystallographic types. Furthermore I show that 
Cooke, in constructing his own system of the chemical elements as set out in his paper ‘The 
Numerical Relation between the Atomic Weights’ (1854), used a number of diagrammatic 
representations in order to generate new knowledge. Importantly this chapter seeks to 
establish that, whilst studying chemistry at Harvard, Peirce engaged with a teaching 
approach which promoted an understanding of the subject in terms of relations and 
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diagrammatic reasoning. In this chapter I establish how Peirce’s training at Harvard in 
chemistry contributed to his thinking on the epistemic and logical value of diagrams. Also, 
this training led by Josiah Cooke made a substantial contribution to Peirce’s way of thinking 
diagrammatically and in terms of relations. 
 
In chapter two we will see how after graduating from the Harvard’s Lawrence Scientific 
School, Peirce maintained his interest in chemistry, being the subject of two of his earliest 
papers. The first (1863) is a contribution to atomic theory of a distinctly Kantian flavour 
where we see Peirce, unlike many nineteenth century chemists, prepared to ground his 
arguments in metaphysics. The second paper, significantly, is an attempt to devise a system 
for the chemical elements based on atomic weights and published in 1869, coincidently the 
same year as Mendeleev’s own first attempt at a systematisation of the chemical elements. 
This paper is an early indication of Peirce’s particular and lasting interest in the periodic 
table. I will show that Peirce continued to engage with Mendeleev’s table throughout his 
life, both in an oft repeated search for its exact mathematical foundation and by way of 
analogy for his later philosophy. This chapter is important to this thesis as it demonstrates 
that Peirce’s study of chemistry endured beyond his studies at Harvard. The impact of 
Mendeleev’s periodic table, and of chemistry, on Peirce is deeper seated than a chemist’s 
interest in classifying the chemical elements for it threaded through his later philosophy. 
There is very little in the secondary literature that connects Peirce’s early study of 
chemistry with his later work in philosophy. This project seeks to establish the value of this 
connection to a wider study of Peirce. 
 
Peirce and Mendeleev – both being philosophical chemists - are connected by the emphasis 
each places on the foundational nature of relations in their respective inquiries. In chapter 
three I will establish how the concept of relations connects these two philosopher-
chemists. I will show how Mendeleev with a focus on the world’s material elements, and 
Peirce in focussing on its cognitive elements, were both committed to surfacing the 
otherwise latent relations that are the foundations of their respective inquiries. Chemical 
valency is founded on the bonding relations between atoms; the periodic table on their 
physiochemical relations. I will argue that in his formulation of phenomenology, Peirce 
draws on his knowledge of the periodic table and his understanding of chemical valency as 
a framework to explore phenomenological relations diagrammatically. This is not an 
approach that features much in the literature. 
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In chapter four I will present Peirce’s three orders of signs – icon, index and symbol – and 
further introduce iconicity by considering nineteenth century chemical graphs as iconic 
diagrams. Iconicity as a means of representation is a controversial topic in the philosophy of 
science. This chapter will also attempt to counter some of the major objections to iconicity 
around the notion of resemblance. Ursula Klein (2001) rejected Peirce’s formulation of 
iconicity in her study of Berzelian chemical formula as paper tools in the creation of new 
knowledge. Klein’s rejection was based on her – in my view faulty - analysis of the relations 
between an icon and that which it represents. I will argue that Peirce’s formulation of 
iconicity would have provided Klein with an effective interpretative framework for her 
study, removing the need for the neologism iconic symbol. Before making this argument I 
will examine more closely – via Mauricio Suárez’s (2010) account - the different types of 
relations that are possible between a representation and its object of study. I will also 
suggest Peirce’s formulation of iconicity as a means of avoiding Suárez’s dyadic approach – 
the analytical inquiry and the practical inquiry - by taking the process of scientific 
representation as integrated within the creative process of scientific inquiry.  
 
In chapter four I will also show how the periodic table was integrated into Mendeleev’s 
inquiry into the relations between the chemical elements. In this context it is more useful 
to speak of the periodic table in terms of Mendeleev’s representational practice. Working 
from two of Mendeleev’s early sketch diagrams I will argue that the periodic table acted as 
an iconic representation: through the practical pen and paper exercise of its construction 
and a capacity for promoting thought experiments involving its further re-construction, it 
informed Mendeleev’s thinking as he accommodated the existing elements and projected 
novel knowledge. Furthermore, Mendeleev’s first publication of his scheme makes claims 
for the periodic table’s future epistemic fruitfulness which, I would argue, are consistent 
with its functioning as an icon.  
 
Originally published in 1869, Mendeleev’s periodic table later came under pressure from 
what Hasok Chang (2012:215), in his account of active realism, describes as ‘nature’s 
resistance’ (emphasis in the original). Nature’s resistance here takes the form of the rare 
earth elements and the appearance of the noble gases, all of which failed initially to comply 
with Mendeleev’s scheme. In chapter five I examine these occasions where Mendeleev’s 
periodic table experienced such clashes with nature. Combining these case studies with 
Peirce’s account of fallibilism, I will argue that the periodic table demonstrates iconic 
robustness in retaining its capacity to promote thought experiments and to generate new 
knowledge, whilst undergoing structural changes in response to nature’s resistance in the 
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form of known elements such as the rare earths and in the appearance of novel elements 
such as the noble gases. At the beginning of chapter five I will define iconic robustness. 
 
One of the current debates around the periodic table concerns those factors that seemingly 
weighed most heavily in favour of its eventual acceptance by the chemistry community. 
Does the prediction of new elements such as scandium, germanium and gallium carry 
greater epistemic weight over the successful accommodation of those elements existing at 
the time of its inception or is the reverse more likely (Brush 1996, Scerri and Worrall 2001)? 
In chapter six I will argue that focussing on Mendeleev’s practice of representation, as 
revealed by his iconic periodic table, provides a new and fruitful understanding of its 
epistemology. The claims and counter claims of what is sometimes known as the 
‘accommodation/prediction debate’ (Douglas and Magnus 2013) fail to offer a coherent 
account of Mendeleev’s representational practice. I will argue that treating the periodic 
table as an iconic representation achieves what Andrea Woody (2004:782) describes as an 
‘articulated awareness of the nature of the objects and relations’ (emphasis in the original) 
constituting Mendeleev’s periodic table. Scientific representations such as the periodic 
table Woody (2004:780) claims can be viewed ‘as pragmatic tools for acquiring the sort of 
articulated knowledge that is the hallmark of nontrivial knowledge’. Drawing on Woody I 
will argue that the polarised ‘accommodation/prediction’ accounts fail to demonstrate the 
means whereby Mendeleev’s table functioned as a ‘pragmatic tool’ for extending his 
appreciation – or ‘non-trivial knowledge’ - of the relations between the chemical elements. 
An articulated awareness whereby the predictive power of Mendeleev’s table in 
discovering new relations between its chemical objects, as well as its construction, is 
revealed from the vantage point of Peirce’s iconicity, as integrated functions of his practice 
of representing.  
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Chapter One 
The Chemistry of Relations: Peirce and Experiments with 
Diagrams 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce graduated (A.B.) from Harvard in 1859. In 1861 and 
after a year with the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, he entered Harvard’s Lawrence 
Scientific School to study chemistry. The Catalogue of the Officers and Students of Harvard 
University fort the Academic Year 1861-62 lists1 Peirce’s father, a founding force behind the 
Lawrence Scientific School,  as ‘Benjamin Peirce, LL.D., Parkman Professor of Astronomy 
and Mathematics’. His son’s chemistry tutor, Josiah Parsons Cooke, is listed as Erving 
Professor of Chemistry and Mineralogy. There are fifty seven2 ‘scientific students’ listed, 
including ‘Peirce, Charles S., A.B’, studying chemistry. Peirce graduated (Sc.B.) summa cum 
laude in 1863 and that same year published his first paper in the American Journal of 
Science and Arts, ‘Chemical Theory of Interpenetration’.  
 
Peirce’s time at the Lawrence Scientific School is generally referred to by Peirce scholars as 
simply a biographical detail. For example Max Fisch records Peirce’s chemical training as a 
period leading on to his later achievements in logic and science, 
 
Chemistry at that time offered the best entry into experimental science in general, 
and was therefore the best field in which to do one’s postgraduate work, even if 
one intended to move on to other sciences and, by way of the sciences, to the logic 
of science as a whole. (W1:xxi) 
 
I will argue that a different perspective on the role of chemistry for Peirce’s later work 
emerges by examining the nature of the chemistry curriculum at Harvard during Peirce’s 
time. This is not an approach that appears to feature in the literature. To begin with it is 
worth focussing on the innovations led by Peirce’s chemistry tutor, the Erving Professor of 
Chemistry and Minerology, Josiah Parsons Cooke. This will provide the context for Peirce’s 
study of chemistry.  
 
                                                          
1
 Page 6 
2
 Pages 71-73 
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Eisele’s Law, after the scholar Carolyn Eisele, states that ‘Peirce's philosophy and logic can 
be understood only in the context of his mathematics’ (Tursman 1987:68). Tursman is 
referring to Eisele’s Charles Sanders Peirce, The New Elements of Mathematics (in four 
volumes), a work of great scholarship which according to Arthur Burks (1978:913), is the 
result of ‘edit[ing] about 2500 pages of the unpublished manuscripts, encompassing pure 
mathematics, numerous applications, and some rather ingenious textbook materials’. Other 
scholars have agreed with the spirit of Eisele’s Law. For example, Kenneth Ketner 
(1982:329) describes Peirce’s account of diagrammatic thought as, ‘simply… mathematical 
thought [as] the thought that works by diagrams’. Christopher Hookway (2003:2) asks the 
rhetorical question, ‘[w]hy did he [Peirce] take mathematics to be a discipline which needs 
no foundations but can provide foundations for philosophy?’ More recently, Matthew 
Moore (2010:xv) claims that Peirce’s ‘philosophy of mathematics plays a vital role in his 
mature philosophical system’. These scholars privilege mathematics whilst crediting 
chemistry with no part in the development of Peirce’s philosophy. 
 
In Prolegomena to an Apology of Pragmatism (c1906), Peirce describes the process of 
experimenting with diagrams by using a description drawn from chemistry, 
 
One can make exact experiments upon uniform diagrams; and when one does so, 
one must keep a bright lookout for unintended and unexpected changes thereby 
brought about in the relations of different significant parts of the diagram to one 
another. Such operations upon diagrams, whether external or imaginary, take the 
place of the experiments upon real things that one performs in Chemical and 
Physical research. Chemists have, ere now, I need not say, described 
experimentation as the putting of questions to Nature. Just so, experiments upon 
diagrams are questions put to the Nature of the Relations concerned. (CP 4.530, 
c1906) 
 
Whilst not refuting Eisele’s emphasis on mathematics I take Peirce’s experimental chemist 
putting ‘questions to Nature’ as more than a literary device – an analogy – for the logician 
experimenting on diagrams and putting questions ‘to the Nature of the Relations 
concerned’. In this chapter I argue that chemistry was an important material source that 
informed and directed Peirce’s thinking about the epistemic and logical value of diagrams 
and diagrammatic reasoning; that along with mathematics, chemistry contributed 
substantially to his way of thinking diagrammatically and in terms of relations. The 
mathematical and chemical thinking that formed part of Peirce’s study of chemistry at 
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Harvard provided a conceptual basis for his later account of diagrams; an account that has 
so far been neglected in the literature. Before making any direct connection between 
Peirce’s training as a chemist and his later philosophy it is worth first examining the 
chemistry curriculum at Harvard during his time there and the reforms introduced by his 
teacher Josiah Cooke. 
 
1.2 Josiah Cooke: the rejuvenation of the chemistry curriculum at Harvard 
The American chemist Frank Wigglesworth Clarke (1878:190) and a graduate (1867) of the 
Lawrence Scientific School, describes the introduction of science courses into many 
American colleges as being, ‘controlled almost exclusively by men of classical training and 
bias – men wholly outside of scientific life’. Science was studied by rote learning and 
recitation, supplemented by lectures and occasional practical demonstrations where, as 
Clarke (1878:190) describes,  
 
Students come to the professor of chemistry much as they would go to see a 
conjurer; expecting to be stunned, dazzled, and delighted but dreaming of no real 
study except an occasional recitation and the cram for examinations at the end of a 
term. 
 
It is not surprising that, as William Jensen (1988:8) claims, ‘[m]ost 19th-century American 
chemists seeking advanced chemical training during this period went instead to Germany, 
where it has been estimated that roughly 600 received graduate degrees of some sort’. The 
German universities were attractive for reasons, summarised by Edward Beardsley 
(1964:14-15) as being, ‘fashionable… and because German training was an index of culture’. 
Principally, American universities were not research minded and German universities 
‘offered a level of chemical education that no American institution could match’. For, as 
Beardsley (1964:15) continues, study in Germany ‘offered the in-comparable opportunity to 
work under such masters of chemistry as Friedrich Wohler at Göttingen, Heinrich Rose at 
Berlin, August Kekulé at Bonn, Justus von Liebig at Giessen and later Munich, and Robert 
Bunsen at Heidelberg’. The American Chemical Society was founded in 1876 and yet for the 
first thirty years, claims Robert Budd (1985:191),‘six out of ten ACS presidents had been 
trained in German universities, while another three out of ten came to chemistry via 
medical training’. 
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One American chemist who trained in Germany was Ira Remsen3 who, states I Bernard 
Cohen (1959:671), ‘went to Göttingen to work under Fittig and Wöhler, receiving his PhD in 
1870’. Remsen’s original intention was to study with Liebig at Munich but Liebig was 
accepting no additional students at this this time. Returning from Germany to America in 
1872 Remsen was appointed professor of chemistry at Williams College. Once in post 
Remsen discovered that his students had no access to a laboratory. On applying for funds 
to establish a teaching laboratory, Cohen (1959:671) records the college president replying 
‘you will please keep in mind that this is a college and not a technical school. The students 
who come here are not to be trained as chemists or geologists or physicists. They are to be 
taught the great fundamental truths of all sciences. The object aimed at is culture, not 
practical knowledge.’ This attitude by the university authorities underlines a division that 
existed during the first half of the nineteenth century over the relation between theory and 
practice in respect to chemistry teaching; practical chemistry often being dismissed as 
being a craft when set against the more exact sciences of physics and mathematics: the 
higher calling being to ‘teach the great fundamental truths of all sciences…culture not 
practical knowledge’.  
 
This was not an attitude located solely in America. When the German chemist Liebig 
approached the University Senate at Giessen to recognize his institute within the university 
he was, states Holmes (1989:127) ‘voted down on the grounds that the proper role of the 
university was to educate future civil servants, not to train apothecaries, soap makers, 
brewers, and other craftsmen, important though such training might be’. This rejection 
reflects the conflict in German universities at the time, Holmes argues (1989:127), ‘between 
the ideal of a general education to cultivate the mind (Bildung) and the goal of training 
specific skills (Ausbildung). Chemistry, argues Alan Rocke (2003:108), was viewed by the 
university authorities as being ‘too applied, and consisted mostly of compounding of 
pharmaceuticals, boiling of soap, and preparation of heavy chemicals such as potash, soda, 
salt, and mineral acids’. It was, Rocke (2003:108) explains, the aim of Liebig and others to 
overcome this position and who, ‘powerfully influenced by the Romantic and neo-humanist 
movements were at great pains to stress that chemistry was a true Wissenschaft, 
independent but complementary to other sciences such as physics, mathematics and even 
philology and history’. 
 
                                                          
3 In 1876 Remsen was appointed as inaugural professor of chemistry at Johns Hopkins University 
which Rocke (2003:113) states was ‘the first truly successful transplant of German-style graduate 
education to the United States’ 
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The connections between Eben Horsford (Rumford Professor of the Application of Science 
to the Useful Arts), the Lawrence school and the method for training chemists developed by 
Liebig in Giessen are important in understanding Peirce’s own training as a chemist. It is 
worth saying something in brief about Liebig’s pedagogy. Studies by historians of science 
(e.g Holmes 1989; Fruton 1988) have emphasized how at Giessen, Liebig established a 
laboratory where students and assistants worked on projects alongside one another. These 
projects usually stemmed from Liebig’s own interests. For example Holmes (1989:160) 
records how in 1839 Liebig’s research interests turned to the fatty acids deciding that, 
‘there were still some questions worth reexamining’. Fatty acids are organic molecules with 
relative high molecular weights and containing large numbers of carbon and hydrogen 
atoms in addition to smaller numbers of oxygen atoms. On analysis, small differences in 
their percentage composition would give correspondingly large differences in their 
molecular formula. To inquire into this problem Holmes (1869:160) describes how ‘Liebig 
organized for the first time in the winter of 1839/40 the research efforts of a sizable group 
of his students into a coordinated attack on a single large problem, the investigation of the 
fatty acids’. By this time, explains Rocke (2003:101), it was Liebig’s practice to ‘take his most 
experienced Praktikanten and give them research assignments’. In stark contrast to the 
methods of rote learning and recitation Clarke had observed in American colleges, Rocke 
(2003:106) states that Liebig’s method was not a training but an education for ‘[t]hose who 
learned about both empirical phenomena and theory by active learning in the laboratory 
had learned how to think, not simply how to mix drugs. Such chemists would also be far 
better able to apply their learning, by comparison to those who had trained in a craft, 
apprentice-style, merely by rote’. Catherine Jackson (2011:65) captures a sense of Liebig’s 
teaching methods when she states, ‘[s]tudents and assistants worked together in a 
communal laboratory, learning by doing and by watching more experienced chemists 
perform operations in which they were not yet expert’.  
 
It was against this background that the Lawrence Scientific School was founded which, 
Beardsley (1964:2) claims, was one of the colleges which ‘led the way in giving chemistry a 
respected place in American higher education’. In 1843 Benjamin Peirce – Charles’ father 
and Harvard professor of mathematics and astronomy - proposed a radical revision of how 
the sciences were to be taught at Harvard. The plan, explains Mary Ann James (1992:68), 
was that the Rumford Professorship for the Application of Science to the Useful Arts ‘should 
be the focal point at the new school of practical science’. The school was founded in 1847 
and named the Lawrence Scientific School after its benefactor, the local industrialist Abbot 
Lawrence. The new School added an extra dimension to Harvard’s curriculum by providing 
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courses that focussed on both the theory and practice of science. In 1847 Eben Horsford 
was appointed Rumford professor, having previously graduated in civil engineering from 
the Rensselaer Institute at Troy, New York - one of American’s earliest colleges of science 
and civil engineering. After graduating, Horsford studied chemistry at Liebig’s laboratory in 
Giessen for the two years between 1844 and 1846 before returning to America. In an early 
account of the beginnings of laboratory teaching in America, Frank Whitman (1898:203) 
explains that it was Eben Horsford and ‘a favourite pupil of Liebig [who] brought to 
Cambridge the methods and ideas of the Giessen laboratory’ – a point of agreement with 
Rocke (2003:113) who states that, ‘Horsford modelled his institute closely and explicitly on 
Liebig's’. 
 
It was Horsford’s connections with Liebig, whose practical approach was highly regarded in 
America, argues Keith Sheppard (2006:567), which contributed to persuading Abbot 
Lawrence ‘to donate fifty-thousand dollars’ for the school’s foundation – a record amount 
at that time. In addition Horsford was also connected to manufacturing, having patented 
the first formulation for a baking powder based on calcium phosphate – this too would 
have likely impressed Lawrence who was also a manufacturer. In addition Lawrence’s 
experience as a manufacturer had, states Beardsley (1964:7), convinced him that, 
‘bleacheries and print works sorely needed skilled chemists’. It is Sheppard’s (2006:567) 
view that ‘Eben Horsford was most influential in transplanting Liebig’s methodology to the 
United States’ with the new School being ‘modelled along Liebig’s lines’. A point 
corroborated by H Benninga (1990:81) in stating that Horsford organised his chemistry 
department ‘in accordance with the principles he had learned from Liebig’; also by Aaron 
Ihde (1984:270) who described the teaching being ‘patterned on the Giessen model’. The 
historian of science Margaret Rossiter4 captures Horsford’s plan succinctly: to create ‘a 
Giessen on the Charles’ in Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
 
In 1847 Horsford’s first laboratory course in chemistry had a total of twelve students. Nine 
years after his appointment Horsford founded the Rumford Chemical Works (1856) and 
divided his time between his commercial interests and his academic post – a situation likely 
motivated in part by the relatively low level of academics’ salaries.  This had an adverse 
impact on Horsford’s teaching and it is for this reason, argues van Klooster (1949:13), that 
‘the laboratory work in the beginning was meagre’. Eventually a combination of ill health 
and his ever growing commercial interests resulted in Horsford devoting less time to his 
                                                          
4
 cited in Salzman (1986:1649) 
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academic post with student numbers declining as a result; Horsford resigned from Harvard 
in 1863. A second reason for the failure of Horsford’s project, Rocke (2003:113) gives is that 
only half of Lawrence’s donation of $50, 000 went to support Horsford's laboratory; ‘the 
essential difficulty was always lack of sufficient funds…there can be little doubt that the 
endeavour would [otherwise] have succeeded’ (emphasis in the original). 
 
Whilst it was Horsford who brought the Liebig’s laboratory method of teaching to Harvard, I 
will show in the next section that it was Cooke who, motivated by his contact with the 
French chemists Jean Baptiste André Dumas (1800 – 1884) and Henri Victor Regnault (1810 
– 1878), resurrected the laboratory programme after its subsequent decline. The chemist 
and historian Stephen Weininger (2013:97) captures the twin effects of Horsford and Cooke 
on chemistry at Harvard by stating that whilst Horsford was ‘a prominent conduit to the US 
for the Liebig program’ nevertheless Harvard undergraduates ‘had to wait half a decade 
longer before a select few had the opportunity to undertake laboratory work in a cramped 
room without gas and running water under the new Erving Professor, Josiah Parsons Cooke 
Jr.’.  
 
In 1850 Josiah Cooke, having been appointed originally as a tutor in mathematics, was 
appointed Instructor in Chemistry and Mineralogy. In that same year and only two years 
after graduating, Cooke was advanced to the Erving Professor of Chemistry and Mineralogy 
and, argues Sidney Rosen (1982:525), ‘the reason for this promotion was that chemistry 
teaching at Harvard had become virtually non-existent’. The mathematician turned chemist 
Cooke then set about to reawaken an interest in the study of chemistry and the laboratory 
teaching method first developed by Liebig and introduced at Harvard some years earlier by 
Eben Horsford. This was no easy task for as Beardsley states (1964:9) ‘there was no 
laboratory for teacher or pupil, nor did the college own a single piece of chemical 
apparatus’. The year before Cooke’s appointment John Webster, an earlier professor of 
chemistry, was found guilty of the murder of a Boston physician and hanged.  
 
1.3 Josiah Cooke’s laboratory 
Once appointed Erving Professor of Chemistry and Mineralogy, Cooke travelled to Europe in 
search of apparatus for his new department. At the same time he took the opportunity to 
attend lectures in Paris given by the French chemists Dumas and Regnault. So impressed 
was Cooke, states Ralf Hamerla (206:173), that he  ‘befriended and idolized’ the two French 
chemists, realising that ‘the mixture of lecture, demonstration and hands-on experimenting 
so popular in Europe during this period was a component missing from academic 
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instruction in chemistry in the United States’. Writing on Dumas over thirty years after his 
appointment, Cooke recalls attending his lectures in Paris in 1848 and 1851.  In his article 
Cooke (1884:752) recollects ‘that exuberance of fancy’ which ‘made Dumas one of the most 
successful of teachers, and one of the most fascinating of lecturers’. In addition to praising 
Dumas’s lecturing style as a great theatrical performance, Cooke (1884:750) also applauds 
the point that ‘Dumas early recognized the importance of laboratory instruction in 
chemistry, for which there were no facilities at Paris when he first came there, and in 1832 
founded a laboratory for research at his own expense’.  
 
On his return to Harvard, Cooke set about re-establishing a laboratory based method of 
teaching chemistry. As Sheppard (2006:567) explains, Cooke ‘returned to set up a private 
laboratory at Harvard emulating Horsford’s laboratory at the Lawrence Scientific School’ – 
and to rekindle Liebig’s laboratory method of teaching first introduced by Eben Horsford. 
The impact of the French chemists that so influenced Cooke was wide ranging, for example 
Mary-Jo Nye (1993:53) notes that ‘influenced by his experiences in Regnault's Parisian 
laboratory of chemistry, William Thomson (later Lord Kelvin) organized a physical 
laboratory near his lecture room at Glasgow in 1850’. It took a further ten years for a 
second similar laboratory to teach the theory and practice of electricity to be established at 
University College, London. Nevertheless Cooke’s new Boylston Hall laboratory at Harvard, 
record Stephen Contakes and Christopher Kyle (2011:3), ‘enabled Cooke to introduce 
instruction in chemistry by Liebig’s laboratory method in 1858, albeit as an elective course’. 
This elective quickly established its worth whereby, states Hamerla (2006:175), ‘Cooke was 
able to expand his lab to attract the attention of the most gifted students’. Peirce was one 
such ‘gifted student’. In his memoir of Cooke, a former student and later colleague of Cooke 
and America’s first eminent organic chemist Charles Loring Jackson (1902:178) describes his 
teacher’s lack of formal training and how he often referred to himself as a ‘self-taught 
chemist, but ‘the fact that he had taught himself chemistry by his own experiments showed 
him the value of this method for other students’. Nonetheless, records Jackson 
(1902:177/8), with such seemingly limited experience Cooke reformed a situation where 
‘chemical teaching in Harvard College had become extinct and must be re-established’ 
against a situation where ‘the college was wedded to methods of teaching excellent for 
classics and mathematics, but entirely unfit for a subject like chemistry’, and also recalling 
‘the zeal with which he [Cooke] threw himself into these tasks led to substantial results 
much more quickly than could have been expected’. As Liebig had achieved earlier in 
Germany, Cooke in Jackson’s opinion (1902:178) ‘was called upon to take a prominent 
share in the great battle to introduce science into the college course on an equality with the 
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humanities’. It was through the commitment and enthusiasm of scientists such as Horsford 
and Cooke that Liebig’s laboratory methods founded at Giessen in 1826 travelled to 
America. In addition to promoting Liebig’s methods, Cooke – as we shall see - modified the 
chemistry curriculum by adding a greater degree of mathematical rigour. 
 
The Catalogue of the Officers and Students of Harvard University fort the Academic Year 
1861-62 outlines the curriculum for each subject. The entry5 under chemistry states that 
the course of instruction will include ‘recitations in Experimental Chemistry, Qualitative 
Analysis, Chemical Physics, and the Applications of Chemistry to the Arts’. The academic 
lectures available included chemistry, physics, botany and anatomy as well as laboratory 
sessions to do with chemical analysis, manufacturing chemistry, metallurgy and pharmacy. 
Of particular interest are the text books that were used as these give some insight into the 
content of the chemistry curriculum. Students were expected to have ‘an acquaintance 
with Stöckhardt’s Elements of Chemistry (1858) in addition to Cooke’s Chemical Physics 
(1860) and Regnault’s Elements of Chemistry (1853).  
 
In addition to being highly regarded as a chemist, Cooke was also an excellent teacher and 
popular with his students. Jackson, his former student, recalls6, ‘I had had an excellent 
course of lectures on inorganic chemistry from Professor Cooke’. Another of Cooke’s 
students, Francis Storer and a later co-founder of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, described Cooke7 as ‘first and foremost among the great chemical teachers’. 
With similar enthusiasm Sidney Rosen’s (1982:525) profile states that Cooke’s  ‘greatest 
success was as an inspiring teacher of chemistry’ who ‘eschewed technical details and 
talked about the inspiring aims, needs and methods of chemistry’ – and with such an 
approach is not surprising that ‘Cooke literally packed them in the aisles’.  
 
As well as admiring Dumas as a teacher, Cooke also holds his skills as an experimental 
chemist in high regard. Both Dumas and Cooke shared a research interest in establishing 
accurate atomic weights. Whilst a number of other nineteenth century chemists worked in 
this area, it is Cooke’s (1884:752) view that ‘in none of his work did he [Dumas] show 
greater experimental skill…[where Dumas’s]…determination of the atomic weight of oxygen 
by the synthesis of water, and of that of carbon by the synthesis of carbonic dioxide, are 
models of quantitative experimental work’. In 1887 Cooke in association with Theodore W. 
                                                          
5
 Page 75 
6
 Cited in Forbes (1964:98) 
7
 Cited in Contakes and Kyle (2011:4) 
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Richards published a paper titled The Relative Values of the Atomic Weights of Hydrogen 
and Oxygen. America’s first Nobel prize for chemistry (1919) was subsequently awarded to 
Theodore Richards for his work on the accurate determination of atomic weights first 
begun under the direction of Josiah Cooke. 
 
1.4 Josiah Cooke’s reforms to the mathematical demands of chemistry 
Mathematics was Cooke’s first degree. He graduated from Harvard in 1848 and 
subsequently was appointed as a tutor in mathematics. One of Cooke’s reforms to the 
chemistry curriculum was to introduce a greater degree of mathematical rigour. This is of 
relevance to this project for it coincides well with the mathematical mind-set scholars often 
attribute to Peirce. Later in his life Peirce was to write ‘[m]y special business is to bring 
mathematical exactitude, I mean modern mathematical exactitude into philosophy, and to 
apply the ideas of mathematics in philosophy’ (NEM:x c1894). By increasing the 
mathematical content of chemistry Cooke was perhaps acting on the rhetoric of the time 
that such a move would establish chemistry more on an equal footing with physics. There is 
also a second reason: Cooke believed mathematics to be an essential tool to logical 
thought. In a tribute to Cooke, the American agricultural chemist and his former student 
Francis Storer (1894:528) wrote, ‘it was by his mathematical studies more particularly that 
Cooke acquired that habit of thinking clearly and reasoning closely which distinguished him 
through life’. In his book The Credentials of Science: the Warrant of Faith, Cooke (1888:94) 
explains that, for the application of the deductive method in science, ‘mathematics is the 
most important tool’.  
 
But for Cooke (1888:101) mathematics was important to the study of science not only as a 
mechanism for deductive reasoning but also for the reason that ‘mathematics is the science 
of quantitative relations wholly independent of their material expression’. As I will show 
later on, this is remarkably similar to Peirce’s treatment of mathematical equations as 
‘icons’. The nineteenth century saw the rise of physical chemistry with mathematics being 
central to its study and understanding. Later in the same volume, when dealing with the 
solubility in water of a wide range of compounds at varying temperatures – a problem in 
physical chemistry – Cooke (1888:192) comments that the processes occurring ‘cannot be 
understood without some understanding of mathematics’. Such an approach is likely to 
have appealed to Peirce’s mathematical inclinations. It is worth therefore exploring how 
Cooke approached the role of mathematics to the laboratory method of chemistry 
teaching, inspired by the French chemists Regnault and Dumas who were introducing 
Liebig’s pedagogical methods in France. 
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As we will see Cooke went on to bring a degree of mathematical rigour to the study of 
chemistry – to present chemistry as an exact as well as a descriptive study. The impact this 
had on chemistry can be followed by looking at the text books Cooke chose and also 
authored for his courses. Shortly after his appointment as tutor in mathematics and 
chemistry in 1850 Cooke sought and gained Harvard’s governing council’s (the Corporation) 
permission to introduce Julius Stockhardt’s text Principles of Chemistry. Why Cooke thought 
such high-level permission was needed is not clear, but Charles Eliot (1894:532), President 
of Harvard during this time, recalls ‘I know of no other instance within the last fifty years in 
which the President and Fellows have passed a vote concerning the adoption of a text-
book’. Perhaps Cooke anticipated the changes he was about to make, with less emphasis on 
rote learning and a greater focus on mathematical rigour and problem solving through 
laboratory based investigations, might be unpopular with some of his students. His 
‘permission’ was perhaps a form of insurance against the possibility of later complaints by 
students unhappy with this increase in mathematical rigour and difficulty. Even twenty-five 
years after his first intake of students, Cooke (1875:528) comments that ‘mathematical 
studies are peculiarly well adapted to train the logical faculties’. Nonetheless because of 
the widespread practice of rote learning found in many American schools Cooke (1875:530) 
follows up with the observation that students arriving on his course ‘will solve an involved 
equation of algebra readily enough so long as they can do it by turning their mental crank, 
when they will break down on the simplest practical problem of arithmetic which requires 
of them only thought enough to decide whether they shall multiply or divide’. The changes 
Cooke had made were in part an attempt to compensate for this perceived weakness in the 
school system. 
 
America was not as far advanced in physical chemistry compared to some other parts of 
Europe. In his essay ‘Between Physics and Chemistry: Helmholtz’s Route to a Theory of 
Chemical Thermodynamics’, Helge Kragh (1993:426) argues that Hermann von Helmholtz’s 
work ‘exerted a considerable influence on French and German chemists, it does not appear 
to have had a similar impact on British or American Chemistry’. During the early 1880s 
Helmholtz had developed a mathematical theory of thermodynamics for chemical 
processes. Other European chemists such as Svante Arrhenius, Jacobus van’t Hoff, Friedrich 
Ostwald and Walther Nernst were also contributors to what was becoming a powerful 
research programme in physical chemistry. The growing branch of physical chemistry 
demanded a sophisticated understanding of mathematics. Why were American chemists 
seemingly reluctant to engage with physical chemistry? During the nineteenth century 
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European chemists and other physical scientists received a greater education in higher 
mathematics than was the case in America. The American historian of science John Servos 
(1990:179) argues that whereas European students of the physical sciences ‘typically 
received a mathematical preparation at early stages in their careers that was both intensive 
and extensive’ in America ‘secondary schools, colleges, and even graduate programmes in 
physics gave mathematics short shrift’. In her comparison of nineteenth century physics 
teaching in German and American universities Kathryn Olesko (1988:111) states that 
where, ‘German physics students might be expected to work out elliptical integrals and 
transcendental equations’, American students in general ‘did not go beyond elementary 
differential and integral calculus, and most often they deployed simple algebraic 
calculations’.  
 
One of the reasons for this lack of mathematical training, argues Servos (1990:180), lies in 
the Protestant values of nineteenth century America which, ‘encourages scientists to 
dedicate themselves to laboratory work’ believing that there was something ‘sinful’ in 
deploying ‘mathematical cunning to determine how nature worked’. However, as Servos 
(1986:612) explains in an earlier paper, during the nineteenth century America specialised 
in ‘typically field or laboratory sciences, heavily dependent on observational or 
experimental evidence and techniques’; American scientists were in general 
experimentalists not theoreticians. The reason for this, argues Servos (1986:614-5), is not 
simply because American scientists ‘exulted in collecting facts and feared demon 
mathematics, an idol that could pervert an unprejudiced understanding of nature’, but also 
a result of ‘the quality of mathematical training given [to] American scientists’ at the time. 
German and French secondary education provided a far superior training in mathematics 
than American high schools. Of greater significance Servos (1986:616) argues were the 
changes occurring in American colleges and universities where ‘with the expansion of the 
curriculum and the growth of elective studies after the Civil War, mathematics was the 
subject that suffered the greatest losses, save perhaps Greek’. At Yale for example 
mathematics suffered at the expense of creating more time for the laboratory sciences. I 
would argue that Cooke sought to build in his students a great level of skill and confidence 
in mathematics so they were better able to manage the quantitative aspects of chemistry, 
something he aimed to redress through his text books. As a mathematician this was 
something Cooke was well placed to do. 
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1.5 Josiah Cooke’s text books 
1.5.1 Chemical Problems and Reactions to Accompany Stöckhardt’s Elements of 
Chemistry (1857) 
The first text book Cooke published was in 1857 and titled Chemical Problems and 
Reactions to Accompany Stöckhardt’s Elements of Chemistry. This was a companion to 
Stöckhardt’s own text which Cooke had sought Harvard’s permission to introduce. Before 
looking to see how Cooke’s text contributed to the mathematisation of chemistry, it is first 
worth considering the original by the German chemist Julius Stöckhardt. The introduction 
to the 1852 edition of Stöckhardt’s Principles of Chemistry states that the work was 
recommended for translation by Harvard’s Eben Horsford. The translation was, states Max 
Fisch, carried out by Charles’s uncle Charles Henry Peirce and his aunt, Charlotte, ‘whose 
German was excellent’ and who did most of the translating’ (W1:xviii). In his introduction to 
Stöckhardt (1852:x), Horsford explains that the book is aimed to offer a laboratory based 
practical course where ‘the apparatus necessary for many of the most instructive and 
interesting chemical experiments would cost but a few dimes, and as many dollars would 
furnish the requisites for all, or nearly all, the most important experiments…’. The purpose 
of Cooke’s text as an accompaniment to Stöckhardt’s original text can be illustrated by 
comparing the two pages below. The format of Cooke’s book mirrors Stöckhardt’s by 
setting problems to accompany the practical exercises – note that both entries refer to 
experiment 159. 
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Figure 1: Preparation of nitric acid 
Source: Stöckhardt’s (1852) Principles of 
Chemistry, page 152 
Figure 2: Calculating the yield of nitric acid 
from the reaction between potash nitre and 
sulphuric acid 
Source: from Cooke’s (1857) Chemical 
Problems and Reactions to Accompany 
Stöckhardt’s Elements[Principles] of 
Chemistry, page 63 
 
Here Stöckhardt describes an experiment to produce nitric acid whilst Cooke sets his 
students a number of quantitative problems based on this practical situation – for example 
to determine the mass of nitric acid that can be made from a known mass of potash nitre 
(sodium nitrate) and sulphuric acid. Notice too in passing that Cooke represents chemical 
change as an equation with an ‘equals’ sign (=) separating the reactants from the products. 
The introduction of arrows to show the direction of change was not made until 1884 by the 
Dutch chemist Jacobus van’t Hoff in his book on chemical equlibrium Étude de Dynamique 
Chemique  (Studies in Chemical Dynamics) where double reversed arrows where used to 
indicate reversible reactions and the dynamic nature of chemical equilibrium. 
 
The content of Cooke’s Chemical Problems included what today would be described as 
stoichiometric calculations as well as problems using the gas laws, solubilities, specific 
gravities and converting quantities from one system of units to another. The mathematical 
demand is limited to an understanding of the four rules of arithmetic and an appreciation 
of proportionality. Whilst Stöckhardt’s text was a course of practical chemistry, Charles 
Jackson (1894:5126) recalls Cooke’s view was that ‘it did this at the sacrifice of all that is 
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distinctive and peculiarly valuable in the study of an experimental science’ - a laboratory 
based problem solving approach involving quantitative methods. By establishing his 
laboratory method Cooke also emphasised a number of skills essential to experimental 
chemistry. These included the need for accurate working when making and recording 
observations, the ability to process numerical data and to draw deductions from 
experimental results. In this way Cooke led his students to appreciate that chemistry was 
both a descriptive and quantitative science. In the opinion of a former president of the 
Kansas Academy of Science, F P Dains (1911:30), Cooke’s Chemical Problems was ‘the first 
book of the kind with which I am acquainted, and it shows his desire to promote the rigid 
accuracy which forms the basis of any adequate science teaching’. In more recent times 
William Jensen (2011:14), in a survey of physical chemistry texts books before the German 
chemist Friedrich Ostwald (1853–1932),finds that although there were several German text 
books in physical chemistry published in the 1820s, Cooke’s Chemical Problems was ‘the 
first specialized English-language book to deal specifically with the subject of chemical 
calculations’. In Cooke’s opinion the lack of quantitative work in Stöckhardt’s original text 
made it ‘insufficiently developed for the purposes of college teaching’8.   
 
1.5.2 Elements of Chemical Physics (1860) 
Some three years later in 1860 Cooke published his second book, Elements of Chemical 
Physics, believing that his students should have a good grounding in physics and its 
quantitative methods. Early in chapter one Cooke (1860:5) distinguishes the study of 
chemistry as ‘the study of chemical change’ from physics which ‘deals with physical 
properties and the physical changes of matter’. There are only three occasions when Cooke 
uses the term ‘chemical change’. Firstly when describing the process of adhesion, secondly 
in an account of dissolving, and thirdly in an explanation of melting which Cooke (1860:47) 
describes as the process where solids can ‘bear the change of temperature without 
undergoing chemical change’. For notwithstanding Cooke’s choice of title this is primarily a 
physics text covering such topics as dynamics, crystallography and heat. There are 
numerous references to Regnault, whose interests as a professor of both chemistry and 
physics coincided with a number of the topics dealt with by Cooke’s book. In his tribute to 
Cooke, Charles Jackson (1902:515) states, ‘Regnault especially inspired him [Cooke] with 
the warmest affection, as is pleasantly shown by the enthusiastic reverence with which he 
is invariably mentioned in his book on Chemical Physics’. The relative lack of sophisticated 
mathematics in this text is frankly acknowledged by Cooke (1860:iii), who states that ‘only 
                                                          
8 Cited in Jensen (2003:1248) 
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an elementary knowledge of mathematics’ is required in order to complete the exercises. 
On several occasions, for example when dealing with centre of gravity, Cooke (1860:61) 
indicates that a detailed treatment is not possible, ‘since these methods depend on the 
principles of higher mathematics’. Whilst Cooke has increased the mathematical demand 
on his students the methods required were relatively straightforward.  
 
The impact of this new quantitative and problem solving approach is recalled by Jackson 
(1902:518), and one of Cooke’s students as follows: ‘neither of these books was popular 
with the students…as they obliged their readers to think, and there is no occupation more 
distasteful to the undergraduate’. Nonetheless Jackson (1902:518) acknowledges the 
educational value of Cooke’s two books described here and his desire to develop the 
mathematical competence, accuracy and problem solving ability of his students,  
 
I can well remember the utter despair which settled upon me when I attacked my 
first problem in the Chemical Physics. I had never been called upon to think 
unassisted before, and at first I doubted the possibility of the process. But in this 
very demand on the thinking powers of the student lay the chief usefulness of 
these books, and their educational value on this account can hardly be 
overestimated. Nor would the fact that this work was distasteful have troubled him 
much, as he often expressed his disapprobation of the sugar-coating now so 
generally considered essential on educational pills. 
 
Accepting Jackson’s recollection, the success of Cooke’s texts lay in presenting chemistry as 
an experimental inquiry and not as a sequence of facts and ‘recipes’ of methods, the ability 
of a chemist to problem solve and to process numerical data being treated as essential to 
their experimental practice. 
 
What was the impact of Cooke in his attempt to introduce a greater degree of 
mathematical formalism to the teaching of chemistry? A reviewer9 for the American Journal 
of Science (1869:435) of Cooke’s third text book First Principles of Chemical Philosophy 
(1868), judges the text to be an ‘important manual of instruction’ by Cooke to whom ‘more 
than to any American, is due the credit of having made chemistry an exact discipline in our 
colleges’. But to what extent was Cooke’s project an attempt to introducing a degree of 
mathematical formalism to chemistry? As we have seen earlier, Cooke himself regards the 
                                                          
9
 Also cited in Jensen(2011:17) 
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mathematics that his approach demands as relatively straightforward and points his 
readers to ‘higher mathematics’ for a more sophisticated treatment of chemical physics. I 
would argue that Cooke was preparing his students so that they would have the necessary 
mathematical skills and confidence to operate and to problem solve within the quantitative 
branches of chemistry. The American historian Servos (1990:179) regards Cooke’s Chemical 
Physics as ‘being a quantitative physics, but not a mathematical physics’. It is quantitative in 
that Cooke expects his readers to process problems requiring relatively unsophisticated 
arithmetical methods but not mathematical in the absence of more exacting and 
sophisticated mathematical techniques. For example, Cooke in his treatment of an 
oscillating pendulum makes no mention of simple harmonic motion which would lead on to 
an analysis involving calculus and differential equations – one of the higher mathematical 
techniques Cooke points towards but leaves out. Overall and in terms of Cooke’s practice as 
a chemist, I would argue that he was using mathematics in a non-reductive sense. 
 
1.6 Josiah Cooke’s treatment of relations 
In common with other nineteenth century chemists Cooke framed aspects of his approach 
in terms of the nature of the relations operating between concepts, quantities and entities. 
This section examines Cooke’s approach to relations, one that his student Charles Peirce 
would have been exposed to. This is of relevance as the nature of relations was to figure 
prominently in Peirce’s later scientific and philosophical writings.  
 
The term relation was frequently used by nineteenth century chemists when discussing the 
degree of correspondence between two or more chemical objects. For example John 
Dalton (1808:339) in his New System of Chemical Philosophy, in observing that 100 volumes 
of what he describes as nitrous gas will form 48.5 volumes of nitrous oxide and 28.3 
volumes of oxygen, comments that ‘it is very remarkable that these relations should have 
so long escaped observation’ (emphasis added). Here Dalton is discussing the 
correspondence between numerical quantities but he also deploys the term relations when 
describing how substances react. For example, when discussing the reactions of silex (a 
form of silica found in flint) Dalton (1808:539) reports that he has ‘succeeded pretty well by 
investigating its [silex] relations with potash, lime and barytes’ (emphasis added).  
 
The use of the term relations occurs many times in Humphry Davy’s Elements of Chemical 
Philosophy (1812). In common with Dalton, Davy too uses the concept of relations when 
dealing with numerical quantities. For example, in a section dealing with what today we 
would describe as empirical formulae – the simple whole number ratio in which elements 
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combine to form compounds – Davy (1812:62) writes, ‘the element which unites in the 
smallest quantity being expressed as unity, all the other elements may be represented by 
the relations of their quantities to unity’ (emphasis added). So for example in more modern 
terminology, the formula of sodium oxide is Na2O, with the quantity of sodium being 
represented by its relations to oxygen being set as unity or with the value one.  
 
In February 1863 Chemical News carried a paper by the English chemist John Newlands 
(1837-1898) titled On Relations among the Equivalents which Eric Scerri (2007:xix) 
describes as one of the ‘early periodic systems’. In introducing his proposed scheme of 
correlations between equivalent weights10 and the physiochemical properties of the 
chemical elements Newlands (1863:70) states that what follows ‘are among the most 
striking relations observed on comparing the equivalents of analogous elements’ (emphasis 
added). In this version of his arrangement, Newlands produces a scheme of eleven groups 
of elements setting out the numerical correlation between each element’s equivalent 
weight. An example of Newland’s (1863:71) approach can be seen from this extract, 
 
Group XI.-- Mercury, 100; lead, 103.7; silver, 108. 
Lead is here the mean of the other two  
 
Having demonstrated many such correlations for each of his eleven groups Newlands 
(1863:72) offers this final caveat as a closing sentence: ‘I also freely admit that some of the 
relations above pointed out are more apparent than real; others, I trust, will prove of a 
more durable and satisfactory description’ (emphasis added). It is not perhaps surprising 
that when Cooke proposed his own scheme this too was framed in terms of the numerical 
relations between the atomic weights of the elements. 
 
In 1896 Francis Preston Venable (1856 – 1934), an American research chemist, university 
teacher and president of the University of North Carolina and the American Chemical 
Society, published The Development of the Periodic Law. This work covers in detail the 
development of the periodic law from 1817, when the German chemist Johann Döbereiner 
(1780 – 1849) put forward his law of triads, through the numerous developments of the 
nineteenth century and including the contributions of Cooke, Peirce and Mendeleev. The 
                                                          
10
 Scerri (2007:19) states: ‘The equivalent weight of any particular metal, for example, was originally 
obtained from the amount of metal that reacts with a certain amount of a chosen standard acid. The 
term “equivalent weight” was subsequently generalized to denote the amount of an element that 
reacts with a standard amount of oxygen’. 
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term relation occurs many times over to describe patterns existing between the properties 
of the chemical elements and their atomic weights. In the opening sentence, where he 
introduces the scope of the book, Venable (1896:1) writes, ‘this work is intended as a study 
of the development of the natural law underlying the relations of the elements and their 
properties to one another’ (emphasis added). The book was very well reviewed in the 
American Journal of Science (1897:280) with the reviewer (W.A.N.) capturing the ubiquitous 
term relations in this context in stating,  
 
The scope of the book includes an account of the numerous attempts which have  
been made to discover numerical and other relations between the atomic weights 
and also an account of speculations as to the origin of the elements and their 
relation to some fundamental form of matter. (emphasis added) 
 
The reviewing author deploys the term relation to connect a correspondence between the 
atomic weights of the elements. Also mentioned is the relation between individual 
elements and some primary form of matter as suggested by the English chemist William 
Prout (1758 – 1850). The term relation was commonplace in the literature of nineteenth 
century chemistry - a term that Peirce would have understood clearly in its application. 
 
1.6.1 Josiah Cooke – ‘The Numerical Relation between the Atomic Weights, with Some 
Thoughts on the Classification of the Chemical Elements’ (1854) 
This paper was published seven years before Peirce joined the Lawrence Scientific School in 
1861 and is relevant to this chapter as it shows Cooke writing in terms of the relations 
between the atomic weights of the chemical elements.  Thus Peirce experienced at first 
hand his tutor Cooke’s research interest in systemising the chemical elements based on an 
approach that emphasised relations. As we shall see later, Peirce also published an 
arrangement of the chemical elements in terms of their atomic weights11.  
 
In 1854, and whilst striving to establish the status of chemistry as an academic subject 
within Harvard’s curriculum, Cooke published, ‘The Numerical Relation between the Atomic 
Weights, with Some Thoughts on the Classification of the Chemical Elements’. In the very 
first sentence Cooke (1854:33) states the focus of his paper to be, the ‘numerical relations 
between the atomic weights of the chemical elements’ (emphasis added). Whilst noting 
that a number of elements can be grouped into triads, where the atomic weight of the 
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 Peirce’s own scheme was published in 1869 and will be considered in chapter two. 
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middle element is the approximate arithmetical mean of the other two – such as lithium 
(6.5), sodium (23.0) and potassium (39.212) – Cooke (1854:33) further claimed that such 
triads ‘are only parts of series similar in all respects to the series of homologues of Organic 
Chemistry, in which the differences between the atomic weights of the members is a 
multiple of some whole number’. Taking his lead from organic chemistry Cooke (1854:33) 
placed chemical elements with similar properties into one of the ‘six series’ each with a 
general formula,  
 
 Series 9 Series 8 Series 6 Series 5 Series 4 Series 3 
General 
Formula 
8 + n9 8 + n8 or 
4 +  n8 
8 + n6 6 + n5 4 + n4 or 
2 + n4 
1 + n3 
 
Each series is characterised by a general formula which is related to the atomic weight of 
each element within the series. For example for Series 9 with the general formula 8 + n9, 
the differences in atomic weights between each element in the series are always a multiple 
of nine. The elements of each series had similar chemical properties and were often 
isomorphous13. In devising his scheme Cooke emphasised the resemblance of his system 
with the various homologous series to be found in organic chemistry. There were some 
problems with this arrangement which Cooke fully acknowledged – for example oxygen 
appeared in three of the six series – series 6, 8 and 9. Notwithstanding such anomalies, 
Cooke (1854:239) saw his major achievement was in ‘the discovery of the numerical 
relation between the atomic weights’ of the chemical elements (emphasis added). 
 
When describing his system, Cooke (1854:236) explains it as ‘bringing together such 
elements as were allied in their chemical relations considered collectively’ (emphasis 
added). The initial motive behind both Cooke’s attempt to systemise the elements was 
pedagogic – to rationalise the chemical elements for easier comprehension and assimilation 
by his students. For, as Cooke (1854:238) explains, although his system may be found to 
have ‘defects’, it was devised as a teaching aide. This is consistent with Cooke’s project 
which was to establish a laboratory based and problem solving approach to learning with 
less reliance on rote and recitation.  
 
By attempting to systemise the chemical elements, Cooke was seeking a way of presenting 
their chemical properties as a table of chemical relations, making their connections less a 
                                                          
12
 Atomic weight values as in Cooke (1854:269) 
13
 identical crystalline forms 
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subject of memory and more one of logical reasoning. As we will see in chapter three this 
was an aim shared also by Mendeleev in his systemisation of the chemical elements. In his 
paper Cooke laments the lack of classification schemes in chemistry such as exist in natural 
history. In many chemistry texts elements of similar properties are scattered throughout 
the body of the work. Even where the system metal and metalloid (non-metals) is used, 
great anomalies arise: for example selenium with a shiny metallic like surface is classified as 
a metal, where sulphur is grouped with the metalloids, even though they share a number of 
similar chemical properties. As Cooke comments (1854:237), ‘for a zoologist to separate the 
ostrich from the class of birds because it cannot fly, would not be more absurd, than it is for 
a chemist to separate two essentially allied elements, because one has a metallic lustre and 
the other has not’. The original purpose of Cooke’s (1854:388) classification was to avoid 
such unhelpful groupings and to bring together elements of similar physiochemical 
properties, ‘to facilitate the acquisition of chemistry [by his students]’. Nonetheless as 
Cooke (1854:239) explains, he would not have sought publication of his scheme, ‘had it not 
led to the discovery of the numerical relation between the atomic weights’ (emphasis 
added).  
 
In his essay ‘American Forerunners of the Periodic Law’, George Kauffman (1969:129) 
describes how Cooke’s paper was hailed as ‘the most complete classification depending 
upon the atomic weights of the elements, which had up to that time appeared’. Although it 
was widely praised, Kauffman (1969:129) still considers Cooke’s contribution to the 
periodic law to be an ‘unjustly neglected contribution’. Nevertheless the influence of 
Cooke’s paper reached beyond America. For example, Kaufmann (1969:129) mentions the 
Dutch chemist Guillaume Elsen’s view that ‘Cooke's table shows a strong similarity to that 
of Mendeleev, so that we can state that in 1854 the first foundations of the periodic system 
were nearly laid’. In his memorial to Cooke, Charles Jackson (1894:517) recalls that 
‘Benjamin Peirce in particular hailed it [Cooke’s paper] as a wonderful discovery’. It is not 
perhaps too great a speculation to suggest that Charles Peirce’s father Benjamin carried this 
view home, given his teenage son’s known interest in chemistry.  
 
1.7 Charles Peirce – relations between the chemical elements and their atomic weights 
Peirce’s first degree studies at Harvard had not culminated in great success where he was a 
‘poor student, typically in the bottom third of his class’14. It is perhaps easy to appreciate 
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 Cited in Burch, Robert, "Charles Sanders Peirce", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 
2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/peirce/>.last visited 23/09/2016 
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how he flourished at the Lawrence Scientific School under the inspirational teaching of 
Josiah Cooke who placed such a high value on mathematical reasoning. I believe it was this 
exposure to Cooke’s teaching and to his thinking on the numerical relations between the 
atomic weights that first sparked Peirce’s own interests in this area – one founded on 
relations – a concept that later underpinned so much of his own work. As will be described 
in chapter two, Peirce’s paper ‘The Pairing of the Elements’ published in an 1869 edition of 
Chemical News, followed the interests of his tutor Cooke by outlining an arrangement of 
the chemical elements based on their atomic weights. This indicates Peirce’s interest as a 
chemist in this prominent nineteenth century research programme.  
 
As part of his introduction to the history of the periodic table Scerri (2006:xix) suggests  
William Prout, Johann Döbereiner and Leopold Gmelin as three historical actors ‘who began 
to explore numerical relationships among the elements’, with ‘early periodic systems’ being 
developed by William Odling, Julius Lothar Meyer and others, ‘culminating with 
Mendeleev’s tables’. Once Mendeleev published his periodic system in 1869, Scerri 
(2006:80) records that the English chemist ‘[John] Newlands began to publish a series of 
letters setting out his priority in arriving at the first successful periodic system’. There were 
a number of other priority counterclaims, for example the German chemist Lothar Meyer 
became engaged with Mendeleev in what Scerri (2008:93) describes as, ‘a rather bitter 
priority dispute’. In America during March 1892, the debate to which Scerri refers was 
played out in The Nation to which Peirce also contributed. In an article titled The Periodic 
Law (1892) we see Peirce commenting on a research programme that he too shared an 
interest in as a young graduate chemist with his tutor Josiah Cooke. At the start of his 
article Peirce makes the following powerful claim for his old tutor as the foremost herald of 
Mendeleev in stating, 
 
The principal precursor of Mendeléef was, as it seems to us, that penetrating 
intellect, Josiah P. Cooke, who first proved that all the elements were arranged in 
natural series. (W8:284, 1892) 
 
In his inquiry into American precursors of the periodic law, Carl A Zapfee (1969) identifies 
the Harvard chemist Oliver Wolcott Gibbs (1822 – 1908) and Josiah Cooke. It was Cooke, 
claims Zapfee (1969:468) who, ‘developed a remarkable classification based upon simple 
arithmetical formulae for six different "series”’ which ‘not only represented one of the first 
clear breaks from the concept of triads, which had largely held since the time of 
Döbereiner, but it anticipated Newlands' "octaves" in that several of Cooke's series were 
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based upon the number eight’. Here Zapfee identifies Newlands’s law of octaves published 
in 1865 where, with some adjustments, ordering by atomic weight gave a system where 
elements of similar chemical properties occurred with every eighth element – hence law of 
octaves. The result was a series of vertical columns of elements with similar properties. 
Newland’s arrangement, which received wider coverage than Cooke’s earlier attempt, is 
somewhat dismissed by Peirce,  
 
No doubt, many a chemist in those days drew up a table more or less like this, but 
refrained from publishing it, feeling that a great discovery was imminent. An 
obscure American chemist actually assigned this as a reason for not attaching his 
name to such a table. Yet this was all, if not more than all, that Newlands did; and 
his papers, in a very widely circulated journal, made no sensation. (W8:285 1892) 
 
The ‘obscure American chemist’ mentioned here is Peirce himself, referring to his paper 
‘The Pairing of the Elements’15 published in the June 1869 issue of the American edition of 
Chemical News. By the time Newlands was publishing there was a greater agreement on 
atomic weight values, a result in part due to the first international conference of chemists 
held in 1860 at Karlsruhe in Germany, and the work of Italian chemist Stanislao Cannizzaro 
(1826–1910) amongst others. It was Peirce’s view that once there was general agreement 
on atomic weights following the 1860 Karlsruhe congress, chemists would then speculate 
on the possible relations between chemical behaviour and atomic weight. Writing in this 
way Peirce proposes the ‘penetrating intellect’ of Josiah Cooke as the ‘principal precursor’ 
of Mendeleev, having arrived at his scheme before atomic weight values became more 
settled. In ending his article Peirce makes the point that it was Mendeleev who ‘alone had 
the sagacity to discern the true scheme of relationship’ (W8:285). In terms of the 
contemporary debate around the acceptance of the periodic scheme with reference to its 
ability to accommodate existing data or in making successful predictions, writing some 
twenty three years after Mendeleev’s first publication Peirce shows no preference in 
praising,  
 
His [Mendeleev’s] wonderfully vivid conception of the scheme, as well as his clear 
perception of its evidence, [which] is shown by the formal and audacious 
descriptions he gave of the properties of several elements then undiscovered, but 
required to fill blank spaces, and by the subsequent triumphant verification of his 
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 This paper will be considered in chapter two 
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predictions, especially of what seemed the most wild and improbable of all—that 
relating to gallium. (W8:285, 1892) 
 
The accommodating aspects of Mendeleev’s ‘wonderfully vivid conception’ are not ranked 
against the predictive and ‘subsequently triumphant verification of his predictions’16. 
Nonetheless Peirce is clear that taken in total, ‘very few inductions in the whole history of 
science are worthy of being compared with this as efforts of reason’ (W8:285, 1892). To 
paraphrase Peirce’s view, if Dmitri Mendeleev was ‘alone’ the true sage of the periodic 
scheme then Josiah Cooke was his prophet.  
 
1.8 Cooke’s treatment of crystallography – a case of diagrammatic reasoning 
At this point it is worth investigating the resonance between Peirce’s formulation of 
diagrammatic reasoning and his experience of studying chemistry with Cooke – something 
that has been largely ignored by Peirce scholars. Whilst the theory of iconicity is prominent 
in much Peirce scholarship, Stjernfelt (2007:89)  argues that ‘Peirce’s general notion of 
diagram has passed much more unnoticed’ even though ‘the diagram concept plays a 
central, not to say the central, role in the mature Peirce’s semiotics’ (emphasis in the 
original). The concept of a diagram occurs in many of Peirce’s writings but it is to his essay 
‘Prolegomena to an Apology of Pragmatism’ (c1906), we encountered earlier on, that I shall 
refer here. It is this paper, Stjernfelt (2007:89) argues that ‘makes clear the crucial part 
played by the diagram and diagrammatic reasoning in Peirce’. It is here that Peirce 
describes the process of experimenting with diagrams by using a description drawn from 
chemistry. It is also recalling the often quoted Eisele’s Law: ‘Peirce's philosophy and logic 
can be understood only in the context of his mathematics’ (Tursman 1987). Again Peirce 
picks up on a chemical analogy – a chemist inquiring into the nature of a compounds 
molecular structure, 
 
But the object of the chemist's research, that upon which he experiments, and 
to which the question he puts to Nature relates, is the Molecular Structure, which 
in all his samples has as complete an identity as it is in the nature of Molecular 
Structure ever to possess. Accordingly, he does, as you say, experiment upon the 
Very Object under investigation. (CP 4.530) 
 
                                                          
16
 I will return to what has become known as the accommodation/prediction debate (Brush 1996, 
Scerri and Worrall 2001) around the periodic table in chapter six. 
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Next Peirce tackles the objection that there might be a difference between a laboratory 
experiment, where the chemist is in direct contact with the ‘very object under 
investigation’, and an experiment on a diagram where there is no direct physical 
connection with the thing it represents. What links the two - experimenting on a chemical 
compound and experimenting on a diagram – is that in each case the object of investigation 
‘is [in] the form of a relation’ (CP 4.530) (emphasis in the original). Next and seemingly in 
accord with Eisele’s Law, Peirce turns to mathematics to demonstrate that the Object of 
Investigation ‘is the form of a relation’ and that ‘this Form of Relation is the very form of 
the relation between the two corresponding parts of the diagram’ (CP 4.530).  
 
For example, let f[1] and f[2] be the two distances of the two foci of a lens from the 
lens. Then,  
 
1/f[1] + 1/f[2] = 1/f[o] 
 
This equation is a diagram of the form of the relation between the two focal 
distances and the principal focal distance; and the conventions of algebra (and all 
diagrams, nay all pictures, depend upon conventions) in conjunction with the 
writing of the equation, establish a relation between the very letters f[1], f[2], f[o] 
regardless of their significance, the form of which relation is the Very Same as the 
form of the relation between the three focal distances that these letters denote.  
(CP 4.530) (emphasis in the original) 
 
Taking here from Peirce - molecular structure is the ‘very object’ of the chemist’s 
investigation; for the mathematician the ‘algebraic Diagram presents to our observation the 
very, identical object of mathematical research’. (CP 4.530). By performing operations on a 
diagrams – whether molecular formulae or mathematical equations - we are in effect 
performing experiments on the on the very objects they represent. Notice also a 
connection here between Cooke and Peirce. Earlier we saw Cooke (1888:101) state that, 
‘mathematics is the science of quantitative relations wholly independent of their material 
expression’. This resonates with Peirce, when he describes an equation (here to do with 
focal lengths) as establishing a relation irrespective of the letters used in its material 
notation. That said, I am not claiming a direct connection between Peirce’s approaches to 
mathematics and to Cooke, his chemistry tutor. What I do claim is that Peirce’s treatment 
of relations owes something to his training as a chemist and is not located wholly within the 
context of mathematics. Peirce’s chemical training – directed by Cooke (in turn inspired by 
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Liebig through Dumas and Regnault) – brought together the ‘form’ of relations with the 
practice of chemistry. From a slightly different perspective, chemistry contributed to 
Peirce’s mind-set when dealing with the nature of relations.  
 
1.9 Chemistry, diagrams and logical relations 
We will see here how Josiah Cooke encouraged his students not to see chemistry as a study 
of essences but as an inquiry into the relations between its objects. At the very start of his 
book Chemical Physics (1860), Cooke identifies chemistry as an empirical study of the 
relations between substances and the laws that capture these associations. It is Cooke’s 
(1860:3) view that we can have no knowledge of a substance’s essential nature, 
 
In regard to the essential nature of matter, or of the elements of which it consists, 
we have no knowledge, but we have observed the properties of almost all known 
substances, as well elements as compounds, have studied their mutual relations 
and their action on each other, and have discovered many of the laws which they 
obey. 
 
For, as Cooke affirms, chemistry has no access to the essences of substances – to things in 
themselves – it is only possible to come to know the objects it studies by observing their 
relations as they act on one another. Notwithstanding the Kantian overtones here Cooke 
makes no reference to this in his text. A study of properties through ‘their mutual relations’ 
characterises the way Cooke attempts to engage his students with the practice of 
crystallography. The crystalline form was not treated as a thing in itself but as a set of 
triadic relations: the crystalline form under investigation, its diagrammatic representation 
and the thoughts in the minds of his students. 
 
Harvard’s catalogue for 1861-62 includes17 Cooke’s Chemical Physics as one of the texts  
Peirce would have used. It was as previously described, largely a physics text with chemistry 
mentioned only twice within the ‘contents’ – ‘physical and chemical change’ and ‘physical 
and chemical properties’. Chapter three of Cooke’s Chemical Physics deals with the three 
states of matter and has an extensive section on crystallography. What is of particular note 
is the approach Cooke takes as he initiates young chemists, such as Peirce, into the various 
crystallographic systems. Before looking at Cooke’s diagrammatic approach to crystal 
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structures it is worth examining how Peirce connects thinking and reasoning, using a 
diagram functioning as an icon, as described in his essay ‘On the Algebra of Logic’, 
 
Icons are so completely substituted for their objects as hardly to be distinguished 
from them. Such are the diagrams of geometry. A diagram, indeed, so far as it has a 
general signification, is not a pure icon; but in the middle part of our reasoning we 
forget that abstractness in great measure, and the diagram is for us the very thing. 
(EP1 226, 1885) 
 
I will show that Peirce was immersed in this form of visual thinking as part of his chemistry 
training on crystallography. Whilst a mathematical diagram is iconic in being completely 
substituted for the object it represents, crystallographic diagrams too – if we are willing to 
suspend in our minds their abstraction from the sample under investigation – also become 
‘the very thing’. I will show that Cooke’s use of crystallographic diagrams encourage the 
student to reason whereby the diagram becomes indistinguishable from the crystal form it 
represents. The importance to the practice of science of being able to construct and 
manipulate a diagram or equation was emphasised by the philosopher and psychologist 
David Gooding. It is possible to see Cooke attempting to develop in his chemistry students 
this important skill which Gooding (2010:15) describes as, ‘[t]he ability to create and 
manipulate visual representations [which] is a cognitive skill acquired as a scientist 
becomes an accomplished participant in the methods that define a particular domain’. In 
this case the ‘domain’ of study is crystallography.  
 
The section on crystallography begins with Cooke (1860:132) emphasising the need to 
engage with these diagrams by encouraging his students to reproduce their own 
representations by ‘prepar[ing] models of the more important forms’. He then considers 
the principal crystal systems starting with holohedral forms of the monometric system.  An 
example of his approach can be seen in the section dealing with the crystallographic form 
known as the tetrakis-hexahedron. The shape of each crystalline form in this particular 
system can be described by the ratios of the three values, represented by the letter a, 
measured along three mutually perpendicular axes (x, y and z). For the tetrakis – 
hexahedron these ratios are a:ma: ∞. In this example Cooke (1860:134) offers his students 
(such as Peirce) the following diagram and instruction, 
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Tetrakis-hexahedron 
 
Earlier in the text Cooke deals first with more 
straightforward crystallographic forms such as the cube 
and dodecahedron.  The tetrakis-hexahedron is 
intermediate in form between the cube and 
dodecahedron. The dodecahedron aspect of the structure 
Cooke (1860:134) states is formed when ‘m=1 [and] the 
pair of faces meeting at m coincide and the cube is formed 
as ‘the value of m increases, the solid angle at A becomes 
more obtuse’ with the four planes meeting at A when m= 
∞ 
Figure 3: Diagram of the tetrakis-hexahedron crystalline form 
Source: Cooke’s (1860) Chemical Physics, page 135 
 
Having described the tetrakis-hexahedron Cooke suggests that his students repeat the 
process for themselves on a number of other analogous structures such as the hexakis-
octahedron. The responsibility for this Cooke (1860:134) places squarely with Peirce and his 
fellow students: ‘to trace out these relations, both in the symbols and the forms, is left for 
an exercise to the student’.  
 
There are three points of interest here in terms of how Peirce is later to deal with diagrams. 
Firstly Cooke describes the diagrammatic structures in terms of the relations between their 
geometric characteristics. Secondly Cooke defines the internal characteristics of his 
diagrams in terms of a number of key indicators such as the ratio values expressed as the 
symbols a, b and c and measured along the x, y and z axes as well as the sizes of the solid 
angles formed between the various planes. When describing a set of compound crystalline 
forms Cooke (1860:161) sets out the values for a, b and c, stating that, ‘with the aid of 
these symbols, the student will easily be able to see the relations of the forms without any 
further description’ (emphasis added). Such key crystallographic factors as these correlate 
with or point out key relational aspects within the diagram. Sometime later, after his 
training as a chemist, Peirce would describe such pointers as the indexical aspects of a 
diagram18. 
 
Thirdly, to help his students fully engage with the diagrammatic structures, Cooke 
(1860:132) encourages them to ‘prepare models of the more important forms’ or by 
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examining ‘[c]rystals made of wood or of porcelain [which] can be obtained from dealers in 
philosophical instruments’. Cooke’s emphasis on engagement rather than rote learning of 
the facts can be seen in the way he encourages his students to experiment on the diagrams 
in his text. Not all the crystal systems are set out in detail, for as Cooke (1860:140) asserts 
somewhat confidently, ‘since, after the details already given, the relations of these forms 
can easily be traced by the student, we need not dwell upon the subject [of the remaining 
systems]’. In training his students in this way Cooke is striving to develop what Gooding 
(2004a:278) describes as the skill of ‘visualization [which] involves making and manipulating 
images that convey novel phenomena, ideas and meanings…[being]…central to the 
intellectual objectives of almost every area of science’. In this second example from Cooke’s 
Chemical Physics we can see how he develops this skill of ‘visualisation’ in his students. 
What is interesting here is that later Peirce was to connect our mental processes in a 
graphic way for he writes that the mind imagines or visualises diagrams to experiment on in 
order to reason by, 
 
We form in the imagination some sort of diagrammatic, that is, iconic, 
representation of the facts, as skeletonized as possible. The impression of the 
present writer is that with ordinary persons this is always a visual image, or mixed 
visual and muscular; but this is an opinion not founded on any systematic 
examination. (CP 2.778, 1902) 
 
We can see how Peirce’s chemistry training involved mental experiments upon diagrams. 
Here Cooke (1860:121) is approaching reasoning as both a visual and a diagrammatic 
process by way of introducing his students to a number of fundamental concepts in 
crystallography such as crystal, faces and plane angles. 
 
 
In using geometric diagrams in this 
way, Cooke offers to the student’s 
imagination an image that seems 
to encourage her to merge the 
representation as printed in the 
text book with its object itself - the 
crystalline form found in nature. 
Figure 4: Diagrams of crystal systems 
Source: Cooke’s (1860) Chemical Physics, page 121 
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Cooke writes in a way that brings the student’s attention to the internal geometric 
characteristics of the structure without losing sight of the crystal as an object of 
observation. In the text accompanying the diagram Cooke (1860:121) refers directly to the 
natural crystalline form - the object - as ‘the faces of the diamond and of some other 
crystals are at times curved…[although]..made up of a large number of small planes’. He 
then shifts his focus seamlessly to the diagram’s geometric features by describing ‘the axis 
of a crystal is a line passing through its centre, round which two or more faces are 
symmetrically arranged’. Here Cooke invites the student to visualise in his imagination the 
superimposition of the natural characteristics of the crystal form – the appearance of its 
faces - with its visual representation in terms of its internal axis. In recalling Peirce’s earlier 
chemical analogy relating to experimenting on diagrams the effect here is that Cooke’s 
geometric diagram – his representation - is, for the student, the thing itself – the object – 
the natural crystalline form under investigation. This aspect of Peirce’s training as a chemist 
encouraged him to engage with the relations established between the natural crystalline 
form, its representation and his thoughts. In this way Peirce and others came to know the 
object of their study – the crystalline form itself. By viewing the representation through the 
lens of Peirce’s chemical practice he was experiencing an iconic form in a way which he 
later described as, 
 
So in contemplating a painting, there is a moment when we lose the consciousness 
that it is not the thing, the distinction of the real and the copy disappears, and it is 
for the moment a pure dream, – not any particular existence, and yet not general. 
At that moment we are contemplating an icon. (EP1 226, 1885) 
 
By means of Cooke’s diagramatic approach were Peirce and his fellow students introduced 
to crystallography. The student is encouraged to set to one side or to suspend the 
distinction between the crystal object form and the iconic diagram printed in the text. In 
this way Cooke guides his students in coming to an understanding of the important 
crystallographic relations under study where, in Peirce’s words, the diagram on the page 
becomes ‘the very thing’.  
 
1.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown that whilst Liebig’s laboratory method was first introduced at 
Harvard by Eben Horsford it was Josiah Cooke who, influenced in particular by Dumas and 
Regnault, fully developed these methods into a highly successful teaching programme. In 
structuring the curriculum, Cooke was determined that his students would develop 
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problem solving skills and the ability to process numerical data. Such an approach would 
very likely have appealed to Peirce given his interests and skills in mathematics. In common 
with other nineteenth century chemists, Cooke framed the subject in terms of the relations 
existing between chemical objects and their physiochemical properties. As a young chemist 
Peirce would have been immersed in this language of relations as a means of making visible 
the interplay between the world’s material elements and its cognitive elements.  
 
Douglas Anderson (1995:32) expresses a view common amongst Peirce scholars that, ‘for 
Peirce, all other sciences depend upon mathematics insofar as it was the model for 
reasoning… involv[ing] imaginative construction and experimentation in diagrammatic 
thinking…’. This is another form of what we previously encountered as Eisele’s Law. I claim 
that in this chapter I have laid the foundations to question the exclusive focus on 
mathematics that has preoccupied Peirce scholars thus far. Furthermore, Peirce’s training 
at Harvard as directed by Josiah Cooke made a substantial contribution to his way of 
thinking diagrammatically and in terms of relations. The way of thinking that was integral to 
Peirce’s study of chemistry at Harvard has so far been largely ignored by scholars in their 
accounts of the conceptual basis for his later accounts of diagrams.  
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Chapter Two 
Charles Peirce – a nineteenth century chemist 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter focusses on Charles Peirce as a nineteenth century chemist. Whilst there are a 
few papers on Peirce’s use of analogies drawn from chemistry in support of his philosophy 
(Atkins 2010 & 2012, Roberts 1973 and Tursman 1989,) there is very little analysis of the 
papers he published on the subject of chemistry. To emphasise the breadth of Peirce’s 
interests and achievements Max Fisch19 asked the following rhetorical question, 
 
Who is the most original and the most versatile intellect that the Americas have so 
far produced? The answer "Charles S. Peirce" is uncontested, because any second 
would be so far behind as not to be worth nominating. [He was] mathematician, 
astronomer, chemist, geodesist, surveyor, cartographer, metrologist, 
spectroscopist, engineer, inventor; psychologist, philologist, lexicographer, 
historian of science, mathematical economist, lifelong student of medicine; book 
reviewer, dramatist, actor, short story writer; phenomenologist, semiotician, 
logician, rhetorician and metaphysician. 
 
It was perhaps with such a list in mind that Vincent Colapietro (1996:138) encouraged his 
readers to ‘reflect on the heroic dimension of his [Peirce’s] philosophical career’. Although 
Fisch lists chemistry, this aspect of Peirce’s work sits outside of his ‘heroic’ output being 
rarely mentioned in the literature. I will show that Fisch’s somewhat triumphalist portrait of 
Peirce as a unique intellect does not necessarily apply to his output as a chemist. An 
examination of Peirce’s published works and research interests, as part of the 
historiography of nineteenth century chemistry, reveals a more ordinary Charles Peirce – at 
least as a chemist. Where Peirce is unusual for a nineteenth century chemist is in his 
willingness to engage in metaphysical speculation. Nineteenth century chemists, claims 
Bensaude-Vincent (2009:48), were ‘not really concerned with understanding the fine 
structure of matter’. As an example Bensaude-Vincent (2009:48) cites August von Kekulé 
who offered the six membered hexagonal structure of carbon atoms as the structure of 
benzene as ‘deny[ing] the existence of atoms’ and firmly rejecting this ‘ontological issue out 
of chemistry, as belonging to metaphysics’. This is taken from a quotation from Kekulé 
(1867) which Alan Rocke (2010:225) cites in full as, ‘[t]he question whether atoms exist or 
not has but little significance in a chemical point of view: its discussion belongs rather to 
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metaphysics’. Whilst rejecting the Daltonian notion of the indivisible atom Rocke 
(2010:226) argues that Kekulé believed that, ‘the chemist is perfectly justified in using this 
empirically supported concept’ for although ‘[c]hemical atoms may well not be irreducible 
bits of matter, like Dalton’s tiny hard spheres; but they behave chemically as if they were’. I 
will later claim that Peirce’s chemistry writings of the early 1860s present him as a 
metaphysical chemist which, as I will show, was an unusual position for the time and not 
one found in Peirce scholarship.  
 
In addition to Peirce’s position as a chemist I will also explore the connections between 
Peirce’s largely neglected writings in chemistry and his philosophical essays of that same 
period. Many Peirce scholars acknowledge the influence of Kant on his thinking, particularly 
his earlier writings. As Cheryl Misak (2004:1) points out ‘one of the most important 
influences on Peirce was Kant’, an opinion supported by Gabriele Gava (2008:699) when he 
states that, [f]rom his own day to ours, the Kantian character of Charles S. Peirce’s 
philosophy has been recognized’. Around the same period of Peirce’s chemistry papers he 
also published his essay ‘On a New List of Categories’ (hereafter the ‘New List’). This paper 
is for many scholars, according to Mats Bergman (2007b:604), ‘the foundational text’ for 
Peirce’s theory of signs which, Bergman claims, ‘provides a Kant-styled ‘derivation’ of the 
basic concepts of the theory of categories and semiotic in one brilliant, albeit dense and 
often enigmatic package’. In common with other Peirce scholars, Misak (2016:85) is of the 
opinion that Peirce’s own set of metaphysical categories grew out of his reading of Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason which he had first read ‘as a teenager and continued to be 
immersed in…(in the original German) as an undergraduate at Harvard’.  
 
The year Peirce graduated from Harvard’s Lawrence Scientific School coincided with the 
first paper of his career, published in the American Journal of Science and Arts, ‘Chemical 
Theory of Interpenetration’ (1863). I will show that this paper also has a Kantian lineage, 
this time to the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1878) and to Kant’s later and 
unpublished work, the so-called Opus postumum. As far as I am aware there is nothing in 
Peirce scholarship that connects Peirce’s writings on chemistry with Kant. Scholars such as 
Carolyn Eisele and Max Fisch have so far paid little attention to Peirce as a chemist; this 
project hopes to make an original contribution to this neglected area of Peirce scholarship. 
 
An examination of Peirce’s ‘Chemical Theory of Interpenetration’ (1869) will show in part 
that his interests were common to other nineteenth century chemists such as Jean-Baptiste 
Dumas and Jöns Jacob Berzelius as well as his tutor Josiah Cooke. These interests included 
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atomism, the validity of Prout’s hypothesis and using atomic weights as a classification 
scheme for the chemical elements. This paper also reveals something of the younger 
Peirce’s metaphysics as applied to chemistry. In 1869 Peirce publishes in both chemistry 
and philosophy. In arguing for an orderly arrangement of the chemical elements Peirce 
deploys inductive reasoning. That same year Peirce publishes a series of three papers which 
includes a justification for inductive reasoning which denies J.S Mill’s defence in terms of 
the orderliness of nature. I will show that ‘philosopher’ Peirce’s position in opposing Mill’s 
position is not inconsistent with the ‘chemist’ Peirce in seeking an orderly arrangement of 
the chemical elements. 
 
2.2 Nineteenth century atomism 
Before considering Peirce’s paper ‘The Chemical Theory of Interpenetration’ (1863), it 
would be useful to say something of the nineteenth century debates around atomism in 
order to place Peirce’s work in context. This also provides a useful starting position for a 
later examination of Peirce’s reception of Prout’s hypothesis.  
 
The historian Alan Rocke (1978:225) claims, 
 
There were two types of atomism in the nineteenth century: the universally, if 
usually implicitly, accepted chemical atomic theory, which formed the conceptual 
basis for assigning relative elemental weights and molecular formulas, and the 
highly controversial physical atomic theory, which made statements about the 
intimate mechanical nature of substances. 
 
As will be shown later, chemists were often willing to receive Dalton’s atomic theory by way 
of accepting atomic weights as experimentally useful for determining reacting quantities 
and likely product yields. There was however reluctance by some to embrace physical 
atomism, thinking this to be irrelevant to their practice, or as Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent 
and Isabelle Stengers (1996:117) explain, ‘why venture into an area inaccessible to 
experiment to establish the gravimetric proportions of combination’. Using Rocke’s (1978) 
terms, whilst chemists of the early and mid-nineteenth century were comfortable with the 
‘chemical atom’, many regarded the ‘physical atom’ as a metaphysical speculation, 
inaccessible to experimental verification and a distraction from their empirical practice. 
Consider for example Dumas’s20 (1837)  observation that, ‘if I were master, I would erase 
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the word ‘atom’ from the science, persuaded that it goes beyond experience; and in 
chemistry we should never go beyond experience’. Chemists sharing Dumas’s position took 
an empirical approach to Dalton’s theory whilst rejecting its ontological speculations. 
Chemical atomism unlike physical atomism avoids any reference to indivisible atoms as the 
basic building blocks of matter. 
 
It is impossible to capture the subtlety of the debates that took place in such a short space 
as this chapter affords. The scepticism towards Dalton’s physical atomism can however be 
appreciated in the Swedish chemist Jacob Berzelius’s21 judgement of it as ‘imperfect and 
clogged with difficulties’. As Alan Chalmers (2009:182) explains, Berzelius devised a system 
of chemical formulae, such as SO2 for sulphur dioxide, which represents the combining 
weights of the two elements; such an approach was ‘without a commitment to atoms’. We 
now examine Dalton’s atomic theory and more of the responses it provoked. A useful 
source of Dalton’s papers published from manuscripts held originally by the Literary and 
Philosophical Society of Manchester is Roscoe and Harden’s A New View of Dalton’s Atomic 
Theory (1896). In his lecture notes (13th January, 1810) John Dalton22 argues there being 
some point beyond which matter cannot be divided and that the existence of ultimate 
particles of matter ‘can scarcely be doubted, though they are probably much too small ever 
to be exhibited by microscopic improvements’. Here Dalton appears to affirm his belief in 
atoms as real entities. He chooses the word atom over particle or molecule for its 
expressive power in conveying the property of indivisibility. In a letter to Berzelius (20th 
September, 1812)  Dalton23 asserts the logic of his theory as ‘the doctrine of definite 
proportions appears to be mysterious unless we adopt the atomic hypothesis’ – then 
borrowing on the authority of Newton for emphasis he continues – ‘it appears like the 
mystical ratios of Kepler, which Newton so happily elucidated’. 
 
In 1808 Dalton published A New System of Chemical Philosophy (Part 1) which contained 
the now famous Plate IV. The visual impact of this representation of atoms, together with 
what later became known as molecules, provided powerful support for Dalton’s concept of 
atomism.  
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Table of atomic weights and accompanying signs – Plate IV 
 
Figure 5: Plate IV 
Source: Dalton’s (1808) A New System of Chemical Philosophy, page 218 
 
The diagrams, Dalton (1808:219) explains, are ‘arbitrary marks or signs chosen to represent 
the several chemical elements or ultimate particles’. The accompanying explanations and 
atomic weights were intended to be considered together as a single representation which 
Bernard Cohen (2004:69) describes as ‘addressing the ontological status of the entities 
through their tandem representational format’. The cause of Berzelius’s24 scepticism is the 
very realistic and spatial interpretation which he described as ‘imagining these elementary 
bodies in spherical form’ – real physical entities. 
 
Another of Dalton’s opponents to his atomic theory was Humphrey Davy (1778 – 1829) who 
in 1812, some four years after Dalton, published Elements of Chemical Philosophy. In the 
letter to Berzelius referred to earlier, Dalton’s realist approach to visualising atoms and as 
exemplified by his table, was justified by his interpretation of the law of definite 
proportions25. In his treatment of this law Davy (1812:64) contests Dalton’s interpretation 
in stating, ‘it is not necessary to consider the combining bodies, either as composed of 
indivisible particles, or even as always united one and one, or one and two, or two and 
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three proportions…numerical expressions ought to relate only to the results of 
experiments’. Without delving into Davy’s own interpretations it can be seen that he has 
rejected Dalton’s diagrams of ‘ultimate particles’ as depicting real entities – physical atoms. 
In emphasising this physicality, David Knight (1996:193) describes Dalton’s atoms as ‘not 
just chemical atoms, which resist analysis at present but might succumb to more 
formidable procedures, but genuine physical atoms’. Although, as Rocke (2005:147) states, 
Davy’s opposition to chemical atomism softened, he never accepted Dalton’s position 
‘which seemed to him far too material and hypothetical’ – conflicting as it did with his 
Kantian idealism and a rejection of atoms as material entities. The philosopher Rom Harré 
(1981:15) argues that Davy’s writings involved ‘attacks on ‘substance’ theories of physical 
action’ and that ‘true to his Kantian predilections Davy preferred theories based on the 
assumption of attractive and repulsive forces’ such as the atomic theory of Roger 
Boscovich (1711 – 1787). Interestingly the young Peirce too will be shown to object to – in 
today’s terms - physical atomism, offering a Kantian theory in response. Although a 
reluctance to accept atomism on Kantian grounds is not surprising for a nineteenth 
chemist, Peirce’s willingness to engage in metaphysical debate in support of his own 
position perhaps is, as will be shown later. 
 
As well as detractors Dalton also had his supporters, one being Thomas Thomson professor 
of chemistry at Glasgow University. In his A system of Chemistry, Thomson (1810:441) 
writes ‘the hypothesis upon which the whole of Mr Dalton's notions respecting chemical 
elements is founded, is this: When two elements unite to form a third substance, it is to be 
presumed that one atom of one joins to one atom of the other, unless when some reason 
can be assigned for supposing the contrary’, which was followed by a number in Dalton’s 
atomic diagrams.  
 
Problems came for Dalton’s physical atomism towards the end of the first decade of the 
nineteenth century with Gay-Lussac’s law of combining gas volumes (1809) as well as a 
theory put forward independently by Amedeo Avogadro (1811) and André-Marie Ampère 
(1814), that equal volumes of gases contained the same number of particles under constant 
conditions. For example, two volumes of hydrogen combine with one volume of oxygen to 
form two volumes of steam. The problem here is that using Dalton’s atomic theory would 
require the ‘indivisible’ atom of oxygen to divide in two. It was partly in response to this, 
explains Alan Chalmers (2009:182), that  ‘Berzelius (1813, 1815) argued for using formulae 
in preference to Dalton’s diagrams because the latter, in conjunction with a table of ‘atomic 
weights’, could capture all that was warranted by experiments on combining weights and 
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volumes without commitment to the atomic hypothesis’. Whilst the epistemic usefulness of 
the theory was accepted its ontological implications were not.  
 
As discussed in chapter one Peirce was taught chemistry by Josiah Cooke who was much 
influenced by the French chemists Dumas and Regnault. It is therefore worth examining 
briefly the position taken towards ‘atomism’ by these three chemists. Nineteenth century 
French chemists, argues Bensaude-Vincent (1999:81), ‘were reluctant to adopt the atomic 
theory…. Instead of atomism, the French chemists preferred the language of equivalents 
because it avoided commitment to a speculative theory of indivisible elementary particles’. 
This offers a different approach to expressing the relations between the chemical elements 
and their reacting quantities on the formation of new substances. An example can be seen 
on examining Regnault’s (1853:112) Elements of Chemistry, one of the texts Cooke chose to 
support his course, where it states, ‘[w]e shall exclusively adopt the notation of equivalents 
in the present work’. Experiment shows that eight parts by weight of oxygen will combine 
exactly with one part of hydrogen to form water. From this Regnault (1853:111) argues 
‘[t]he quantities 8 of oxygen and 1 of hydrogen are called equivalent quantities, or chemical 
equivalents’ (emphasis in the original). On this basis water is represented by the formula 
HO, a statement of the relations between the elements of composition and their combining 
mass ratios.  Such reasoning was common to chemists who took a similar ‘equivalentist’ 
position. This is a different approach to the relations between the chemical elements to 
that offered by the use of atomic weights, one that avoids any commitment to the atomic 
theory. 
 
What Bensaude-Vincent (1999:81) describes as Dumas’s (1836) ‘solemn condemnation of 
atoms’ was quoted in part earlier and is given here in greater detail, 
 
On this subject too many hypotheses have already been made; (…) instead of 
investigating these hypotheses more thoroughly, it would be far better to seek 
some reliable foundations on which to base more substantial theories. … If I had my 
way, I should erase the word `atom’ from science, in the firm belief that it goes 
beyond the realm of experiment; and never in chemistry must we go beyond the 
realm of experiment. 
 
This quotation is often cited as an example of Dumas’s positivist attitude in seeking to 
eliminate all consideration of unobservable entities from physical theory. Bas Van Fraassen 
(2009:16) suggests caution here before we label Dumas an instrumentalist or empiricist 
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anti-atomist for ‘the quotation scandalously omits the sentence just before that ‘‘If I had 
my way’’, which is ‘‘It is my conviction that the equivalents of the chemists—those of 
Wenzel and of Mitscherlich, which we call atoms—are nothing but molecular groups’. It is 
Rocke’s (1978:261) view, having also pointed out the missing sentence, that Dumas whilst 
rejecting physical atomism, was ‘not expressing a general opposition to chemical atomism’. 
However, the prevailing view of in France during the time Cooke studied there was one that 
avoided speculative theory focussing instead on the empirical and descriptive aspects of 
chemistry.  Such an attitude was embodied by the influential French chemist Marcellin 
Berthelot who, argues Mary Jo Nye (1993:69), was ‘an antiatomist and powerful member of 
the French establishment…[and]… dissuaded students from writing their examinations in 
the notation of atomic weights and symbols that were used almost everywhere outside 
France after 1860’. In preference Berthelot required his students to work with equivalent 
weights which are founded on chemical analysis where, as Nye (1993:69) states, ‘atomic 
weights are based on physical hypotheses’ (emphasis in the original).  
 
What approach did Peirce’s tutor Josiah Cooke take once he returned from France, having 
attended Dumas’s Paris lectures of 1848 and 1851, to take up his post as Erving Professor of 
chemistry at Harvard? Unsurprisingly perhaps given Cooke’s admiration for Dumas and 
Regnault, his Chemical Problems and Reactions to Accompany Stöckhardt’s Elements of 
Chemistry (1857), discussed in the previous chapter, works entirely in equivalents -  as does 
Regnault in Elements of Chemistry. There is no mention of the atomic hypothesis. Thus 
writing the symbol C stands for six parts of carbon, or as Cooke (1857:15) states, ‘[t]he 
weight of an element indicated by its symbol is called one equivalent; and it is a law of 
chemistry that elements always combine by equivalents’. Cooke’s Elements of Chemical 
Physics (1860) was also used on his course as discussed in chapter one. In the preface 
Cooke (1860:iv) affirms his subject’s empirical foundations and one founded on precise 
measurement of quantities, 
 
The history of Chemistry as an exact science may be said to date from Lavoisier, 
who first used the balance in investigating chemical phenomena, and the progress 
of the science since his time has been owing, in great measure, to the 
improvements which have been made in the processes of weighing and measuring 
small quantities of matter. 
 
We can see here the value Cooke places on the chemical balance as an instrument of 
chemical inquiry. A successful inquiry is dependent upon the chemist’s skilful and accurate 
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work with the chemical balance with a keen appreciation of any sources of error. A keen 
theoretical knowledge of the principles underlying the processes involved is also essential 
for, as Cooke (1860:iv) states, an investigator who ‘relies on mere empirical rules, will be 
exposed to constant error’. Nevertheless Cooke (1860:110) is familiar with the notion of 
atoms as invisible and indivisible particles which he describes as, ‘the atomic theory as this 
hypothesis is called’. However, Cooke (1860:110) aligns himself ‘with Newton regard[ing] 
them [atoms] as infinitely small, that is, as mere points, or, as Boscovisch [sic] called them, 
variable centres of attractive and repulsive forces’. Significantly Cooke (1860:110) prefers 
Boscovichian atoms where ‘matter is purely a manifestation of force’. Peirce differs from 
his tutor Cooke in being prepared to engage in metaphysical speculations which Cooke, as 
we will see later, rules as being out of the chemist’s court. In First Principles of Chemical 
Philosophy (1868) Cooke (1868:24) offers an account of the atomic theory to explain the 
loss of identity which occurs when a substance undergoes chemical change as, ‘suppos[ing] 
that the molecules themselves are broken up into still smaller particles, which it calls 
atoms’ (emphasis in the original) with the new product being a different arrangement of 
the original atoms. Cooke (1868:24) explains the word atom is derived from ancient Greek 
and ‘recalls a famous controversy in regard to the infinite divisibility of matter, which for 
many centuries divided philosophers of the world’; then adding,  [b]ut chemistry does not 
deal with this metaphysical question’ (emphasis added).  
 
It is here that we shall later see Peirce departing from his tutor by engaging in metaphysical 
speculation within a paper targeted at chemists and dealing with the atomic theory. Cooke 
appears not to favour an approach based on the atomic theory and atomic weights 
although he gives an account of both in his text. As an empirical chemist trained in France 
he retains a preference for the earlier system of equivalents which, states Cooke (1868:55), 
have the advantage ‘that they are the result of direct experimentation, and are based on no 
hypothesis in regard to the molecular constitution of matter’. Given that the number of 
atoms in a particular compound is, states Cooke (1868:30), ‘more or less hypothetical’ then 
inevitably this uncertainty ‘must extend to the atomic weights of the elements, so far as 
they rest on such hypothetical conclusions’. Nevertheless Cooke was not hostile to the 
atomic theory but was cautious of its hypothetical foundations. For example Cooke 
(1865:31) concludes that atomic weights when accurately determined ‘become essential 
data in all quantitative analytical investigations’.  
 
Thus in sum: Peirce was taught chemistry by Cooke, who admired the largely anti-atomist 
French chemists Dumas and Regnault and retained a preference for empirically determined 
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equivalent weights and the ‘Boscovich atom’. Cooke believed metaphysics was not the 
province of chemists but kept an open mind on the developing atomic hypothesis and 
recognised the empirical value of atomic weights if determined accurately. His student 
Peirce shared some of his tutor’s views but differed radically in feeling able to mix 
metaphysics with chemistry.  
 
As we shall see in the coming chapters Peirce was a great admirer of Mendeleev and it is 
worth looking briefly at the Russian chemist’s position on atomism. Mendeleev’s stance on 
atomism is more difficult to fix, as will be seen in the very different positions adopted by 
Eric Scerri (2006) and Robin Hendry (2006) on the matter. Writing in 1872 Mendeleev 
(1872:44) argues that the concept of atomic weight had acquired such ‘an indestructible 
solidity’ that it might be expected to ‘remain without change, whatever modifications the 
theoretical ideas of chemists might undergo’. At the same time Mendeleev acknowledges 
that the term atomic weight ‘implies the hypothesis of atomic structure of matter’ which he 
describes as ‘a rather conventional concept’; atoms as a useful working convention rather 
than an existing physical entity. In a footnote to this Mendeleev (1872:98 n1) adds that ‘by 
replacing the expression “atomic weight” with “elementary weight” one could, it seems to 
me, avoid the concept of atoms when speaking of atoms’. Scerri (2006:312) regards 
Mendeleev as an anti-atomist, citing in support Mendeleev stating, ‘there is a simplicity of 
representation in atoms, but there is no absolute necessity to have recourse to them…the 
atomic hypothesis seems to me to be useless’. It is on the basis of such evidence that Scerri 
(2006:311/2) argues that Mendeleev was rather sceptical of atomistic explanations’ and 
regarded atoms only as ‘useful fictions’. 
 
It is also possible to find Mendeleev writing in seemingly realist terms about atoms. For 
example in the 1901 English translation of his seminal text book The Principles of Chemistry, 
Mendeleev (1901a:xi) make the following statements, 
 
Just as the microscope and telescope enlarge the scope of vision, and discover life 
in seeming immobility, so chemistry in discovering and striving to discern the life of 
the invisible world of atoms and molecules and their ultimate limit of divisibility, 
will clearly introduce new and important problems into our conception of nature.  
 
Also when describing chemical change Mendeleev (1901a:33) writes in a realist manner 
that likens the reacting atoms to the celestial planets, 
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Not only does chemical reaction itself consist of motions, but that in the compound 
formed (in the molecules) the elements (atoms) forming it are in harmonious stable 
motion (like the planets) in the solar system.  
 
It is partly on the basis of writings such as these that Robin Hendry (2006:332) disagrees 
with Scerri’s argument that Mendeleev was ‘sceptical of atomistic explanations’ describing 
this as ‘contestable’. In support of Mendeleev’s atomism Hendry (2006:332) quotes from 
Mendeleev’s 1902 pamphlet, Attempt at a chemical conception of the ether. Here again 
Mendeleev offers a seemingly realist account of the atom and one similar to the two 
mentioned earlier, 
 
Chemically the atoms may be likened to the heavenly bodies, the stars, sun, 
planets, satellites, comets & c. The building up of molecules from atoms, and of 
substances from molecules, is then conceived to resemble the building up of 
systems, such as the solar system, or that of twin stars or constellations, from these 
individual bodies. This is not a simple play of words in modern chemistry, nor a 
mere analogy, but a reality which directs the course of all chemical research, 
analysis and synthesis. 
 
From just this very brief selection from Mendeleev’s writings it is possible to begin to see 
why scholars such as Scerri and Hendry disagree so strongly on Mendeleev’s stance on 
atomism. It is Hendry’s (2006:331) view that, ‘Scerri is mistaken to represent Mendeleev as 
an anti-atomist’. For his part Scerri (2006:312) states ‘Hendry has been too quick…in 
assuming that Mendeleev shared Dalton’s belief in the existence of physical atoms’. 
To complete this section and by way of contrast to Mendeleev’s nuanced position on 
atomism it is worth giving an example of a more staunchly atomist and of an anti-atomist 
view. Firstly a clear anti-atomist position: throughout most of his career the physical 
chemist Wilhelm Ostwald26 (1853 – 1932) had been an opponent of atomism. As late as 
1904, showing that this debate continued through the nineteenth and into the twentieth 
century, Ostwald (1904:508/9) argued that the mainstays of atomism – stoichiometric laws, 
and the laws of constant composition, multiple proportions and of combining weights could 
be, 
 
                                                          
26
 In his definition of chemistry as ‘the science of the different kinds of matter’ (CP 1.259) Peirce cites 
Ostwald and Mendeleev in claiming this to be ‘substantially [their] definition’ too. 
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 [D]educ[ed] from the principles of chemical dynamics [...] mak[ing] the atomic 
hypothesis unnecessary… put[ting] the theory of the stoichiometrical laws on more 
secure ground than that furnished by a mere hypothesis.  
 
As an indication of the continuing liveliness of the debate around atomism during the early 
twentieth century, particularly in Britain, the home of Dalton’s atomic theory, Ostwald 
(1904:509) adds ‘I am quite aware that in making this assertion I am stepping on somewhat 
volcanic ground…among this audience there are only very few who would not at once 
answer, that they are quite satisfied with the atoms as they are, and that they do not in the 
least want to change them for any other conception’.  In opposing atomism Ostwald 
offered an interpretation of the laws of chemistry in terms of energy and the recently 
formed laws of thermodynamics.  
 
A supporting statement on atomism is provided by the Alsatian French chemist Charles 
Adolphe Wurtz (1817 – 1884), who is described by Alan Rocke (2001:5) as ‘the apostle of 
atomic theory in France’ and as Jaime Wisniak [2005:348] notes ‘a staunch defender of the 
atomic theory against the sceptical positivism of [Marcellin] Berthelot.’ One of Wurtz’s 
most notable texts was La Théorie Atomique (1879) where he developed his theory of 
atomicity or the valency of the atoms. Towards the end of his book Wurtz (1880:301) sets 
out his position on atomism in distinctively realist terms, 
 
Atoms are not material points; they possess a sensible dimension, and doubtless a 
fixed form; they differ in their relative weights and in the motions with which they 
are animated. They are indestructible and indivisible by physical and chemical 
forces, for which they act, in some manner, as points of application. 
 
Set against this context we can now consider Peirce’s opposition to atomism in terms of its 
lack of explanatory power with regards the laws of chemistry and also to Prout’s 
hypothesis. 
 
2.3 ‘The Chemical Theory of Interpenetration’ (1863) 
This was one of Peirce’s earliest papers written when he was aged twenty-four having just 
graduated from Harvard’s Lawrence Scientific School. It is worth quoting in full Peirce’s 
(1863:78) introduction and then looking to see how this fits with the concerns of other 
chemists writing at the time, and also with Peirce’s later philosophical writings, 
 
62 
 
Physicists are now rapidly doing away with all theories which demand peculiar 
shapes and kinds of matter in favour of those which demand peculiar vibrations. At 
this day, the arrow shaped particles of the old theory of light seem grotesque. 
There is a good reason for this tendency. We require an explanation of forces. Now 
a force is only a mathematical function of a change, and a change in space can only 
be conceived of a priori as a motion. To explain a thing is to bring it into the realm 
of our a priori conceptions. Hence, whenever we endeavour to explain any force of 
nature by means of hypothetical shapes and properties of matter these only help 
us so far as they are conditions of certain motions. These motions are the real 
explanation; and if we can succeed in getting the motions without the peculiarities 
of matter, our hypothesis will be so much the smaller. The object of the present 
article is to apply this principle to the Atomic Theory. 
 
There are several points worth pursuing here which will be discussed in turn:- 
a) The deference to physics in justifying his choice of chemical hypothesis 
b) The metaphysical speculations – such as ‘a change in space can only be conceived 
of a priori as a motion’ – which rejects Daltonian atomism on the basis of a Kantian 
dynamical theory of matter27  
c) The fact that the topics considered were common to nineteenth century chemists 
of his time – in addition to the atomism mentioned above Peirce also attempts a 
justification of Prout’s hypothesis. 
 
2.3.1  ‘The Chemical Theory of Interpenetration’ (1863) and physics 
What is at first striking for a paper on chemistry is that Peirce (1863:78) opens with an 
appeal to physics and to physicists who he claims, ‘are now rapidly doing away with all 
theories which demand peculiar shapes and kinds of matter in favour of those which 
demand peculiar vibrations’. This is a reference to a challenge to Newton’s corpuscular 
theory of light by the wave theory of Thomas Young (1773 – 1829) and Augustin-Jean 
Fresnel (1788 – 1827). It is interesting to contrast Peirce’s claim, that physicists favour 
theories ‘which demand peculiar vibrations’ with regards to light, with Young’s own caution 
as illustrated in his lecture to the Royal Society of 1801. 
 
                                                          
27
 Michael Friedman (2004:xvi) describes Kant’s dynamical theory of matter as follows: ‘Matter fills 
the space it occupies by a continuous “balancing” of the two fundamental forces of attraction and 
repulsion exerted by all the continuum of points in the space in question’. I will return to this 
formulation later on. 
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In his Bakerian Lecture ‘On the Theory of Light and Colour’, delivered to the Royal Society in 
1801, Young (1801:16) defends the hypothesis and explains that ‘undulations are excited in 
this ether whenever a body becomes luminous’. Young states that ‘I use the word 
undulation, in preference to vibration, because vibration is generally understood as 
implying a motion which is continued alternately backwards and forwards, by the 
combination of the momentum of the body with an accelerating force, which is more or 
less permanent’. In brief Young prefers undulation which, although a vibratory motion 
within the transmitting medium, the motion continues only as the effect of repeated 
transmissions of further undulations from the source. As the historian of science Frank 
James (1984:47) explains, ‘there existed essentially two theories of light during the early 
nineteenth century: the particulate theory and the wave theory’ although we now 
recognise this to be a simplification ‘since there were many varieties of each theory’. 
Perhaps Peirce in his portrayal of physicists of the 1860s being so ready to dispense with 
the corpuscular theory is an illustration of James’s (1984:47) point that as a supporter of 
the wave theory Peirce viewed its alternative as having ‘faults so fundamental that no 
distinction between varieties of the same theory was sufficient to placate [his] opposition 
to that theory’.  
 
In common with the physicists alluded to in the introduction to this paper, Peirce also   
favoured theories based on vibrations. For example, in an essay written six year later and 
on the English scientist and historian of science William Whewell (1794 – 1866), Peirce 
states that the spectroscope’s capacity to distinguish between different chemical 
substances is due to ‘the greater or less refrangibility28 of the heat with which they vibrate’ 
arguing that ‘[d]ifferent chemical substances are therefore bodies of different elasticity and 
susceptible of different rates of vibration’ (W2:343 1869, emphasis added). Also when 
discussing sound and the pitch a particular note makes Peirce states that this ‘depends 
upon the rapidity of the succession of the vibrations which reach the ear (W2:197, 1868, 
emphasis added). In describing the ‘arrow shaped particles of the old theory of light’ as 
now seeming ‘grotesque’ we might view Peirce as a historical actor in accepting the wave 
theory of light without as James (1984:47) argues, having ‘distinguished between different 
varieties of either theory’. In this way Peirce is adopting an attitude typical of many of 
physicists and chemists of his time. 
 
                                                          
28
 Refrangibility is a capacity for refraction 
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We can see something more of the early Peirce (1861) privileging physics when he poses 
the question: ‘what is the meaning of this thing? Examples being: ‘What makes the 
rainbow? [and]’ What makes the top stand up?’. Questions in this form, Peirce claims, are 
inquiries belonging to ‘physics…[because]…[t]hey are questions of force’ (W1:53 1861). 
Peirce understands force to be present wherever there is matter. He argues that questions 
relating to different kinds of matter, ‘must then treat questions of force…[and]…is therefore 
a branch of Physics’ (W1:53 1861). Peirce illustrates this approach with a question from 
chemistry: what happens when an acid reacts with an alkali for form a salt? Peirce argues 
that there ‘must be a certain force’ which brings about the transformation of an acid and an 
alkali into a salt (W1:53 1861). Matters of force belong to physics. Thus the answer to the 
chemist’s question ‘what makes an acid react with an alkali?’ – a question concerned with 
different kinds of matter – sits within the domain of physics. As we will see in the next 
section, Peirce’s references here to force and physics sit within a Kantian approach to the 
behaviour of matter. 
 
2.3.2 ‘The Chemical Theory of Interpenetration’ (1863) and metaphysical speculations 
In this section I will attempt to show that Peirce’s paper, which deals with a chemical 
theory, is underpinned by Kantian metaphysics. Returning to Peirce’s (1863:78) 
introduction, he claims that ‘to explain a thing is to bring it into the realm of our a priori 
conceptions’; when it comes to the behaviour of matter ‘motions are the real explanation’. 
Moving forces of nature, a priori, contain the principles that enable an explanation of the 
laws of chemistry. The Kantian connection here can be seen in the Opus postumum where 
Kant (1993:21:) states that ‘moving forces must be assumed for the laws of motion that are 
a priori given, which [forces] alone serve for the explanation of the latter, although one 
cannot prove them’. Kant (1993:21) sets out his dynamic theory of matter as a 
metaphysical system founded a priori as moving forces and revealed to the observer in the 
laws of experience.  
 
In the metaphysical doctrine of nature, matter was only [dealt with] as the movable 
in space, as it is determinable a priori; in physics the moving forces are [dealt with] 
as experience reveals them; in the transition from metaphysics to physics, however, 
the movable with its moving forces is arranged in a system of nature, so far as the 
form of such a system can be constructed in general from these elements, 
according to the laws of experience. 
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I will attempt to show how Peirce takes a Kantian approach to the atomic theory, where the 
moving forces of nature embody a priori the principles of chemistry’s laws of experience.  
 
As a philosophical chemist, Peirce’s objections to the explanatory power of Dalton’s 
atomism are founded on metaphysics. As has been shown earlier, a concern with the 
implications of Dalton’s atomism was common to other nineteenth century chemists. 
Nonetheless Peirce’s readiness to engage in metaphysical disputation by way of rejecting 
Dalton’s atoms was not typical of chemists of his time. Peirce’s approach stands in stark 
contrast to his tutor Josiah Cooke who, as we saw earlier, dismissed metaphysical 
speculations as being irrelevant to the study of chemistry. Cooke is an example of a 
nineteenth century chemist who Mary Jo Nye (1993:71) describes as having, ‘a pragmatic 
epistemology that suited well the practical needs of everyday laboratory life’ eschewing 
metaphysics ‘because it presented few useful strategies in the chemical laboratory’. Where 
other chemists rejected untestable metaphysical speculations as irrelevant to the empirical 
status of their science, Peirce offers a detailed Kantian explanation for the laws of 
chemistry in opposition to Dalton’s atomism.  
 
The possible relationship between Peirce’s writing on chemistry and Kant is not something I 
believe that has featured in Peirce scholarship. Two of the laws Peirce deals with in detail 
are the chemical laws of composition and Prout’s hypothesis. It is however worth 
examining Peirce’s Kantian metaphysics further so that Peirce’s explanations might be 
better understood. Peirce scholars would generally agree with Gava (2008:699) when he 
states that, ‘[f]rom his own day to ours, the Kantian character of Charles S. Peirce’s 
philosophy has been recognised’. A view held by Hookway (2003:184) when he states: ‘All 
would agree that Peirce was much influenced by Kant and that this influence was evident 
throughout his writings’. There is however nothing in the literature on the relationship 
between Peirce’s Kantianism and his writings in chemistry. In particular, how Kant provides 
a metaphysical framework that allows the early Peirce (pre 1880) to explain a number of 
the laws of chemistry. It is this gap in Peirce scholarship that this project, in part, seeks to 
address.  
 
The title of the paper is given as ‘The Chemical Theory of Interpenetration’.  Peirce’s use of 
the word interpenetration connects his anti-atomism to Kant. In his final major work Opus 
postumum Kant (1993:28) states, ‘matter does not consist of simple parts, but each part is, 
in turn, composite, and atomism is a false doctrine of nature’. This is part of Kant’s 
argument against the theory that matter is composed of impenetrable atoms distributed in 
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empty space. Halfway through his paper Peirce (1863:80) flies his Kantian colours in stating 
his intention as ‘the facts of chemistry are explicable by the view of Kant, that matter is not 
absolutely impenetrable and that chemical union consists in the interpenetration of the 
constituents’. The two theories seem completely incommensurable: where Daltonian 
atoms are discrete entities, Kant proposes a continuous and dynamical theory of matter.  
Before looking at how Peirce accounts for the laws of chemistry in terms of 
interpenetration, Kant’s dynamic theory of matter needs closer inspection. 
 
In 1786 Kant published his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. In the second 
chapter on dynamics Kant develops the dynamical theory of matter, which Friedman 
(2004:xi) describes as ‘the longest and most complicated part’ of the work. The intention 
here is to set out in summary those parts of Kant’s Foundations that help to put Peirce’s 
later explanations of the laws of chemistry into context. Kant sets out his metaphysical 
foundations of dynamics as a sequence of propositions. In the first proposition Kant 
(2004:34) states his view that ‘matter fills a space, not through its mere existence, but 
through a particular moving force’ (emphasis in the original). There are for Kant (2004:35) 
two fundamental forces in nature. The first is the ‘attractive force’ which as a dynamic force 
draws matter together thereby preventing its separation. The second is the ‘repulsive force’ 
which is the cause of matter separating. Matter is considered exclusively in terms of these 
two moving forces which, as Friedman (2004:xvi) explains, ‘fills the space it occupies by a 
continuous “balancing” of the two fundamental forces of attraction and repulsion exerted 
by all the continuum of points in the space in question’. In this way these two opposing and 
dynamic forces are responsible for enabling matter to fill space. These forces are not 
properties of matter as is rigidity or elasticity. 
 
How then does Peirce’s use of the word interpenetration in relation to the theories of 
chemistry associate this account with Kant’s dynamic theory of mater? The relationship 
between the two opposing forces of nature is, in Kant’s view, directly connected to material 
properties such as rigidity, elasticity and density. When discussing impenetrability, Kant in 
Foundations (2004:38) distinguishes between two situations. First there is ‘relative 
impenetrability’ where resistance, as with a volume of gas in a cylinder fitted with a piston, 
increases in proportion to the extent of compression. Secondly there is ‘absolute 
impenetrability’ which rests on ‘the presupposition that matter as such is capable of no 
compression at all’. It is Kant’s (2004:62) view whereby according to the dynamical theory 
of matter ‘the objects of the outer senses…must be viewed as a moving force’ and the 
properties of matter are determined by the relationship between the opposing forces of 
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attraction and repulsion. In this case, states Kant (2004:62), ‘the so-called solid or absolute 
impenetrability is banished from natural science, as an empty concept, and repulsive force 
is posited in its stead’. All matter is however subject to relative impenetrability. Matter as a 
result behaves in an elastic manner as repulsive forces resist attempts at compression.  
 
In arguing against the absolute impenetrability of matter within a dynamic structure of 
moving fundamental forces of attraction and repulsion, Kant (2004:62) holds ‘that space, if 
it should be necessary, can be assumed to be completely filled, and in different degrees, 
even without dispersing empty interstices within matter’ (emphasis in the original). 
Differing densities are explained by the degree with which space is filled or, as Kant 
(2004:62) explains, whilst all space is considered to be completely filled it is ‘filled in 
different measures, whereby empty space at least loses its necessity, and is demoted to the 
value of a hypothesis’. Atomism posits a theory of matter of discrete, indivisible and so 
impenetrable atoms distributed in empty space. Kant rejects this on two points: that empty 
space is at the very least not necessary and a rejection of the absolute impenetrability of 
matter. 
 
As explained above, essential to what Kant in his Foundations (2004:62) describes as ‘the 
mechanical natural philosophy’ of atomism is the ‘absolute impenetrability of the primitive 
matter’ as discrete and separate particles distributed within empty space. Arguments on 
the corpuscular model explaining for example why the density of lead is greater than 
sulphur rest, Kant (2004:62) argues, ‘on the apparently unavoidable necessity for using 
empty spaces on behalf of the specific difference in the density of matters’ (emphasis in the 
original). The mechanical model fails for Kant (2004:62) because the empty spaces on which 
the concept of density is argued are not ‘determinable or discoverable by any experiment’. 
Empty space is not a possible object of experience and as a result a model of matter as 
atoms situated in the void is rejected.  From an atomistic approach, differences in chemical 
behaviour can be explained in terms of the varying characteristics of different types of 
atoms. For Kant the difference in chemical behaviour, as between for example lead and 
sulphur, is because each element’s fundamental forces of attraction and repulsion are 
dynamic and combined in different ways. The difference between the dynamic and 
atomistic theories of matter and Kant’s own preference is summarised by Friedman 
(2004:xviii) as,  
 
In general, the “metaphysical-dynamical” approach, which views matter as a true 
dynamical continuum and eschews absolutely hard elementary corpuscles and 
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empty space, is to be preferred [by Kant] to the opposing “mathematical-
mechanical” approach, which postulates precisely an interspersing of hard 
elementary corpuscles and empty space from the very beginning (to explain 
differences of density) – and, in its extreme form, thereby attempts to dispense 
with all genuinely dynamical forces originally inherent in matter. 
 
Before taking up Peirce’s paper again, where he applies Kant’s theory of interpenetration to 
the laws of chemistry, it would be useful to see the approach Kant takes to explaining 
chemical change. The examples chosen are not Kant’s but are of chemical substances that 
would have been known at the time. Take for example the effect of dissolving zinc metal in 
hydrochloric acid29. The type of change occurring here is described by Kant (2004:69) as 
chemical ‘insofar as they [the reactants] mutually change, even at rest, the combination of 
their parts through their inherent forces’. The word ‘inherent’ is important as it situates the 
forces involved as intrinsic to the zinc and to the acid. The effect of this change is the 
dissolution or separation of both the zinc metal and the acid brought about by their 
inherent and fundamental forces. This is a very different process to the physical separation 
which occurs when a piece of zinc is sawed mechanically into separate pieces. The saw does 
not act by way of inherent forces but by the physical action of the hard edge of the serrated 
blade against the softer zinc. Dissolution by contrast is achieved by reacting zinc with the 
acid, where each is considered to be completely and uniformly intermingled with the other. 
This process is described by Kant (2004:69) as ‘absolute dissolution, which can also be called 
chemical penetration.’ As we shall see in detail later, Peirce’s use of the term 
interpenetration follows similar Kantian lines to be found in his account of dissolution. For, 
as Kant (2004:69) explains, taking the zinc-acid reaction as an example with the acid as 
solvent, ‘there can be no part of the volume of the solution that would not contain a part of 
the solvent’ and so the acid fills the volume of the reaction liquid as a continuum. The zinc 
acts as solute which as Kant explains, ‘must also fill the whole space constituting the 
volume of the mixture, as a continuum’. Thus continues Kant, the zinc and acid ‘fill one and 
the same space, and each of them does this completely, they penetrate one another’ – the 
interpenetration of matter. 
 
Having made the claim for the process of the total dissolution of two substances to be 
accompanied by their complete and mutual penetration one of another, Kant then 
describes the process in greater detail. Once the reaction is complete, the volume of the 
                                                          
29
 Zinc was discovered in 1746 by the German chemist Andreas Marggraf (1709 – 1782) and 
hydrochloric acid from much earlier times.  
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zinc in acid product solution is very similar to the sum of their separate individual values – 
or as Kant (2004:69) observes ‘the matters [zinc and acid] together occupy a space, which 
accords with the sum of their densities, not outside, but inside one another, that is, through 
intussusception’. The term intussusception is explained by Hein van den Berg (2013:134) as 
the process whereby ‘the solute and the solvent fill the whole space constituting the 
volume of the mixture as a continuum’. The process of intussusception occurs as the 
attractive force of the acid solvent overcomes the weaker forces of attraction within the 
zinc. The result of dissolving zinc in acid produces a product that exists as a continuum 
brought about by the interpenetration of these two substances. The strength of the 
dissolving forces at work here is evidenced, Kant (2004:69) argues, in that once two 
substances have reacted together they ‘can be separated again by no art' – where by art 
Kant is referring to the practice of chemistry. To complete the example, zinc could not be 
easily recovered from the final product solution.  
 
Having outlined Kant’s dynamical theory of matter we can return to Peirce’s paper to see 
how he deploys this theory to refute atomism’s ability to explain the laws of chemistry. As 
we have seen Peirce introduces his paper with references to motion, forces and physics. 
Following on from this Peirce (1863:78) sets out to show that Dalton’s ‘hypothesis of atoms, 
in itself explains nothing’. He then lists nine laws that a single successful hypothesis should 
be able to explain: the laws of equivalence, multiple proportions, combining volumes of 
gases, volumes of isomorphous crystals, thermal equivalents of the elements, thermal 
equivalents of isomorphous crystals, Kopp's Law of Boiling points and Prout's Law as 
modified by Dumas. Particular attention is paid to the laws of proportion which, as we have 
seen, were foundational to Dalton in the formation of his theory. In denying atomism’s 
ability to explain the empirical laws of chemical proportion Peirce (1863:78) comments, 
 
The explanation is that these are the weights of the atoms and that bodies combine 
atom by atom. But how should we know that they combine atom by atom? This is 
an addition to the hypothesis. 
 
In extending this point Peirce (1863:80) argues that the law of definite proportion30 ‘is 
capable of demonstration without any hypothesis’. Given Peirce’s reference to ‘atom by 
atom’ it is the suggestion of physical atoms that he is rejecting here. That is to say 
                                                          
30
 The French chemist Joseph Proust (1799) first proposed the law of constant composition as a 
result of his observations that in chemical compound the elements were always present in the same 
definite proportion by weight 
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establishing that the law of definite proportion, as applied for example to copper oxide, can 
be demonstrated empirically – in line with Rocke’s (2005) and Chalmers’s (2009) discussion 
of chemical atomism. Any reference to physical atomism is in Peirce’s view speculative and 
in addition to the experimental data. There then follows Peirce’s explanation of the law of 
definite proportions where, and in some detail, Peirce draws on Kant’s dynamic theory of 
matter. The argument begins with Peirce (1863:80) stating that ‘we can conceive of no 
event in space which does not consist of a motion’ where ‘every quality of matter is either 
motion or some element of the mental analysis of the conception of a body moving in some 
way or other’.  
 
The action of one body on another as in a chemical reaction is, explains Peirce (1863:80), 
‘merely one motion modifying a second to produce a third’ where motion ‘communicates 
itself from the moving particle to all others which are in communication with that’. This 
reference to moving particles communicating through their motion resonates with the 
earlier Kantian metaphysical-dynamical approach where different substances act (in 
modern terms, react) through the recombination of their respective attractive and 
repulsive forces. Taking the case of two substances reacting then it is through these forces, 
inherent in the bodies themselves, that brings about what Peirce (1863:80) describes as a 
‘homogeneity of quality throughout the two’ – or what today would be said to be the 
products of chemical change. In covering cases where no reaction occurs the Kantian theme 
is continued, where the lack of change is the result of there being equal forces of attraction 
and repulsion between the two reacting bodies. It is clear, states Peirce (1863:80), that 
‘when the force of the acting body equals that of the body acted upon, all the force will be 
exhausted in preventing the homogeneity’ – that is to say no chemical change takes place. 
It is at this point that Peirce (1863:80) applies the dynamical theory of matter to the law of 
constant composition: 
 
Now the same kind of matter under the same dynamical conditions possesses 
always the same amount of force proportionally to its mass; hence when one kind 
of matter acts on another through being of a different kind, it can only act on a 
definite amount of that matter, the dynamical circumstances remaining the same. 
 
Take for example the burning of magnesium in air – a reaction known at Peirce’s time - and 
relate this to his explanation above. The dynamic forces associated with magnesium and 
oxygen are both different in magnitude and proportional to their respective masses. 
Magnesium metal burns brightly in air to form what Cooke (1868:115), and very likely 
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Peirce, knew as ‘magnesic oxide’ – in today’s terms magnesium oxide, MgO. There is a limit 
to the amount of magnesium able to combine through the process of intussusception with a 
particular quantity of oxygen whereby the sum total of dynamic attractive forces exceeds 
the net forces of repulsion. This being the case the reacting mass ratios of each element will 
remain constant and the resulting magnesium oxide will have fixed proportions of each 
element (MgO). No recourse to atomism is needed.  
 
I would argue that in setting out his arguments to his ‘Chemical Theory of Interpenetration’, 
Peirce adopts a Kantian approach. We have seen how Peirce acknowledges the need for 
explanations to fall within ‘our a priori conceptions’. Furthermore and seemingly in accord 
with Kant above, Peirce (1863:78) suggests that in order to account for a concept such as 
the atomic theory, arguments based on the ‘properties of matter’ – such as the chemical 
law of multiple proportions – are only useful ‘so far as they are conditions of certain 
motions’. It is, Peirce continues, ‘[t]hese motions [that] are the real explanation’. In 
conclusion Peirce states that, ‘[t]he object of the present article is to apply this principle to 
the Atomic Theory’. This echoes Kant who states that ‘the moveable with its moving forces 
is arranged in a system of nature’ which become manifest ‘according to the laws of 
experience’.  
 
2.3.3 ‘The Chemical Theory of Interpenetration’ (1863) and Prout’s Hypothesis 
In this third and final section we will see that in seeking to justify Prout’s hypothesis Peirce 
is joining a debate then common to other historical actors of nineteenth century chemistry. 
Peirce (1863:81) explains Prout’s Law as follows: ‘If we suppose, with the metaphysicians, 
that all the kinds of matter are derived from one…all the equivalents of the elements will be 
multiples of that of the original matter’. Peirce’s attempts to demonstrate the validity of 
Prout’s Law as modified by Dumas will be taken up later in this section. Nineteenth century 
chemists had, argues Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent (1986:5), ‘two alternative strategies to 
cope with the multitude of elements [being discovered]’ One was Prout’s hypothesis which 
sought to reduce the multitude of individual elements into aggregates of a single element 
or primary matter. The second, argues Bensaude-Vincent (1986:6), supported as did 
Mendeleev that, ‘elements were actually individual, and that they would never be divided 
or converted into another element’. Supporters of Prout’s hypothesis included: in Britain, 
Thomas Thompson, the French chemist Jean-Baptiste Dumas and the Swiss chemist Jean 
Charles Galissard de Marignac. The hypothesis became an issue of debate amongst 
nineteenth century chemists and came under attack, argues Bensaude-Vincent (1986:6), 
‘when more accurate experiments brought undesirable, non-integral values for atomic 
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weights’. In America Ralf Hamerla (2006:173) states that Josiah Cooke and his student 
Theodor Richards (later awarded America’s first Nobel Prize for chemistry), who both 
investigated atomic weight values in the early 1860s, ‘eventually concluded that Prout’s 
hypothesis had to be viewed as valid until better analytic techniques could determine 
otherwise’. Prout’s hypothesis was something that concerned chemists both in Europe and 
in America. The balance of the debate is captured by Hamerla (2006:157) when he states 
that, [w]hile there were vocal opponents of Prout’s hypothesis, by the second half of the 
nineteenth century a majority of scientists accepted it as correct’. 
 
In this section we see Peirce, as a nineteenth century chemist, engaging in the debate 
around Prout’s hypothesis. Yet again, rather than dismissing metaphysics as not falling 
within the context of chemistry – as his tutor Cooke did – Peirce engaged in an empirical 
inquiry into the dispute around Prout’s hypothesis, at the same time framing his 
explanations within a wider metaphysical framework. Before looking at what Peirce has to 
say on Prout’s hypothesis it is worth looking at some of the issues surrounding this 
hypothesis at the time by way of historical context.  
 
The English physician William Prout (1785-1850) measured the specific gravities of a wide 
range of substances and found these to be generally integral multiples of hydrogen at one 
unit. As a result Prout (1816:29) stated that `if the views we have ventured to advance be 
correct, we may almost consider the πρώτη ὕλη31 of the ancients to be realized in 
hydrogen’. This has become known as Prout’s law or hypothesis and can be stated as ‘the 
atomic weights of the elements are integer multiples of that of hydrogen’. As Otto Benfey 
(2006:104) explains, Prout’s proposal ‘led to much fruitful research throughout the 19th 
century and later to some ingenious speculations as to why atomic weights deviated from 
integral values’. As techniques for determining atomic weights improved and values were 
re-calculated, some elements were found to have non-integral values and so were 
seemingly in conflict with Prout’s hypothesis. Chemists began to take sides, as Hans-Werner 
Schütt (2006:243) explains, ‘alongside Berzelius, chemists like Jean Servais Stas (1813–
1891) rejected Prout’s hypothesis on analytical grounds, while chemists such as Thomas 
Thomson (1773–1852) and Dumas tended to support it’. Later it will be shown that Peirce, 
in common with other chemists of his time, also took an empirical approach to the 
verification of Prout’s hypothesis.  Two years after Prout published his hypothesis, the 
Swedish chemist Jöns Berzelius determined independently the atomic weights of forty-five 
                                                          
31
 πρώτη ὕλη translates from the Greek as prote hyle  (sometimes described as prime matter) from 
which the term protyle is derived. 
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elements. A stumbling block for Berzelius was the non-integral values for elements such as 
chlorine (35.47). These values, explains A A Matyshev (2005:1269), ‘were inconsistent with 
the Prout hypothesis’; therefore Berzelius rejected it. 
 
To place Peirce’s approach in context it is worth considering in brief the contribution to the 
debate around Prout’s hypothesis made by other nineteenth century chemists. For example 
the Belgian analytical chemist Jean Servais Stas (1813 - 1891), later to be shown as one of 
Peirce’s sources of atomic weight values, also tested Prout’s hypothesis. As we will see, 
Stas, in common with Peirce, selects only those elements showing the greatest stability and 
agreement in their atomic weights. Writing three years before Peirce, Stas (1860:45) 
chooses nitrogen, chlorine, sulphur, potassium sodium, lead and silver because he explains 
‘they are the best known, form the stablest compounds, and because generally they have 
been regarded as obeying Prout's law’. In describing his technique Stas (1860:40) states 
that he has exercised the most ‘efficacious control’ of his methods and ensured sufficient 
repeats for each value ‘so that the probability in favour of their exactness becomes very 
great’. Somewhat differently to Peirce who as we will see finds in favour of Prout’s Law, 
Stas (1860:45) comes to the following view, 
 
I conclude then by saying: as long as we hold to experiment for determining the 
laws which regulate matter, we must consider Prout's law as a pure illusion, and 
regard the un-decomposable bodies of our globe as distinct entities having no 
simple relation by weight to one another. 
 
The Swiss chemist Jean Charles Galissard de Marignac (1817 – 1894) in response to Stas’s 
paper, whilst praising the thoroughness and accuracy of his method, rejects his conclusion. 
Stas, and as we shall see later Peirce, tested Prout’s hypothesis by seeking a common 
divisor for the atomic weights. Marignac takes a different approach in suggesting that a 
number of the laws of chemistry, such as Gay-Lussac’s law of gaseous volumes, have been 
shown to be inexact when subjected to particularly precise measurements. Such laws are 
none the less useful to chemists in calculating quantities to degree of precision that they 
find acceptable for practical purposes. From this perspective of practice Marignac 
(1860:57), believes that for Prout’s hypothesis too, ‘even if it is not rigorously confirmed by 
experience, it none the less appears to express the ratios between the atomic weights of 
the elements with sufficient accuracy for the practical calculations of chemistry…’. In his 
concluding paragraph Marignac offers the following comment to chemists such as Stas, and 
later Peirce, who favour the ‘common divisor’ approach to testing Prout’s hypothesis. 
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Firstly Marignac (1860:58) reminds his readers of the fundamental principle of ‘the unity of 
matter’ that prompted Prout’s formulation of his law and also of ‘all the more or less 
brilliant conceptions which have been based on this principle’. Secondly the fruitfulness of 
Prout’s hypothesis is in Marignac’s (1860:58) opinion ‘altogether independent of the 
magnitude of the unit which serves as common divisor to the atomic weights of the 
elements…whether this weight be that of a single atom of hydrogen, or of a half or a 
quarter atom or whether it be an infinitely smaller fraction, say a hundredth or a 
thousandth…’Marignac (1860:58) takes the view that Prout’s hypothesis may not imply a 
common divisor for every element’s atomic weight because the ‘primordial atoms’ of 
primary matter are grouped together as ‘chemical atoms’ and ‘obey[ing] the law of 
universal attraction’ in such a way ‘that the weight of each group might not be exactly the 
sum of the weights of the primordial atoms composing it’. With this argument Marignac 
sought to save Prout’s hypothesis. 
 
In reviewing the points described above it can be seen that the dispute surrounding Prout’s 
hypothesis was centred on how the changing atomic weight data over time fitted the 
possibility of a common divisor. In 1859 and six years before Peirce’s paper, Dumas 
published a list of the atomic weights for thirty five elements showing values that were 
either whole multiples of 1, 0.5, or 0.25 - for example, C = 6, Cl = 35.5, Cu=32.75. On the 
basis of this evidence Dumas proposed a modification of Prout’s original hypotheses where 
atoms were composed of primary units of matter of mass 0.25 (with H=1). The primary 
units could no longer be thought of as hydrogen atoms. Later in this section we will see 
Peirce also working from Dumas’s modification of Prout’s hypothesis.  
 
As atomic weights were determined with ever increasing accuracy no common divisor could 
be found with Prout’s hypothesis becoming ever more difficult to defend. In his third paper 
(1871) and two years after the first publication of his periodic system, Mendeleev32 
expresses this point as follows, 
 
Everybody knows the fate of Prout's hypothesis, viz., that the atomic weights of the 
elements are integer multiples of that of hydrogen. There could have been no 
doubt whatsoever that this hypothesis overstated the facts, after exact 
investigations had shown that there are atomic weights which contain fractions, 
and after Stas has shown that there are no rational fractions among them, despite 
                                                          
32 Cited in Sambursky (1969:106) 
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Marignac's33 splendid critical remarks in support of the hypothesis. It seems to me 
that there are no sufficient reasons in favour of accepting this hypothesis. 
 
Without going into further details of this debate the attempts to salvage Prout’s Hypothesis 
are captured by (1917:298) by Alexander Scott in his 1917 presidential address to the Royal 
Society of Chemistry,  
 
As the determinations of atomic weights increased in accuracy doubts began 
likewise to grow in strength as to the validity of “Prout’s law,” as it was not 
unfrequently styled. Marignac’s modification to take 0.5 of the hydrogen unit as a 
common divisor would not fit all cases; even reducing this to half, that is, 0.25, as 
Dumas proposed, was not enough to bring all into line.  
 
Peirce also adopts an empirical approach to show the validity of Prout’s Law. In making his 
calculations Peirce (1863:79) decides that ‘the only atomic weights which have been 
determined with sufficient accuracy to test the law, besides those of Stas, are the following’ 
and lists with others Berzelius, Dumas and Liebig. In making his calculations as shown in the 
table below Peirce (1863:79) is attempting to use the most accurate and reliable data 
available to him at the time.  
 
 
Peirce lists the experimental atomic 
weights and the atomic weights 
expected from Dumas’s modification of 
Prout’s Law. To test the agreement 
Peirce calculates the difference 
between the two values and then 
expresses this as a fraction of 
experimental value. In conclusion 
Peirce (1863:79) affirms his belief in 
Prout’s law in stating that, although ‘K 
is an unexplained anomaly’ nonetheless 
‘the probability is still in favour of the 
law’.  
Figure 6: Testing Prout’s Law as modified by Dumas 
Source: Peirce’s (1863) ‘The Chemical Theory of Interpenetration’, page 79 
                                                          
33
 Marignac’s ‘splendid critical remarks’ will be taken up later in this chapter. 
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A close examination of Peirce’s results and conclusions yields a number of curious points. 
Firstly the entry for silver (Ag) in the final column has been wrongly calculated (or 
misprinted) with the correct value being 1/1800 and not 1/1600 as Peirce states in error. 
Secondly Peirce’s identification of potassium (K) as the sole anomaly is seemingly not 
consistent with his results. Potassium is identified on the evidence of the greatest 
difference (0.096) between its atomic weight as experimentally determined and the value 
in accord with Prout’s hypothesis. Another measure of agreement between the two values 
would be to express the difference as a fraction or as a percentage of the accepted 
experimental value – what today would be regarded as the experimental error. In the final 
column of the table Peirce makes a similar calculation of error which he expresses as a 
fraction of the accepted experimental value for the atomic weight. On this basis if 
potassium (K) is identified as anomalous with a value of 1/400, then so too should any 
element with a value equal or greater than this. Looking at the table this would give the 
following elements as anomalous: K, N, H and Li – that is to say four of Peirce’s original set 
of eleven elements. This casts doubt on Peirce’s (1863:79) conclusion of the data being ‘in 
favour of the [Prout’s] law’. The results corrected for silver and including a column for the 
percentage error given by the atomic weight in accord with Prout’s hypothesis are given 
below: 
Element Difference between experimental 
atomic weight and that in 
agreement with Prout’s hypothesis 
expressed as a fraction of the 
experimental value 
Percentage 
error 
 
H 1/200 0.50 Elements with deviations 
from Prout’s hypothesis that 
are equal or greater to the 
value for potassium (K) 
N 1/350 0.29 
K 1/400 0.25 
Li 1/400 0.25 
Na 1/500 0.20  
S 1/500 0.20  
Cl 1/900 0.11  
C 1/1500 0.07  
Ag  1/1800 (corrected value) 0.06  
Pb 1/2000 0.05  
Ca 1/10 000 0.01  
Figure 7: Differences between atomic weights determined experimentally and values in 
accord with Prout’s hypothesis (modified by Dumas) 
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Peirce (1863:79) states himself as satisfied of the validity of Prout’s hypothesis as modified 
by Dumas although his reasons for identifying potassium as the sole anomaly are puzzling, 
 
K is an unexplained anomaly, but the probability of only one difference out of 
thirteen being greater than 0.25/4 is 0.0000087, while the effect of the residual 
influence which carries K out of this limit is only 1/12000 of the atomic weight. 
 
Firstly it is not clear what Peirce means by ‘only one difference out of thirteen’ as his table 
contains a total of eleven elements. His method for evaluating the evidence given in his 
table does not address the three other elements – hydrogen, nitrogen and lithium -  where 
the difference between the experimental atomic weight and the value based on Prout’s 
hypothesis is equal or greater than that for potassium. 
 
Having claimed to have demonstrated the validity of Dumas’s variant of Prout’s hypothesis, 
Peirce (1863:79) contends that this ‘must probably be capable of a common explanation 
with the rest ‘of the other laws of chemistry’ whilst claiming that ‘it is clear that the atomic 
hypothesis can never explain it’. In rejecting atomism as an explanation for the laws of 
chemical composition and for Prout’s hypothesis, Peirce (1863:81) claims that, in accord 
with Kant, ‘matter is not absolutely impenetrable and that chemical union consists in the 
interpenetration of the constituents’. From this Kantian perspective Peirce (1863:81)  
argues that, ‘if we suppose, with the metaphysicians, that all the kinds of matter are 
derived from one’ then the atomic weights of the elements ‘will be multiples of the original 
matter’ and it is ‘this explains Prout’s Law’. In sum: Peirce’s chemical theory of 
interpenetration, which draws on Kant’s dynamical theory of matter, holds that matter is 
not completely impenetrable. Prout’s Law is explained on the basis that Peirce’s ‘original 
matter’ condenses to produce the chemical elements with atomic weights that are integer 
multiples of that original matter.  
 
In this section we have seen Peirce take a typically empirical approach to testing the validity 
of Prout’s hypothesis and confirming Dumas’s common divisor for the atomic weights 
having a value of 0.25. I would argue that in seeking to justify Prout’s hypothesis the 
‘younger’ Peirce showed a research interest that was common to other chemists of his 
period. His approach was conventional in that he used mathematical methods to justify a 
common divisor to the atomic weights of those elements where there was good agreement 
on their individual values. His method was typically empirical for a chemist in using atomic 
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weight data gained through the experience of making observations during the course of 
experimentation.  
 
Where Peirce differs however, is in his readiness to frame his empirically derived 
conclusions within a wider metaphysical framework. In this case Prout’s law is explained by 
a dynamical theory of matter. Other chemists of his period were far less interested in 
relating their chemical knowledge to any underlying metaphysical scheme – with Peirce’s 
tutor Josiah Cooke being one typical example. Peirce’s second chemistry paper published 
six years later in 1869 again shows Peirce immersed in another common concern of 
nineteenth century chemistry but this time without the metaphysical speculations of the 
paper just discussed. These are not issues that have featured in Peirce scholarship so far. 
 
 
2.4 ‘The Pairing of the Elements’ (1869) – classifying the elements according to their 
atomic weights 
In this section I examine Peirce’s research interest in developing a system for classifying and 
grouping the chemical elements according to atomic weight is common to nineteenth 
century chemistry. In this respect Peirce’s interest is again main-stream for the period. In 
fact, as has already been discussed in chapter one, Peirce’s interests were also shared by 
his tutor Josiah Cooke. 
 
In February 1869 Dmitri Mendeleev published the first edition of his periodic table. In 
September of the same year The Scientific American34 reported, ‘Mr Charles S Peirce, of 
Cambridge, had greatly added to the illustration of the fact [elements that had 
corresponding or closely approximating atomic weights were related in physical properties] 
of pairing by representing in a diagram the elements in positions determined by ordinates 
representing the atomic numbers’. The arrangement of the chemical elements that Peirce 
achieved  is described by Nathan Houser (1982:xx) as going ‘far in Mendeleev’s direction, 
before Mendeleev’s announcement of the [periodic] law’ and before Mendeleev’s work 
‘became known in Western Europe and America’. Here again Peirce’s chemical researches 
mirror the concerns of other researches in both North America and in Europe. This is a 
diagrammatic representation of Peirce’s arrangement from his paper ‘The Pairing of the 
Elements’ published in Chemical News 1869: 
 
                                                          
34 Scientific American (21) (1869:162) 
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Here Peirce’s (1869:340) table divides the elements into 
two columns: perissads and artiads. Using modern 
nomenclature perissads are elements with odd-numbered 
valencies where artiads have even-numbered valencies. 
Josiah Cooke (1874:59) defines the terms as follows: 
‘atoms like those of sulphur, whose quantivalance is always 
even, are called artiads, while those like nitrogen, whose 
quantivalence is always odd, are called perissads’. The 
terms are derrived empirically from a quantative study of 
sulphur and nitrogen and their compounds. The elements 
are arranged in height order by atomic weights. Elements 
belonging to what Peirce (1869:340) describes as ‘series’ 
and later to be known as groups appear as vertical 
columns. Collected under the perissads are the monovalent 
metals Li, Na, K, Rb and Cs and under the artiads the 
bivalent metals Mg, Ca, Sr, Ba. Peirce (1869:340) notes the 
pattern of ‘parallel shelving lines’ but more importantly the 
‘correspondence between the series of artiads and 
perissads which have the highest atomic weights – that is 
to say, Na, K, Rb, Cs, Tl, on the one hand, and Mg, Ca, Sr, 
Ba, Pb, on the other’. By arranging the elements by atomic 
weight Peirce has achieved a ‘pairing of the elements’ with 
similar properties. Taking for example Peirce’s series of 
what will later be known as the group I and II metals, Na is 
paired with Mg, K with Ca and so on. Peirce notes their 
chemical similarity in that ‘they form strong bases and 
peroxides, but no suboxides or acids’. The paper includes 
other similar connections between say what is now known 
as the halogens (group VII) and group VI - F pairs with O, Cl 
with S and so on. This particular ‘pairing’ brings elements 
of similar properties together, Peirce notes, in that they 
‘unite in simple proportions’ with the metals mentioned 
above and ‘form strong acids with oxygen, but never 
bases’. 
Figure 8: Peirce’s arrangement of the chemical elements 
Source: Peirce’s (1869) ‘The Pairing of the Elements’, page 340 
 
Commenting on Mendeleev’s original paper (1869) on the periodic law Eric Scerri and John 
Worrall (2001:414) state, ‘very similar ideas were being developed independently by others 
in 1869 and indeed earlier Lothar Meyer, for example, had essentially the same table; and 
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other periodic tables with some differences to Mendeleev's but with much overlap, were, 
as is well known, developed by Hinrich, Odling, de Chancourtois and Newlands’. For 
example in 1863 the English chemist John Newlands organised fifty-six elements into eleven 
groups according to their physical properties. A year later Newlands published a version of 
the periodic table where the chemistry of every eighth element was similar – his so-called 
law of octaves. A second example is the German chemist Julius Lothar Meyer who five years 
before Mendeleev produced a table comprising twenty eight elements organised by 
valence.  
 
In common with Mendeleev and other earlier workers on the classification of the chemical 
elements, Peirce too recognised the organisational power of atomic weights order to reveal 
groups of elements with similar chemical behaviour. Also worth noting is that whilst Peirce 
(1869:340) writes of ‘resemblances between elements’, he does not frame his account in 
terms of the relations to be found in Mendeleev and in Cooke. This is perhaps because 
whilst some intriguing patterns emerge (such as the pairing of Na and Mg) Peirce 
(1869:339) describes ‘the regularity observable’ as ‘certainly a very rude one’. As noted 
earlier, Peirce orders around sixty elements into two series: artiads and perissads, with a 
close correspondence between a number of elements belonging to the two series. Whilst 
Peirce regards his system as rather rudimentary in form, Helge Kragh (2010:100) notes that 
‘[i]n fact, the correspondence amounted to a classification of groups of elements which in 
some cases were the same as those proposed by Mendeleev the same year. Furthermore 
Kragh (2010:100) argues that, ‘although Peirce’s “pairing” scheme of elements has not 
attracted attention among historians of chemistry, it clearly has a place in the history of the 
periodic system’. To my knowledge Peirce’s scheme does not feature in the recent standard 
texts on the periodic table (e.g Scerri 2007, 2011). Here again we see Peirce engaged in a 
research programme common to other nineteenth century chemists. The extent of 
regularity that Peirce has uncovered in this brief paper is insufficient to justify the detailing 
of relations35 between the chemical elements. It is worth now however pursuing an 
occasion that same year (1869) Peirce connects regularity, orderliness and the possible 
existence of relations.  
 
 
 
                                                          
35
 The role of relations in the writings of Peirce and Mendeleev will be considered in detail in chapter 
four. 
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2.5 The relationship between Peirce’s chemistry and his philosophical writings of the 
same period 
Towards the end of the 1860s Peirce published three essays in the Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy which Bergman (2007a:53) describes as, ‘a stinging criticism of Cartesian 
thought … advocat[ing] a semiotic theory of cognition that denied the privileged status of 
individual intuitions while affirming the dynamic and ultimately social nature of 
knowledge’. In 1869, the year Peirce is also writing on the possibility of an orderly 
arrangement among the chemical elements, the second of his anti-sceptical, anti-Cartesian 
essays, ‘Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic: Further Consequences of Four 
Incapacities’ is published. A section of this essay is concerned with hypothesis formation 
and inductive inference where Peirce states: ‘All probable inference, whether induction or 
hypothesis, is inference from the parts to the whole. It is essentially the same, therefore, as 
statistical inference’ (EP1:78, 1869). 
 
Returning to Peirce’s ‘Pairing of the Elements’ (1869) we can see Peirce applying inductive 
thinking when he discusses his arrangements of the chemical elements. For example, Peirce 
(1869:339) notes that in order to arrive at his diagrammatic arrangement he has, ‘put the 
different elements at heights representing their atomic weights, and those of one series in 
columns together’ – the series being families of elements with similar physiochemical 
properties. Here Peirce uses inductive reasoning to build his series by ‘infer[ing]’ from the 
parts’ – the individual atomic weights and knowledge of each element’s series – ‘to the 
whole’ as shown by ‘The Pairing of the Elements’. In so doing Peirce has managed to project 
a degree of order onto the approximately sixty chemical elements that fall within his 
scheme. Interestingly though, in his essay ‘Further Consequences’ (1869) Peirce rejects any 
justification of induction on the inherent orderliness of nature when he states that such an 
explanation ‘will not do’ for ‘nature is not regular’ (EP1:75, 1869).  
 
Before pursuing Peirce’s claim any further it is worth exploring first what he understands 
here by the term relations. By way of clarification Peirce describes a hypothetical event 
where a man in China buys a cow shortly after a Greenlander sneezes. Although Peirce 
writes of these two events as a state of relations, they are he explains ‘not connected with 
any regularity whatever’, stating further that ‘such relations [are] infinitely more frequent 
than those which are regular’ (EP1:75, 1869). Thus for Peirce the term relations can be used 
to associate frequent (‘regular’) events such as a Greenlander sneezing with the possibility 
of having contracted the cold virus. There are also incidental or irregular relations such as 
the purchase of a cow in China with a person sneezing many thousands of miles away in 
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Greenland. These points are emphasised by Peirce when he again picks up the themes of 
orderliness, regularity and relations, 
 
 The orderliness of the universe, therefore, if it exists, must consist in the large 
proportion of relations which present a regularity to those which are quite 
irregular. But this proportion in the actual universe is, as we have seen, as small as 
it can be; and, therefore, the orderliness of the universe is as little as that of any 
arrangement whatever. (EP1:76, 1869) 
 
Note here the two points already encountered. Firstly Peirce implies that regularity is not 
always required in order for a relation to exist.  Secondly, the most common relations are 
those that present as irregular; our experience of orderliness presents as that proportion of 
relations that are regular. A third point to note is that Peirce emphasises the dominance of 
irregular relations in nature in stating, ‘it is true that the special laws and regularities are 
innumerable; but nobody thinks of the irregularities, which are infinitely more frequent’ 
(EP1:75, 1869). Regularities where they exist are therefore something of a surprise and 
worthy of further inquiry in search of an explanation – which Peirce attempts in his Paring 
of the Elements in searching for a degree of order among the chemical elements. 
 
It is possible to connect further aspects of Peirce’s Further Consequences of Four 
Incapacities – his philosophy - with his paper investigating the possible orderliness amongst 
the chemical elements – his chemistry – both written in 1869. In Further Consequences 
Peirce makes the perhaps surprising statement for a chemist, who is at the same time 
publishing on a possible orderly arrangement of the chemical elements, that even if there 
were orderliness in nature, ‘it never could be discovered’(EP1:76, 1869). The reason, 
explains Peirce, is that should such orderliness exist, ‘it would belong to things either 
collectively or distributively’. Where orderliness belongs to a set or system of things 
collectively, the difficulty Peirce explains is that, ‘a system can only be known by seeing 
some considerable proportion of the whole’ (EP1:75, 1869). It is difficult to justify 
projecting a degree of discovered orderliness onto the whole of nature as there is no way of 
knowing how large a proportion of nature the discovered order relates to. In describing his 
arrangements of the chemical elements Peirce echoes the earlier point on ‘collective 
order’. In ‘The Pairing of the Elements’, Peirce (1869:339) explains that his proposal of a 
degree of regularity shown by the ‘pairing of the elements’ is limited in reach in that he is 
dealing with ‘only sixty elementary substances, out of the myriads which there might 
probably be’, and so we ought not to expect a ‘more accurate classification of them’ than 
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he is presenting. Thus the chemist’s claim of discovering orderliness among the chemical 
elements is necessarily limited by knowing only a few examples from the ‘myriad’ of total 
possibilities. For, as Peirce (1869:339) explains, how accurate would a classification of the 
animal kingdom be ‘if only sixty animals were known’.  
 
The second kind of order which Peirce claims in Further Consequences of Four Incapacities 
is described as distributive, that is ‘belonged to all things only by belonging to each thing’ 
where the difficulty here lies in that ‘a character can only be known by comparing 
something which has it with something which has it not’ (EP1:76, 1869). This form of 
orderliness or regularity also resonates with Peirce’s paper on the chemical elements. A 
degree of order is established by grouping the elements according to their atomic weights. 
The groupings are confirmed by the presence of chemical characteristics that are held in 
common. For example Peirce (1869:340) relates the monovalent metals (perissads) Na, K, 
Rb, Cs and Tl to the divalent (artiads) Mg, Ca, Sr, Ba and Pb in that they ‘form strong bases 
and peroxides, but no suboxides or acids’. All elements outside these two sets of metals – 
part of Peirce’s evidence for the ‘pairing of the elements’ – do not possess these particular 
properties. Peirce also compares the two groups F, Cl, Br and I with O, S, Se and Te in that 
they ‘form strong acids with oxygen, but never bases’. Again the chemical character of 
these elements is known by comparing a property they all possess with the remaining 
elements that do not. The process here is one of taking a sub-set of the total known 
elements deciding on a quality that brings them into relation with one another, qualities 
that are not present in the remaining elements. Connecting Peirce’s 1869 papers on 
chemistry and inductive logic, it would seem that in order to justify his groupings or 
‘pairings of the elements’ Peirce claims the existence of a degree of distributive order. He 
achieves this by comparing the chemical properties common to a particular set of ‘pairs of 
elements’ (something which has it) with the remaining elements where this property is 
absent (something which has with it not).  
 
So what are we to make of the seeming contradiction between Peirce’s claim for having 
discovered some order among the chemical elements – albeit an imperfect one – and his 
philosophical claim that if order existed in nature it could not be discovered? 36 Does 
Peirce’s practice as a chemist conflict with his early philosophical writings on inductive 
reasoning? The target of Peirce’s arguments on the nature of order within the universe is 
J.S Mill, who as Peirce states ‘explains the validity of induction by the uniformity of nature’ 
                                                          
36
 I am grateful to Mats Bergman in helping me to clarify my thoughts in this section 
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(EP1:77, 1869). Peirce does not believe that ‘the validity of induction and hypothesis [are] 
dependent on a particular constitution of the universe’ (EP1:76, 1869) – upon how the 
universe happens to be. In the universe as we experience it, whilst inductive arguments can 
on occasion fail, Peirce maintains, ‘all that can be said is that in the long run they prove 
approximately correct’ (EP1:76, 1869). On a broader point, Peirce argues that inductive 
inference is both fallible and ultimately self-correcting when he argues that, ‘it cannot be 
said that we know an inductive conclusion to be true, however loosely we state it; we only 
know that by accepting inductive conclusions, in the long run our errors balance one 
another’ (EP1:79, 1869). 
 
Would Peirce at this time deny the discoverability of regularities in the world? I think not. 
Then how is it that an inquirer from Peirce’s perspective, by reasoning inductively, is able to 
seemingly discover a degree of order in the world – such as Peirce’s arrangements of the 
chemical elements? Some insight is given later in Further Consequences (1869), where 
Peirce offers an account of induction within a realist framework,  
 
The other question relative to the validity of induction, is why men are not fated 
always to light upon those inductions which are highly deceptive. The explanation 
of the former branch of the problem we have seen to be that there is something 
real. Now, since if there is anything real, then (on account of this reality consisting 
in the ultimate agreement of all men, and on account of the fact that reasoning 
from parts to whole, is the only kind of synthetic reasoning which men possess) it 
follows necessarily that a sufficiently long succession of inferences from parts to 
whole will lead men to a knowledge of it, so that in that case they cannot be fated 
on the whole to be thoroughly unlucky in their inductions. (EP1:79, 1869) 
 
In his paper ‘The Pairing of the Elements’ and by inductive reasoning – ‘the only kind of 
synthetic reasoning which men possess’ – Peirce offers his arrangement as a contribution to 
the nineteenth century inquiry into the chemical elements. The hope is that in the longer 
term chemists will eventually gain the knowledge they are seeking, as ‘they cannot be fated 
on the whole to be thoroughly unlucky in their inductions’. Peirce (1869:339) acknowledges 
that his own inductions have achieved a somewhat imperfect knowledge when he states, 
‘[t]he regularity observable is certainly a very rude one’. Perhaps we might regard 
Mendeleev, who like Peirce also published his arrangement in 1869, as being luckier in his 
inductions.  
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2.6 Conclusion 
As a nineteenth century chemist Peirce was not unusual in that he shared both interests 
and empirical methods in common with many of his contemporaries. In this chapter whilst 
not wishing to challenge Fisch’s view of Peirce as ‘most original and versatile intellect’, I 
have highlighted that as a chemist, Peirce operated within the boundaries of what Thomas 
Kuhn (1996) described as normal science37. Where Peirce differed was in his ready 
willingness to engage with the metaphysical issues that many chemists, including his tutor 
Josiah Cooke, chose to ignore. During the 1860s most scholars agree that Peirce almost 
‘outsources’ his metaphysics from Kant when forming his philosophical position. What I 
believe is an addition to this scholarship is my claim that Peirce’s Kantian metaphysics 
emerges in his chemistry.  
 
Of significance is that in 1869 Peirce, by employing inductive reasoning, argues for an 
orderly arrangement of the chemical elements. That same year Peirce publishes a series of 
three papers which includes a justification for inductive reasoning which denies J.S Mill’s 
defence in terms of the orderliness of nature. I would argue that Peirce does not deny the 
discoverability of regularities in the world; rather the insufficiency of such an appeal to 
order to justify inductive reasoning. As we have seen Peirce’s justification turns on the 
likelihood that in the longer term inquirers – such as chemists seeking a ordered system for 
the chemical elements – would be ‘fated’ on occasion to be successful in their inductions, 
inductive reasoning being, at least at this stage in Peirce’s philosophy, the only form of 
‘synthetic reasoning’ inquirers possess.  
 
I believe this is an addition to Peirce scholarship where there is little discussion of his 
chemistry papers of 1863 and 1869 or their relation to his philosophical writings of the 
time. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
37
 Kuhn (1996:10) states: ‘Normal science means research firmly based upon one or more past 
scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a 
time as supplying the foundation for its further practice. 
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Chapter Three 
Dmitri Mendeleev and Charles Peirce – the relations between 
chemists, chemistry and philosophy 
 
3.1 Introduction 
So far, in chapter one I tried to show that Peirce’s study of chemistry under Josiah Cooke, 
with an emphasis on mathematics and the use of diagrams paved the way to Peirce's 
subsequent research in chemistry and allied well with Peirce’s later treatment of diagrams 
as a way of visualizing relations. In chapter two I discussed examples of Peirce’s own 
researches into chemistry. In this chapter I will further explore Peirce’s work in chemistry, 
on the nature of relations, and his use of diagrams to create knowledge and to foster 
understanding.  
 
This is relevant to this project for two reasons. Firstly I will argue that the concept of 
relations was important not only to Peirce but also to the Russian chemist Dmitri 
Mendeleev. This will establish some important common ground between these two 
philosopher chemists, ahead of chapter four, where Peirce’s formulation of iconicity will be 
applied to Mendeleev’s periodic table. Secondly, I will show that Peirce had an abiding 
interest in Mendeleev’s periodic table long after its first publication in 1869. The periodic 
table, and the associated concept of chemical valency, will be shown to have provided 
Peirce with a particular mind-set when developing his phenomenology. This will involve an 
exploration into the late Peirce (1903) phenomenology; however it is not intended to be an 
exegesis on Peirce’s phenomenology which can be found for example in Parker (1998) as 
well as Rosensohn (1974&1977).  
 
Richard Atkins (2010) sets out the differences between Peirce’s formal categories 
(Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness) and his material categories by appealing to the 
relations between Peirce and Mendeleev. In particular Atkins (2010:101) characterises 
Peirce’s 1908 re-characterisation of the relationship between his formal and material 
categories as Peirce’s ‘Mendeleevian Model of Formal and Material Categories’. This project 
makes no attempt to deal with Peirce’s system of categories.  My focus will be on how 
Peirce's chemical mind-set contributed to define some key aspects of his phenomenology, 
broadly construed. Chemical valency is founded on the bonding relations between the 
chemical elements; the periodic table on their physio-chemical relations. Both afforded 
Peirce with ways of exploring his formulation of phenomenology diagrammatically. This too 
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will provide an important insight into Peirce’s use of diagrams to generate knowledge in the 
minds of his readers, ahead of the next chapter dealing with iconic diagrams.  
 
Why is the concept of relations of relevance to chemistry? The philosopher of chemistry 
Joachim Schummer (1998:135) argues that ‘chemistry at the core is a science of peculiar 
relations’; chemists such as Peirce and Mendeleev are not measuring, comparing and 
cataloguing isolated chemical objects but, as Schummer (1998:135) states, the ‘dynamic 
relations between objects [which] constitute the basic set of chemical knowledge’. When 
writing of Robert Bunsen (1811–1899) and Gustav Kirchhoff (1824–1887), who in 1860 and 
by using novel spectroscopic methods, discovered the two alkali metals caesium and 
rubidium, Peirce states that they ‘not only discovered these elements, but studied them so 
well…that they are now among those whose chemical relations are the best understood’ 
(W2:286, 1869 emphasis added). 
 
In a series of papers written in 1879 and published in Chemical News, Mendeleev 
(1879:243) emphasised the importance of establishing causal relations as a means of 
gathering new knowledge – he writes, ‘the principal end of modern chemistry is to extend 
our knowledge of the relations between the composition, the reactions, and the qualities of 
simple and compound bodies, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, the intrinsic 
qualities of elements which are contained in them; so as to be able to deduce from the 
known character of an element all the properties of all its compounds’(emphasis added). 
Mendeleev is concerned with the relations between the chemical elements of composition 
and the properties of their compounds. Peirce, in forming his position on phenomenology, 
sought to reveal and identify the most the most universal elements of experience, then, ‘to 
draw up a catalogue of categories…to make out the characteristics of each category, and to 
show the relations of each to the other’ (CP 5.43 1903, emphasis added). Where 
Mendeleev is dealing with the relations between the material elements of chemical 
composition, Peirce is as we shall see concerned with the relations between the conceptual 
elements of experience.  
 
The literature has accounts of the origins of Peirce’s phenomenology (Rosensohn 1974), the 
methodology of Peirce’s phenomenology (Rosenthal 1997) as well as the relationship 
between Peirce’s phenomenology and his three metaphysical categories of Firstness, 
Secondness and Thirdness (Misak 2004). Richard Atkins (2010 & 2012) uses the framework 
of Mendeleev’s periodic table to analyse Peirce’s categories. There is, however, very little 
on how Peirce uses his knowledge and understanding of chemistry and of Mendeleev’s 
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periodic table to explicate the ‘difficult work’ of ‘disentanglement’ of human thoughts that 
is the work of the phenomenologist. I will argue that elucidating Peirce’s use of chemistry 
affords a useful insight into his phenomenology, a view largely ignored in the literature.  
 
Before going any further it is worth setting out a brief description of Peirce’s 
phenomenology or phaneroscopy as he later termed it. In 1902, states Thomas Short 
(2007:60), Peirce ‘presented an ‘architectonic’ ordering of the sciences, within which he 
announced a new science, of phenomenology’. In first using the term phenomenology, 
Short (2007:61) states, Peirce initially ‘referred to Hegel…[and]… in 1904 he switched to 
‘phaneroscopy’ whilst also substituting the term ‘phaneron’ for phenomenon. Peirce sets 
out his position on phaneroscopy in 1904, and as part of his Adirondack Summer School 
Lecture (1904),  
 
Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron I mean the 
collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite 
regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not. (CP 1.284, 1905) 
 
On another occasion, explaining how we might approach the totality of our consciousness 
at any one instant, Peirce invites his reader ‘to join me in a little survey of the Phaneron…in 
order to discover what different forms of indecomposable elements it contains’ (EP2:362, 
1906). By using the term ‘indecomposable element’ – which he rejects as ‘pleonastic’- 
Peirce uses the term ‘element’ as it is ‘the only being a constituent of the Phaneron has’, 
and ‘indecomposable’ because each element ‘of the collective total’ of our consciousness is 
‘incapable of being separated by logical analysis into parts’ (EP2:362, 1906). The 
‘indecomposable’ nature of the cognitive elements of the phaneron is analogous to the 
irreducibility of the chemists’ atoms. By using the term ‘indecomposable elements’ in his 
‘little survey of the phaneron’ Peirce meant, states Gava (2011:238), ‘those features of our 
thought that could not be reduced to simpler concepts without losing their proper 
meaning’.  
 
By 1903 philosophy is described by Peirce as having three sub-divisions: phenomenology, 
normative science (aesthetics, ethics, and logic) and metaphysics38. In his 1903 lectures on 
pragmatism, Peirce describes the practice of phenomenology as, ‘simply to open our 
mental eyes and look well at the phenomenon and say what are the characteristics that are 
                                                          
38
 This is an example of Peirce’s later writings (1903) 
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never wanting in it, whether that phenomenon be something that outward experience 
forces upon our attention, or whether it be the wildest of dreams, or whether it be the 
most abstract and general of the conclusion of science’. No judgements as to causes or 
reasons are required, but only states Peirce the, ‘artist's observational power is what is 
most wanted in the study of phenomenology’ (CP 5.41 1903). Thus in terms of the 
methodology, Peirce writes that the phaneroscopist, ‘does not undertake, but sedulously 
avoids, hypothetical explanations of any sort…[but]…simply scrutinizes the direct 
appearances, and endeavours to combine minute accuracy with the broadest possible 
generalization’ (CP 1.287, 1904). Thus the method of the phaneroscopist, argues Sandra 
Rosenthal (1997:77), ‘does not make judgements concerning the reality that is observed’. A 
similar view is taken by Short (2007:67) when he states that the phaneroscopist should 
note appearances but, ‘not judge their veracity’. The acritical method of the 
phaneroscopist, argues André De Tienne (2004:15), is similar to the study of mathematics, 
‘in the sense that it does not make assertions: the results of its observations are recorded in 
descriptive propositions, the truth of which is not its business to assess’.  
 
My purpose in this chapter is not to contest these views. I will argue that an additional and 
valuable insight is afforded by viewing Peirce’s phenomenology, or phaneroscopy, through 
the lens of chemistry. To show how the concept of chemical valency and the structure of 
Mendeleev’s periodic table offered Peirce (himself a chemist) a framework to explore 
phenomenological relations diagrammatically. There is little in the literature exploring 
these possibilities. The philosopher of chemistry Jaap van Brakel (2012:26), in his analysis of 
Peirce’s formulation of phenomenology argues that,  
 
He [Peirce] based his phenomenology or phaneroscopy, which he also called 
“phanerochemy”, chemistry of appearances, or chemistry of thought, on an 
analogy with chemical elements and compounds…Still it cannot be said that Peirce 
gave a central place to chemistry in the scheme of things. 
 
In justifying his rejection of a ‘central place’ for chemistry in Peirce’s phenomenology, van 
Brakel (2012:26) refers us to a much earlier writing (1861) where Peirce states, ‘[w]e must 
be satisfied with the Natural History of the chemical Elementary bodies without as yet 
explaining their physics’. Unfortunately van Brakel offers no explanation as to why this very 
early example of Peirce’s writings on chemistry leads him to reject chemistry as playing a 
‘central place’ in his phenomenology. Perhaps the objection lies in Peirce suggesting that 
although the properties or ‘Natural History’ of the chemical elements can be determined 
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they cannot be explained on a more fundamental level – ‘their physics’. What van Brakel 
omits is the sentence immediately following on from his quotation where Peirce states, 
‘[w]e must not assume they [the chemical Elementary bodies] do not exist because we 
cannot explain them’ (W1:54, 1861). As has been shown in chapter two, some two years 
later in his paper ‘The Chemical Theory of Interpenetration’ (1863), Peirce offers an 
explanation of the behaviour of atoms – ‘their physics’ – based on a Kantian model of 
forces. Whilst van Brakel makes the connection between chemistry and Peirce’s 
phenomenology, he denies it any significant impact. In this chapter I will disagree with van 
Brakel and argue that chemistry – the periodic table, valency and their capacity to facilitate 
diagrammatic reasoning – offered Peirce a conceptual framework to set out his position. 
 
I should like to make one other point on phaneroscopy before moving on to Peirce and 
Mendeleev’s common interest in the nature of relations. As we have seen, Peirce describes 
the phaneron to ‘mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present 
to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not’ (CP 1.284, 
1905). What does the study of the phaneron – phaneroscopy – entail? Phaneroscopy, states 
Short (2007:68), ‘observes, describes and analyses the phaneron’. Then having observed, 
described and analysed, we are in a position to, as Peirce describes, determine the 
‘broadest categories of phanerons there are’ and then to ‘enumerate the principal 
subdivisions of those categories’ (CP 1.286, 1904). On this basis, argues Robert Marty 
(1982:169), Peirce ‘assigns to phaneroscopy two tasks: the first is analytical and yields the 
formal elements; the second is taxonomic and bears a close resemblance to the methods of 
the naturalist’. There are parallels here with chemistry and the attempt by Peirce – and as 
we shall see Mendeleev - to systemise the chemical elements according to their atomic 
weights. Their first task is analytical whereby the chemical elements and their atomic 
weights are identified. Secondly, and similar to the biologist’s taxonomy of assigning and 
naming groups of organisms on the basis of their shared characteristics, is the chemist’s 
organisation of the chemical elements into groups within their scheme.  
 
3.2 Mendeleev and Peirce on relations 
Both Peirce and Mendeleev published their systems for the chemical elements in 1869. 
Before examining the approach Mendeleev and Peirce took to relations I should like to 
point out that each worked independently of the other. In his extensive research into the 
reception of Mendeleev’s periodic law into America Stephen Brush (1996:609) notes that 
‘no American or British textbooks mentioned the periodic law at all until after the discovery 
of gallium’ – which was in 1875 and six years after Peirce had published. 
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If Peirce had not read Mendeleev’s work in a formal publication were they perhaps in direct 
contact with one another? This author has found no evidence to suggest that Peirce and 
Mendeleev met or corresponded at any time during their careers. The correspondence 
hosted by Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis as the Peirce Edition Project 
records over eight hundred of Peirce’s correspondents but makes no mention of 
Mendeleev. A search of Peirce’s correspondence preserved in the Houghton Library at 
Harvard University and registered in the Robin catalogue also makes no reference to 
Mendeleev. 
 
In their essay ‘Charles Peirce’s First Visit to Europe, 1870-71’ Jaime Nubiola and Sara 
Barrena (2009:101) were able to ‘identify 17 surviving letters of Peirce’s first trip to Europe’ 
– Mendeleev is not mentioned. There is also no suggestion that Peirce travelled to Russia to 
meet Mendeleev. Peirce’s first visit to Europe lasted ten months (June 1870 – March 1871) 
and was close to the time when both he and Mendeleev had published on the organisation 
of the chemical elements by atomic weight. There was one other occasion when the two 
might have met. In June 1876 Mendeleev visited America for one month to make a study of 
oil production processes. Before leaving America, Mendeleev, by now a well-known 
chemist, visited the Centennial Exposition held in Philadelphia. Many prominent American 
and overseas scientists also attended. Seemingly reluctant to take full advantage of this 
situation, Mendeleev appears to have kept a very low profile - Henry Leicester (1957:332) 
describes him as having ‘avoided contact with most of his fellow chemists’. Even had 
Mendeleev shown a greater willingness to socialise, he would not have encountered Peirce 
who was then away in Europe. This trip was part of Peirce’s work on the earth’s magnetic 
field for The U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey. He departed from America in April 1876 to 
return four months later in August. It would seem likely therefore that Peirce’s interest in 
chemistry during the mid to late 1860’s was independent of Mendeleev’s work. 
 
To recap on Brush’s point: American literature made no mention of Mendeleev until after 
the discovery of Gallium in 1875; US chemists such as Josiah Cooke and his student Peirce 
were therefore working independently of Mendeleev in attempting to classify the elements 
according to atomic weight. Scerri (2007:104/5) claims that whilst Mendeleev ‘steadfastly 
maintained in all subsequent writings that he did not see any of the systems developed by 
the five other discoverers of the periodic system, namely, De Chancourtois, Odling, 
Newlands, Hinrichs, and Lothar Meyer’ nonetheless ‘he repeatedly acknowledged his debts 
to some earlier pioneers of the system, including Peter Kremers, Josiah Cooke, Max 
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Pettenkofer, Alexandre Dumas, and Ernst Lenssen’ (emphasis added). For example in his 
Faraday Lecture of 1889, Mendeleev (1889:637) explained that prior to his work and during 
the period 1860-70 and the decade before it had become evident that ‘the relations 
between the atomic weights of analogous elements were governed by some general and 
simple laws’. Mendeleev credits Josiah Cooke along with others such as Dumas for their 
work in this field. The American historian of science Bernard Cohen (1959:672) states that 
Cooke ‘can fairly be described as the first [American] university chemist to do truly 
distinguished work in the field of chemistry’. In support of Cohen’s claim for Cooke as a 
nineteenth century pioneer of American chemistry Brush (1996) notes that during 1876 to 
1885 some American chemists regarded Mendeleev’s successful predictions of gallium and 
scandium as offering significant support for the periodic law. As an example Brush 
(1996:611) cites Cooke who, ‘in a textbook published in 1881 and reprinted several times’, 
asserted that ‘the power of such a working theory to predict the order of undiscovered 
phenomena [as in the case of gallium] is a good criterion of its validity’. The book Brush 
refers to here is Cooke’s Principles of Chemical Philosophy first printed in 1881 and 
reprinted 1885. In the earlier chapters I showed how Peirce and Cooke shared an interest in 
seeking a means of ordering the chemical elements; one framed in terms of relations. We 
will now see how Mendeleev too framed his inquiry into the chemical elements in terms of 
relations. 
 
On June 4th, 1889, some twenty years after the first publication of his periodic table, 
Mendeleev delivered the Faraday Lecture at the Royal Institution before the Fellows of the 
Chemical Society. Early on in the lecture Mendeleev (1889:636) recalled a statement he 
made as part of his address to the Russian Chemical Society some twenty years earlier and 
which he also included in his Principles of Chemistry. The following statement illustrates the 
importance of relations to Mendeleev.  
 
The aim of this communication will be fully attained if I succeed in drawing the 
attention of investigators to those relations which exist between the atomic 
weights of dissimilar elements, which, as far as I know, have hitherto been almost 
completely neglected. I believe that the solution of some of the most important 
problems of our science lies in researches of this kind. (emphasis added) 
 
Mendeleev believed that his periodic law, capturing as it does the regularity of the 
relationship between the elements, the formulae of their compounds and their 
physiochemical properties, as a function of atomic weight, offered a powerful investigative 
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framework to his fellow chemists. Consider now Peirce’s reflections of 1896 – over thirty 
years after his early chemistry papers – on what sets the true scientific chemist apart from 
all who would call themselves ‘a chemist’, 
 
The genuine scientific chemist cares just as much to learn about erbium39 -- the 
extreme rarity of which renders it commercially unimportant -- as he does about 
iron. He is more eager to learn about erbium if the knowledge of it would do more 
to complete his conception of the Periodic Law, which expresses the mutual 
relations of the elements. (CP 1.145, 1896, emphasis added) 
 
Note here the acknowledgement of relations as a foundational issue for Mendeleev and for 
Peirce, both in the realms of chemistry and the chemical elements. It is also worth 
recording Peirce’s appreciation of the significance of Mendeleev’s periodic law as well as 
identifying the dilemma around the correct positioning of the rare earth elements within 
Mendeleev’s scheme. For Peirce, as will be shown, is much concerned with the nature of 
relations in developing his phenomenology, and regards chemists as not interested in 
delving into the physical properties of individual substances any more than is necessary to 
‘identify them and to make out their constitutional relations’(CP 1.260, emphasis added). 
The single physical property defining the ‘constitutional relations’ between the chemical 
elements was identified by Mendeleev  (1879:273) as atomic weight, for he states that, ‘the 
nature of the elements depends above all on the their mass, and it considers this function 
to be periodic’. One piece of advice Peirce offers the chemist engaged in an inquiry is that, 
‘you must train yourself to the analysis of relations’ (CP 1.345, emphasis added). Both 
Peirce and Mendeleev are here united in their understanding of the importance of 
relations. 
 
The importance of an analysis of relations to chemical inquiry can be seen in later writings 
by Mendeleev. In the very first footnote to volume one of his Principles of Chemistry, 
Mendeleev (1901a, Vol 1:1) emphasises relations when making a number of observations 
on the right conduct of scientific investigations. Such investigative inquiries should, he 
argues, include, ‘framing hypotheses or propositions as to the actual cause and true nature 
of the relation between that studied (measured or observed) and that which is known or 
the categories of time, space, &c.’. For hypotheses that build into theories, these too, 
Mendeleev (1901a, Vol 1:1) argues, should ‘account for the nature of the properties of that 
                                                          
39
 A rare earth element 
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studied in its relations with things already known and with those conditions or categories 
among which it exists’ (emphasis added). Mendeleev applies these principles when 
considering Lavoisier’s work on the oxidation of mercury to mercury oxide and as a way of 
gaining an insight into the term element. For it is the chemical element that serves for 
Mendeleev (1901a Vol1:22) as, ‘the starting point, and is taken as the primary conception 
on which all other substances are built up’. True to his footnote on the conduct of inquiry, 
Mendeleev accounts for mercury oxide in terms of ‘relations with things already known and 
with those conditions or categories among which it exists’ – the free elements mercury and 
oxygen and their relations to the material but invisible components of mercury oxide: 
 
Mercury oxide does not contain two simple bodies, a gas and a metal, but two 
elements, mercury and oxygen, which, when free, are a gas and a metal. Neither 
mercury as a metal nor oxygen as a gas is contained in mercury oxide ; it only 
contains the substance of these elements, just as steam only contains the 
substance of ice, but not ice itself, or as corn contains the substance of the seed, 
but not the seed itself. 
 
An element, Mendeleev (1901a Vol1:23) continues, can only be consciously recognised in 
its action with another and in the uniqueness of the compound formed,  
 
The existence of an element may be recognised without knowing it in the 
uncombined state, but only from an investigation of its combinations, and from the 
knowledge that it gives, under all possible conditions, substances which are unlike 
other known combinations of substances. 
 
Here again is a case of relations – this time between the nature and properties of the free 
elements mercury and oxygen and their compound mercury oxide, which is unlike other 
compounds given by these elements – such as mercury sulphide or copper oxide. Hendry 
(2005:43) stresses the importance of the abstractness of the concept of the chemical 
element as the result of chemistry being concerned with explaining chemical changes, such 
as the oxidation of mercury, and so ‘a system of the elements should contain substances 
that can survive change in phase or state of chemical combination’. In sum: Mendeleev 
demonstrates the importance of relations to his underlying rationale - his elemental 
hypothesis was formed around investigative inquiries into the nature of compounds such as 
mercury oxide and framed in terms of the relations with known properties and the existing 
categories.  
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Having established a concept of element, Mendeleev uses this to reject the ancient notion 
of primary matter. Here too relations were important to his argument. Whilst Mendeleev’s 
position as an atomist is disputed (see chapter two) he rejected Prout’s hypothesis (1810) 
of atoms as an aggregation of primary matter (as hydrogen atoms). Having proposed the 
periodic relationship between an element’s atomic weight and its physiochemical 
properties, Mendeleev (1904:227) states, ‘no general relation is possible between things 
unless they have some individual character in them’. Earlier Mendeleev (1901a Vol I: 221) 
argued that, ‘the conception of the individuality of the parts of matter exhibited in chemical 
elements is alone necessary and certain.’ Returning to the Faraday Lecture, Mendeleev 
(1889:640) describes chemical atoms as being ‘best described as chemical individuals’ 
whilst noting that ‘the Latin word ‘individual’ is merely a translation of the Greek word 
‘atom’’. The theory of primary matter arose, he explains, to deal with an issue of relations. 
Early thinkers as well as those of the nineteenth century such as William Prout and his 
supporters took up the idea of a common formative material – primary matter – because, 
states Mendeleev (1889:645), ‘they were not able to evolve the conception of any other 
possible unity in order to connect the multifarious relations of matter’(emphasis added). 
Whilst arguing that science has established a unity of forces and such unity exists in many 
areas of science, Mendeleev (1889:645) argues that in connecting with the many different 
types of relations of matter, ‘we none the less must also explain the individuality and the 
apparent diversity which we cannot fail to trace everywhere’. The chemical elements are 
examples of individuals where diversity exists. 
 
3.3 Peirce’s Reception of Mendeleev’s Periodic Table 
The interest Peirce had in Mendeleev’s work and its value in underpinning philosophical 
work can be seen in his essay ‘On the Logic of Drawing History from Ancient Documents’ 
(1901). This essay is particularly illustrative of Peirce's reception of Mendeleev. Written in 
1901 we can see how the mature Peirce draws on Mendeleev to illustrate some of the key 
elements of what he takes to be ‘the method of science’. So this text is important in two 
ways: firstly because it tells us how the mature Peirce continues to work on chemistry, 
especially Mendeleev, and secondly because he sees also Mendeleev's work as an example 
of the logic of science at work, which lends more substance to his philosophical arguments.  
 
Peirce sets out economic ways of hypothesis testing and is typically wide-ranging. One of its 
important themes is what he describes as, ‘the reasonings of science’ (EP2:106). Here 
Peirce includes induction as a way by which hypotheses are tested and abduction which he 
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describes as, ‘the first step of scientific reasoning, as induction is the concluding step’ 
(EP2:106). Thus, by abductive reasoning a scientist seeks a hypothesis and then collects 
corroborative facts by reasoning inductively. The process of abduction, responsible as it is 
for all new truths, is also described by Peirce as ‘nothing but guessing’ (EP2:107).  Whilst 
Peirce also extols the scientist to be, ‘animated by that hope concerning the problem we 
have in hand’ (EP2:107) two questions arise: how many guesses  are to be made before the 
correct hypothesis is hit on and is there an efficient way of going about this process? A 
possible hypothesis must be capable of being tested experimentally as well as explaining 
the surprising facts that prompted the initial inquiry. Given the great intellectual and 
financial investment in hypotheses testing, and bearing in mind that the whole process has 
been initiated by the chance nature of abductive reasoning, Peirce, with his background as 
an experimental chemist, recognises the need for ‘the consideration of economy’ (EP2:107) 
when selecting a particular hypothesis, for the often protracted and costly process of 
experimental verification. He first identifies three factors upon which his notion of 
economy in this context is dependent: ‘cost; the value of the thing proposed, in itself; and 
its effect upon other projects’ (EP2:107). Thus inexpensive experimental procedures should 
be given precedence in gathering data which by inductive reasoning might put the 
hypothesis to the test. Secondly the scientific inquirer, by both instinct and reasoning, 
needs some measure of their expectations of their chosen hypothesis as being true, 
considering ‘what will happen if the hypothesis breaks down’ (EP2:109), for new 
hypotheses rarely turn out to be entirely satisfactory. But just before completing what 
Peirce describes as, ‘all the elements of merit of an hypothesis’ (EP2:111), he adds one 
more ‘economic’ consideration which he likens to the billiard player’s ‘good leave’ where 
the situation on the table is left in a favourable position after a shot has been played. 
Transferring Peirce’s analogy from the billiard room to the laboratory, a particular 
hypothesis might not accommodate all the known facts but be a useful ‘leaving point’ on 
the path of inquiry to something more complete. It is here that Peirce draws on 
Mendeleev’s periodic table by way of example.  
 
Peirce uses Mendeleev’s periodic table to illustrate an economic method of hypothesis 
testing in seeking to, ‘find some mathematical relation between the atomic weight and the 
succession of chemical elements according to Mendeleef’s system’ (EP2:110). In passing, 
Peirce (EP2:110) is of the opinion that although Mendeleev was successful in his predictions 
of gallium, germanium and scandium, the non-discovery of hecamagnesium leads him to 
the view that, ‘the time has yet to come when it is worthwhile’ to look for an exact 
mathematical relationship. By taking Mendeleev’s table, which Peirce describes as, ‘a first 
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rough approximation to the truth’ (EP2:111), and starting with potassium (atomic weight 
39), he looks at the effect of increasing the atomic weight of each consecutive element by 
2½ units. He then calculates the difference between the observed and calculated values, 
setting out his results in the table below (EP2:112): 
 
In forming 
his table, 
Peirce has 
left sixteen 
spaces after 
neodymium 
(Nd) for 
Mendeleev’s 
other 
predictions40
. He also 
notes that 
the 
difference 
between the 
calculated 
and 
observed 
values start 
to become 
significant 
after 
ruthenium 
(Ru). 
Figure 9: Peirce’s attempt to find a mathematical relation between the atomic weight and 
the succession of chemical elements according to Mendeleev’s system  
Source: The Essential Peirce, Volume 1, page 112 
 
Now what is Peirce up to here? Firstly he is making the point that such simple calculations 
are an economic way of hypothesis testing – in this case the existence of an exact 
mathematical relationship between an element’s position in the periodic table and its 
atomic weight – there isn’t one. As Peirce explains, whilst his table might be ‘of little service 
to chemistry’ he has provided, ‘a tolerable illustration of the point of logic we have under 
consideration to compare the numbers required by this hypothesis with the numbers 
found’ (EP2:111). Secondly the data shows some agreement with the suggestion of there 
being some truth in Mendeleev’s system – a good ‘leaving position’ in search of a more 
exact hypothesis.  But Peirce – the chemist - doesn’t leave it here and further exploits his 
data for additional meaning. Relatively large differences between his calculated and the 
observed values for atomic weights might imply a contaminated sample. Inquiry is 
                                                          
40
 It has now been shown that there are twelve elements not sixteen – which include the eleven 
elements of the lanthanide series 
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prompted by such surprising results and Peirce notes that these differences are particularly 
significant – surprisingly high - at a value of six for both tellurium and barium. It is these two 
elements, Peirce advises, that we should look to as ‘admixtures of substances of higher 
atomic weight’ (EP2:111). Inquiries had proved, in Peirce’s view, inconclusive for tellurium 
but there was perhaps some evidence for barium being contaminated as he described. This 
foray into the periodic table was mainly to illustrate an aspect of economy in hypothesis 
selection and Peirce draws this to a close with the comment that Mendeleev’s arrangement 
‘is itself in considerable doubt’ (EP2:111). Notice too how Peirce when dealing with a largely 
philosophical issue takes time to speculate on matters of chemistry. 
 
Peirce’s continuing interest in the periodic table shown by his search for an exact 
relationship between the atomic weights of the elements as arranged by Mendeleev is 
shown in one of his unpublished manuscripts A Treatise on Discovery (MS 693). This MS 
includes the noble gas radon which, discovered in 1900, dates the MS to be of this date or 
later. Here Peirce explores the relations existing between the atomic weights of successive 
elements within the periodic table. These numerical relationships resonate with those used 
in his essay ‘On the Logic of Drawing History from Ancient Documents’ (1901). They also 
match similar calculations carried out by Mendeleev – and discussed later. 
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Peirce takes 
Mendeleev’s 
system of groups 
arranged 
horizontally and 
periods set out 
vertically. He 
then looks for a 
numerical 
relationship in 
the differences 
of atomic weight 
between 
adjacent 
elements in the 
same period.  
For example in 
group 1:- 
Li(7.03) and 
Na(23.05) 
Difference = 
16.02 
Na(23.05) and 
K(39.14) 
Difference = 
16.09.  
K(39.14) and 
Rb(85.44) 
Difference = 46.3 
Figure 10: Peirce’s investigation into the atomic weights of the elements when arranged by periods 
Source: Peirce’s A Treatise on Discovery  (MS 693:436 c1900) 
 
Here we see Peirce examining the relation between each element’s position in the periodic 
table and successive differences in atomic weight. Whilst there are general increases across 
a period and within a group of elements, there is no exact numerical pattern.  In performing 
these many calculations, it is tempting to cast Peirce, the master of mathematical logic, as 
being frustrated by this lack of numerical exactness. In this same manuscript, Peirce praises 
Mendeleev’s work as ‘one of the most admirable generalisations that the whole history of 
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science can boast’ (MS 693:432, c1900). What are Peirce’s motives here? As a chemist he 
might be expected to be interested in Mendeleev’s arrangement, being the most successful 
attempt then known at a systemisation of the chemical elements. As can be seen from the 
earlier quotation, Peirce appreciates Mendeleev’s contribution to chemistry. But more than 
this, we will see that Peirce, with an understanding of how Mendeleev’s scheme is founded 
upon the relations between the chemical elements, later uses this as an analogy for the 
relational aspects of his phenomenology. On examining the functional relations between 
the chemical elements of the periodic table, Peirce concludes, ‘the evidence seems to be 
that such functions are not of an exact mathematical nature. Indeed, wherever we look, we 
meet with the appearance of an imperfect regularity’ (MS 693:435, c1900, emphasis in the 
original).  
 
Following this Peirce investigates the effect of imposing an arithmetic progression on to 
successive atomic weights and using a method similar to that in ‘On the Logic of Drawing 
History from Ancient Documents’ (1901): 
 
But in order to show the relations between the numbers of the same sort, in their 
sequence in the periods, I give another table, which compares the succession of 
atomic weights with that of an arithmetical series of constant difference 2½ , 
except below the number corresponding to Argon, where the difference is 2.  I have 
differenced the column of plus or minus excesses of the atomic weight over the 
successive numbers of these two arithmetical series; because the regularly 
alternating values of these differences in some place and their constancy in others, 
brings out in another way the imperfections… (MS 693:440, c1900, emphasis in the 
original) 
 
  
101 
 
The effect of Peirce’s experimenting on the data is shown below, 
 
Here Peirce shows the 
experimentally determined or 
observed values for the 
atomic weights of a number 
of elements preceding argon, 
recorded as O. He also assigns 
his calculated atomic weight 
(as C) to hydrogen, the 
lightest element, at 0.5. The 
second element helium is 
given a calculated value of 
4.5. The calculated values for 
subsequent elements are 
assigned by adding 2 to the 
element before. The 
differences between the 
calculated and observed 
values are shown under  
(O-C). Differences between 
successive values of (O-C) are 
shown under Δ(O-C).  
Figure 11: Peirce’s calculations on the difference between an element’s experimentally 
determined atomic weight and one based regular incremental changes from H = 0.5 
Source: Peirce’s A Treatise on Discovery  (MS 693:442, c1900) 
 
It is also interesting to note that ‘the chemist’ Peirce was troubled by the thorny issue of 
the correct positioning of the rare earth elements which, as we shall see, was also a 
concern for Mendeleev. Over thirty years since graduating, Peirce continues to retain an 
investigative interest in chemistry: 
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Peirce states, ‘it hardly 
seems as if these 
elements [rare earth 
elements] and others 
could find places in the 
table. It would be rash, 
in the existing ignorance 
of the physical 
properties of these 
bodies, to attempt to 
place them in the table’ 
(MS 693:438). 
 
 Note too how Peirce 
shows question marks 
against the rare earths 
Pr, Nd, Sm, Er and Tm. 
(omitted from some 
forms of Mendeleev’s 
own table)  
Figure 12:The rare earth elements 
Source: Peirce’s A Treatise on Discovery  (MS 693:438, c1900)  
 
Interestingly Mendeleev, in his paper ‘The Periodic Law of the Chemical Elements’ (1880) 
and published in The Chemical News, also performed calculations similar to Peirce. In 
common with Peirce, Mendeleev cites relations but has rather more to say on there being 
no exact mathematical sequencing. In calculating atomic weight differences in a manner 
similar to Peirce, Mendeleev (1880:301) notes the following differences: ‘Na-Li=16, as also 
K-Na=16 but Mg-Be=14.6; on the other hand Ti—Si=20, V-P=20, Pt-Pd=91, Au-Ag=89, Hg-
Cd=88, Pb-Sn=89, Bi-Sb=86’. In coming to a view on these differences in values Mendeleev 
evokes relations when he writes, ‘it is difficult to admit that the gradual diminution of the 
differences is only a matter of chance. We ought rather to see that the relations between Pt 
and Pd is not altogether the same as that between Bi and Sb and therefore the differences 
cannot be the same’.  
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Modern theory holds that the elements are ordered in atomic number sequence – in order 
of increasing numbers of nuclear protons. The ordering of the elements was tracked by 
Mendeleev indirectly, through changes in atomic weight, where an element’s value is often 
dependent upon the distribution of a number of different isotopes. Both Peirce and 
Mendeleev were not tracking the property that we now accept as governing the ordering of 
the periodic table. It is left to Mendeleev to speculate on why these relations between the 
elements’ atomic weights are not predictable with any exactness. Whilst the elements 
possess properties that show a periodic relation to their atomic weights, Mendeleev 
(1880:301) writes,  
 
We do not really know anything of the just mentioned relation, except the periodic 
property; and even this one is not properly understood. It is therefore impossible to 
determine exactly the amount of the separations, any more than we can correct 
positively the magnitude of atomic weights. We can only determine limits, certainly 
very near together, between which the amount of the atomic weight of an element 
should be. 
 
Earlier, in 1871, and working within the limitations he describes above, Mendeleev 
published a list of predictions as follows41, which are described by Scerri (2007:132) as 
being accurate to ‘an astonishing degree’.  
 
Element Atomic Weight 
(Predicted) 
Atomic Weight 
(Measured) 
Year of Discovery 
Gallium  
(eka-aluminium) 
68 69.2 1875 
Scandium 
(eka-boron) 
44 44 1879 
Germanium 
(eka-silicon) 
72 72.32 1886 
 
Whilst Mendeleev seems content working on the approximate relations – within certain 
‘limits’ - between neighbouring elements and their atomic weights, Peirce searches for a 
more exact relation. As we have seen Peirce is puzzled by Mendeleev’s arrangement for its 
lack of mathematical exactness; his response is to perform his own calculations. Peirce's 
                                                          
41
 From Scerri (2007:132-139) 
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approach here resonates with some central ideas of his mature philosophy, so that in one 
sense his own work with chemistry is at once indicative of his interest in the subject and a 
way of testing his core philosophical ideas. A couple of years before completing MS 693 (c 
1900), Peirce published The First Rule of Logic, the fourth in a series of lectures he delivered 
at Harvard in 1898, where he states, ‘[the] first, and in one sense [the] sole, rule of reason 
[is] that in order to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be satisfied with 
what you already incline to think . . .’ (EP2:48, 1898). We see in MS 693 Peirce as a chemist 
practising his ‘sole rule of reason’ which Amy McLaughlin (2014:229) argues for as, 
‘reasoning [that] must be predicated on a desire to learn, i.e. a desire to find out something 
not known, which is a manifestation of one’s dissatisfaction with the present state of one’s 
beliefs’. Through engaging with Mendeleev’s periodic table, Peirce had a ‘desire to learn’ 
the exact mathematical relations underlying Mendeleev’s arrangement of the chemical 
elements; he was dissatisfied with the seeming absence of mathematical exactness. Earlier 
we saw how Peirce commented on the ‘appearance of an imperfect regularity [of atomic 
weights]’ and how ‘perplexed’ he was by this. Such ‘dissatisfaction’ was the motivation 
behind Peirce’s ‘desire to learn’. Peirce reworked Mendeleev’s periodic table many times 
(e.g MSS 693& 1039) provoked in part by doubts raised by the seeming lack of 
mathematical exactness to Mendeleev’s scheme. In his essay ‘The Fixation of Belief’ (1877) 
Peirce famously states: ‘The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief. I 
shall term this struggle inquiry…’ (EP1:114, emphasis in the original). Thus for Peirce, claims 
McLaughlin (2011:356), ‘[d]oubt is the promoter of inquiry and only occurs with the 
presentation of some surprising stimulus’ – in this case the periodic table’s lack of 
mathematical exactness. 
 
According to Peirce, inquiry ends on the removal of doubt, the ‘sole object of inquiry being 
the settlement of opinion’ (EP1:115). I have found no evidence to suggest that Peirce’s 
doubts were assuaged. In comparing Mendeleev’s periodic law as well as Grimm’s law42 
with the mathematical exact formulation of Newton’s laws, Peirce lays emphasis on their 
lack of precision when he states that these ‘are not laws in the sense in which the 
association of ideas and the three laws of motion are laws. They are not satisfactory for a 
minute. They are nothing that can blend with our metaphysics; they are not of a universal 
kind; and they are not precise’ (CP 7.84 c1896). Also in The Fixation of Belief Peirce analyses 
four possible methods of inquiry in order to argue for one as the most suitable for settling 
                                                          
42
 According to Emonds (1977:108) ‘Grimm’s Law expresses the principal sound changes in the Indo-
European (IE) stop consonant system that differentiated Germanic from other branches of the IE 
language family’.  
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opinion; a consideration of these methods sits outside the scope of this thesis but can be 
found in McLaughlin (2011) and Misak (1991).  
 
What this section has tried to demonstrate is that Peirce’s interest in the relations between 
the chemical elements and their atomic weights was one he shared with Mendeleev. The 
study of chemistry continued from Peirce’s graduate studies of chemistry and the 
publication of ‘The Pairing of the Elements’ (1863) and into his later life. Also we have seen 
something of Mendeleev’s work on the periodic table as an introduction to the later 
chapters of this project. At the time Peirce was writing on the periodic table he was also 
formulating his phenomenology. His essay on ‘On the Logic of Drawing History from Ancient 
Documents’ is dated 1901 and his MS 693 described above is also likely to be from the early 
1900s. As we have seen earlier Peirce’s phenomenology dates from 1902, which he later 
renamed phaneroscopy.  In describing the scale of the task of the phenomenologist Peirce 
writes, 
 
The work of discovery of the phenomenologist, and most difficult work it is, 
consists in disentangling, or drawing out, from human thought, certain threads that 
run through it, and in showing what marks each has that distinguishes it from every 
other. (NEM: 196, 1904) 
 
As stated earlier, the literature has accounts of the origins of Peirce’s phenomenology, the 
methodology of a Peircean phenomenologist – or phaneroscopist, and the relationship of 
phenomenology to Peirce’s three metaphysical categories of Firstness, Secondness and 
Thirdness. There is very little on how Peirce uses his knowledge and understanding of 
valency and of Mendeleev’s periodic table to explicate the ‘difficult work’ of 
‘disentanglement’ of human thoughts that is the work of the phenomenologist. I believe 
that recognising and understanding the connections with chemistry offers an additional 
insight into Peirce’s phenomenology. 
 
3.4 Phaneroscopy and the Periodic Table 
Having earlier set out some of the principles of Peirce’s phaneroscopy I will now show how 
he uses his knowledge and understanding of Mendeleev’s periodic table to illustrate his 
thinking. The connection with chemistry is made by Peirce who had considered using the 
term ‘phanerochemistry’ as well as ‘phanerology’ and ‘phenoscopy’ as alternative 
neologisms for phenomenology. These terms, states Stjernfelt (2007:143) were used ‘from 
around 1905’, nevertheless, as Stjernfelt explains, Peirce returns to phaneroscopy in the 
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Adirondack lectures of 1905 as well as for ‘‘Phaneroscopy (phan)’, intended for the Monist, 
January 1907’.  Before exploring the connections to chemistry it is worth restating a couple 
of Peirce’s statements on phaneroscopy made earlier: 
 
Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron I mean the 
collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite 
regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not. (CP 1.284, 1905) 
 
The method of surveying the phaneron is, as we have noted, ‘simply to open our mental 
eyes and look well at the phenomenon and say what are the characteristics that are never 
wanting in it’ (EP2:147, 1903). The skills needed are, states Peirce,  firstly ‘seeing what 
stares one in the face, secondly the skill ‘of the artist who sees for example the apparent 
colours of nature as they appear and thirdly ‘the generalizing power of the mathematician’ 
(EP2:147/8, 1903). The job of the phaneroscopist is to note appearances but to come to no 
conclusions and to make no assessments, the purpose of observing the phaneron being ‘to 
discover what different forms of indecomposable elements it contains’ (EP2:362, 1906). 
This emphasis on ‘forms’ is also made a year earlier when Peirce states that, ‘[s]o far as I 
have developed this science of phaneroscopy, it is occupied with the formal elements of 
the phaneron’ (CP 1.284, 1905). The use of ‘form’ and ‘formal’ is an appeal to Aristotle, by 
whom, Peirce claims, ‘[t]he distinction of matter and form was first made’ (CP 6.354, 1902). 
Aristotle introduces ‘matter’, claims Thomas Ainsworth (2016), ‘to account for changes in 
the natural world’ and appeals to ‘form’ as ‘what unifies some matter into a single object’. 
 
In the coming section I will consider ‘The Basis of Pragmaticism in Phaneroscopy’ (1905),  
where Peirce privileges considerations of  ‘form’ above those of ‘matter’: ‘because it is 
universally admitted, in all sorts of inquiries, that the most important divisions are divisions 
according to form, and not according to qualities of matter’ (EP2:362, 1905). It is not until 
1907 that Peirce takes up possible material differences in the ‘indecomposable’ elements of 
the phaneron. In describing distinctions according to form, Peirce anticipates his reader’s 
puzzlement in how, ‘distinction of form is possible among indecomposable elements’ 
(EP2:362). To explain this important point Peirce draws on the analogous concept of 
valencies from chemistry – a concept that had been used to great effect in the 1860s in 
developing a successful theory of the structural relations within organic chemistry. Around 
the time Peirce is formulating his phenomenology he also writes on the chemical concept of 
valency. In MS 1041 (c1905) Peirce states that valency in the chemical sense ‘was brought 
to human cognisance by the genius of Sir Edward Frankland’. I will show how Peirce uses 
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the chemical concept of valency to elucidate phaneroscopy. Before this it is worth first 
looking at the development of valency within the confines of chemistry. This is important 
because it shows how chemists use diagrams to develop the concept of valency. With his 
training in chemistry, Peirce uses a similar diagrammatic approach to account for aspects of 
his phenomenology.  
 
3.5 Nineteenth century chemical valency and graphical formulae  
Writing in 1852 on what was then the novel chemistry of organometallic compounds, 
Edward Frankland (1852:440), observing the sequence of formulae NO3, NH3, NI3, NS3, PO3, 
PH3, PCl3, SbO3, SbH3, SbCl3, AsO3, AsH3 and AsCl3, as well as NO5, NH4O, NH4I, PO5 and PH4I, 
writes, 
 
Without offering any hypothesis regarding the cause of this symmetrical grouping 
of atoms, it is sufficiently evident, from the examples just given, that such a 
tendency or law prevails, and that, no matter what the character of the uniting 
atoms may be, the combining-power of the attracting element, if I may be allowed 
the term, is always satisfied by the same number of these atoms. 
 
Frankland’s ‘combining power’ as well as the term ‘atomicity’ were both used during the 
1860s with the term valence coming into use towards the end of the decade. As the 
historian of science Alan Rocke (2010:48) explains, ‘by the late 1850s this phenomenon had 
become known as ‘atomicity’, then by about 1870 as ‘valence’’. A detailed examination of 
the development of valency is beyond the scope of this chapter, for as Rocke (2010:48) 
states, ‘these developments were complex’ since ‘not only did a host of protagonists 
participate in the story’, many of the chemists involved ‘did not always clearly understand, 
or in many cases were not even immediately aware of’ the work of others working in the 
field at that same time.  
 
Early nineteenth century chemists began to identify substances with identical empirical 
formulae43 but surprisingly different properties. One such example is urea and ammonium 
cyanate, both with the empirical formula C2N2H4. It was Berzelius who introduced the term 
isomer44 to accommodate this and other examples, such as fulminic acid and cyanic acid 
(CNOH). It was however to Dalton’s Atomic Theory, and to his visual representations in 
                                                          
43
  The empirical formula is the simple whole number ratio of different elements present in a 
chemical compound 
44
 Isomer (from the Greek isos meaning equal and meros meaning part) are chemical compounds 
with the same number of each type of atom but with different properties. 
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particular, that by the mid-1840s chemists such as Leopold Gmelin (1788 – 1853) and 
others, turned to inquire into isomerism by model building and diagrammatic 
representations – or graphical formulae. During the early 1860s the Scottish physician and 
chemist Alexander Crum Brown’s (1838 – 1922) MD thesis On the Theory of Chemical 
Combination, represented the alcohol (today, ethanol C2H5OH) molecule using the following 
graphical formula, 
 
 
The dotted lines connecting the 
various atoms are described by 
Crum Brown (1861:16) as ‘lines of 
force’. There is no mention of the 
term bond although this 
representation is one of the earliest 
attempts to set out the connective 
relations between the individual 
atoms forming a compound. Other 
substances such as water and 
ammonia were similarly 
represented. 
 
Figure 13:The graphical formula for alcohol (ethanol) 
Source: Crum Brown’s MD thesis (1861) On the Theory of Chemical Combination, page 16 
 
In 1864 (the year after Peirce’s graduation in chemistry) Crum Brown published a paper on 
isomeric compounds where the dotted lines were replaced by a single and continuous line 
with double bonds also being depicted. Take for example Crum Brown’s (1864:233) 
representation of succinic acid (C4H6O4) which he describes as a ‘graphic notation’ depicting 
the ‘constitutional formula’ or the ‘graphic formula’: 
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succinic acid (C4H6O4) 
Notice the C to O double bond. The 
term ‘bond’ or ‘valency’ has yet to 
appear in the literature. The solid lines 
are described by Crum Brown 
(1864:241) as the ‘chemical force’ 
exerted by the individual atoms and 
the number of what, today, would be 
regarded as bonds, as the number of 
‘equivalents’ of an atom. 
Figure 14: The graphical formula for succinic acid  
Source: Crum Brown’s (1864) On the Theory of Isomeric Compounds, page 241 
 
These graphic formulae are not offered as realistic depictions and should not, explains 
Crum Brown (1864:232), ‘be mistaken for a representation of the physical position of the 
atom[s]’ shown. 
 
In 1866 the English chemist Edward Frankland (1825 – 1899) published Lecture Notes for 
Chemical Students: Embracing Mineral and Organic Chemistry which Christopher Ritter 
(2001:41) argues ‘more than any other early venue in which they appeared…helped install 
Crum Brown's formulas in chemical practice’. In his introduction Frankland (1866:v) states, 
‘I have extensively adopted the graphic notation of Crum Brown, which appears to me to 
possess several important advantages over that first proposed by [August] Kekulé’. 
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In 1865 August Kekulé (1865:108) published 
his ‘sausage formulae’ for benzene in the 
Bulletin de la Société Chimique de France. In 
the terminology of the time Kekulé  
suggested that benzene contained a six 
carbon nucleus (black dots) arranged as a 
closed chain with alternating single and 
double bonds, shown by the short vertical 
black lines. The arrows represent the 
valences left over at the ends of the chain. 
Connecting these ‘left over’ bonds closes the 
chain. There is no attempt to depict the 
special distributions of the atoms concerned. 
  
Benzene C6H6 
This is Kekulé’s representation of the 
benzene molecule, published in Lehrbuch der 
organischen Chemie in 1866 and the year 
Frankland used Crum Brown’s graphic 
formulas in his Lecture Notes for Chemical 
Students. Notice that whilst the alternating 
single and double bonds between the carbon 
atoms are shown all six hydrogen atoms are 
omitted. 
Figure 15: Kekulé’s representations of the benzene molecules 
 
In particular Frankland (1866:v) notes that Crum Brown’s graphic formulae ‘affords [a] most 
valuable aid to the teacher in rendering intelligible the constitution of chemical 
compounds’ 
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By using these diagrams Frankland (1866:18) states that 
the elements may be ‘graphically represented showing 
‘point[s] of attachment or bonds’ whereby atoms might 
combine together. Note the emphasis Frankland gives to 
the term bond which enters the literature in place of 
Crum Brown’s ‘lines of [chemical] force’. Nevertheless 
Frankland (1866:25) cautions on the use of the term, 
stating these are ‘but crude symbols of bonds of union’ 
in that ‘no such material connections’ exist between the 
atoms preferring to regard ‘their nature much more like 
those [forces] which connect the members of our solar 
system’.  
Figure 16: Frankland’s graphical representations of atoms showing bonds,  
Source: Frankland’s (1866) Lecture Notes for Chemical Students: Embracing Mineral and Organic 
Chemistry, page 18  
 
The structures Frankland (1866:24) depicts are described as graphic notations, which he 
explains are a ‘method of symbolic notation’ and one ‘founded almost entirely on the 
doctrine of atomicity, and consist in representing graphically, the mode in which every 
bond in a chemical compound is disposed of’. So here we see representations of chemical 
objects being described in terms of a form of graph. The term valence has yet to enter the 
literature with Frankland (1866:19) describing the ‘combining power of the elementary 
atoms’ as ‘their atomicity or atom-fixing power’. Using the diagram above, the atomicity of 
hydrogen would be one and carbon would be four. 
 
By using this form of notation Frankland (1866:346) represents the graphical formula for 
succinic acid (C4H6O4) as shown, 
 
Note the similarity to Crum Brown’s representation shown earlier. 
The molecule is drawn in a slightly different orientation but the 
bonding between the individual atoms is clear to see. 
The guiding principle in drawing graphic formulae is explained by 
Frankland (1886:18) as, ‘no element, either alone or in combination, 
can exist with any of its bonds disconnected’. The atoms must be 
arranged so that the bonds of each element are fully deployed in 
connecting to the other atoms within the molecule. 
Figure 17: Frankland’s graphic formula for succinic acid. 
Source: Frankland’s (1866) Lecture Notes for Chemical Students: Embracing Mineral and 
Organic Chemistry, page 346 
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Repeating Crum Brown’s earlier caution against excessive realism, Mary Jo Nye (1993:69) 
records Frankland as opposing a realist view of the atoms shown in the graphical formulae 
when he states ‘I neither believe in atoms themselves, nor do I believe in the existence of 
centres of forces, so that I do not think I can be fairly charged with this very crude notion’. 
 
Graphical formulae also travelled to America and were available to chemists such as Peirce 
and to his Harvard tutor Josiah Cooke. Take for example this example from Cooke’s The 
First Principles of Chemical Philosophy (1868) 
 
 
This system of graphic formulae 
Cooke (1868:75) describes as 
being ‘frequently used in works 
of modern chemistry’. The 
conventions applied here are 
exactly the same as for the 
examples seen from Crum 
Brown and Frankland.  
Figure 18: Cooke’s graphical formulae for water, alcohol and acetic acid 
Source: Cooke’s (1868) The First Principles of Chemical Philosophy, page 75 
 
By 1885 Cooke’s text shows the following modification to the way graphic formulae are 
being reproduced, 
 
 
Notice now that 
the circles 
depicting the 
atoms have 
disappeared. Each 
element is 
represented by its 
symbol. The types 
of bonds 
connecting the 
elements remain 
clearly visible. 
Figure 19: Cooke’s graphical formulae for the hydrocarbons propane, propene and propine  
Source: Cooke’s (1868) The First Principles of Chemical Philosophy, page 56 
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During the early 1900s, the period when Peirce was formulating his phaneroscopy, he was 
also writing on chemical valency. For example, the following comes from MS 1038 (c1900) 
and reads a little like a text book. Peirce defines such terms as substance, an elementary 
substance, chemical compound, atomic weight and valency as shown below, 
 
The number of atoms of hydrogen to which an atom is thus equivalent is termed its 
“valency”. The valency of hydrogen is 1. Some chemists consider the valency of an 
element to be fixed; but the more general opinion is that it is variable. An atom of 
valency 1 is called a “monad”, of valency 2 a “dyad”, etc. up to “octad”. In graphs or 
diagrams showing the constitution of compounds, the direct relations of 
combination between two atoms are represented by lines called “bonds”. Every 
monad has one bond; every dyad, 2, etc. (MS 1038:4, c1900, emphasis added) 
 
In addition to discussing the term valency Peirce describes a chemical ‘graph’ as a ‘diagram’ 
showing the constitution of compounds. Notice, too, Peirce’s use of relations in describing  
how atoms ‘bond’ or combinine together. In the following extract from MS 1041 Peirce can 
be seen using graphical formulae to speculate on the likely arrangement of atoms within 
two compounds of iron – one trivalent (FeCl3) and the other potentially octavalent – 
thereby supporting the point he made earlier on the general opinion of chemists that 
valency is ‘variable’. Before progressing further it is worth making a point about the 
concept of valency that will prove important to Peirce but up to now remained rather 
implicit. Valency captures the possibility of relations between atoms. Knowing for example 
the valency of chlorine to be one and phosphorous to be three or five gives the possibility 
of two chlorides as: PCl3 and PCl5. Later in the chapter I hope to show how the chemical 
concept of valency provided Peirce with a means of expressing the possibility of a relational 
framework necessary to thought - providing a structure for concepts.   
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In this extract Peirce’s doodle – a 
characteristic of his manuscripts – shows 
the graphical formulae of two compounds 
of iron. As a child Peirce describes himself 
as ‘nourishing his mind with chemistry 
[and] devoured Frankland’s memoirs with 
avidity’. (MSS 1041, c1905)  
Peirce too is of ‘the general opinion…that 
valency can be ‘variable’’ as he shows iron 
here to have valencies of both three and 
eight. 
Figure 20: Peirce’s sketches showing iron as being both trivalent and octavalent, 
Source: Peirce’s  MS 1041, c1905 
 
I will also show how Peirce uses chemical graphs and valency and to explaining away the 
seemingly contradictory position of the ‘indecomposable elements’ of the phaneron having 
differences of form. Later and in chapter four, when examining Peirce’s theory of iconicity, 
we shall see how chemists use such diagrams to generate novel knowledge. A couple of 
years after writing these manuscripts Peirce writes, ‘I do not think I ever reflect in words: I 
employ visual diagrams, firstly, because this way of thinking is my natural language of self-
communion, and secondly, because I am convinced that it is the best system for the 
purpose’ (MS 619: 8, 1909). This example, from Frankland’s How to Teach Chemistry’ 
(1875), is an example of where visual diagrams are used to encourage the reader to think 
and reason about the reaction between marsh gas (today, methane) and chlorine gas. The 
concept of valency provides Frankland with a visual and diagrammatic means of reasoning 
as well as expressing the possible bonding relations between the atoms involved. 
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In describing the experiment 
Frankland (1875:54/5) 
states how when marsh gas 
and chlorine are ignited 
together in the absence of 
sunlight ‘fumes of 
hydrochloric acid will rise 
into the air and a dense 
deposit of carbon remains 
on the sides of the jar, a 
little being thrown out as 
soot’. However, in 
encouraging his students to 
think about the course of 
the reaction where the 
hydrogen atoms are 
replaced successively by 
atoms of chlorine, Frankland 
(1875:56) states that, ‘the 
replicability of hydrogen in 
[marsh gas] should be 
clearly enforced, and 
illustrated by [the] glyptic 
symbols’ – that is to say the 
diagrammatic 
representations of the 
substances shown. Notice 
too Frankland’s use of the 
valency terms monad’, dyad, 
and triad as previously seen 
in Peirce. 
Figure 21: Frankland’s graphical formulae showing the course of reaction between marsh 
gas (methane) and chlorine 
Source: Frankland’s (1875) How to Teach Chemistry, page 56 
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It is perhaps not surprising to see Peirce so consumed with the writings of Frankland, a 
chemist who, like Peirce, valued diagrammatic representations and their capacity to reveal 
new knowledge to the reader. In chapter two I argued that Cooke’s pedagogical method of 
employing diagrams fostered Peirce’s own predilection for diagrammatic thinking. We see 
here another possible influence on Peirce in Frankland’s own methods, a chemist who we 
saw earlier Peirce described as having nourished his mind as a child with chemistry. Here 
we see Peirce’s curiosity in chemistry continuing into his later writings in terms of graphical 
formulae and the associated concept of valency. In The Logic of Relatives Peirce writes on 
the topic of valency whilst at the same time mentioning chemical graphs,  
 
But when chemists became convinced of the doctrine of valency, that is, that every 
element has a fixed number of loose ends, and when they consequently began to 
write graphs for compounds, it seems to have been assumed that this necessitated 
an abandonment of the position that atoms and radicles [sic] combine by 
opposition of characters, which had further been weakened by the refutation of 
some mistaken arguments in its favour. (CP 3.471, 1897) 
 
Notice how Peirce laments the demise of the electrochemical-dualist theory of oppositely 
charged radicals that formed a part of his own undergraduate studies. 
 
Evidence that the term valency crossed to America is given by Peirce’s chemistry tutor, 
Josiah Cooke, who uses Hofmann’s notion of quantivalence. As Cooke (1868:56) explains, 
taking ‘the hydrogen atom as our standard of reference, the atoms of different elements 
are called univalent, bivalent, trivalent, or quadrivalent’ depending upon whether they are 
‘equivalent to one, two, three of four atoms of hydrogen (emphasis in the original). In an 
earlier series of lectures to the Royal College of Chemistry, Hofmann (1866:168) objects to 
the ‘vague and rather barbarous expression, atomicity’ because of its suggestion of the 
physical existence of atoms which he stresses, ‘should be assiduously avoided. It is on this 
basis that Hofmann (1866:169) states his preference for ‘escap[ing] this evil by substituting 
the expression quantivalence for atomicity’ (emphasis in the original). Here we encounter 
again the objections discussed earlier that some nineteenth century chemists had to the 
notion of physical atomism. In time, explains Mary Jo Nye (1993:80), quantivalence was 
‘shortened to valence (Valenz) by Kekulé and by Hermann Wichelhaus’. In passing reference 
to his earlier work on organometallic compounds Frankland (1878:78) brings together the 
four terms relating to an element’s ability to chemically combine in stating, ‘the combining 
value of the elementary atoms, which was first discovered in compounds of certain metals 
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with organic radicals, is termed their atomicity, equivalence, valency,  or atom-fixing 
power’. 
 
Valency features also in key passages of Mendeleev. In the first edition of his Principles of 
Chemistry, Mendeleev organised the first four chapters according to the valencies of the 
elements: hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen and carbon with valencies of 1, 2, 3 and 4 
respectively. The valency of an element defines the relations of combination it is able to 
establish with another element. Taking the elements from Mendeleev’s first four chapters 
above, 
 
Element H O N C 
Valency and 
number of 
single 
bonds 
1 2 3 4 
Structure of 
the hydride 
formed 
   
 
Name of 
hydride 
Hydrogen Water Ammonia Methane 
(marsh gas) 
Figure 22: Diagrams illustrating the valencies of hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen and carbon 
atoms 
 
By way of explanation, oxygen with a valency of two fulfils its possibility of forming two 
single bonds by combining with two monovalent atoms of hydrogen to form water, as H2O. 
Similar argument can be applied to the formation of the other hydrides shown in figure 22. 
Carbon dioxide (not shown) involves fulfilling the possibility of carbon forming four bonds 
and oxygen two as follows: O=C=O.  
 
3.6 Peirce’s use of valency to as a means of explaining his phenomenology 
As we shall see Peirce made use of both chemical diagrams and of the chemical concept of 
valency in setting out his formulation of phenomenology and which he styled as 
phaneroscopy. In this section I will explore the question: what does valency do for Peirce’s 
phaneroscopy? Before this I should like to demonstrate Peirce’s facility in drawing out 
chemical structures which follow the rules of valency. Take for example this series of 
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sketches from MS 1031 (c 1896) on the reactive and combustible gas acetylene, C2H2. In his 
biography of Peirce, Brent (1993:251) states that Peirce was at one time engaged in, ‘a 
sophisticated design to produce cheap domestic lighting from acetylene gas’ – something 
Peirce was to record a claim for: 
 
 
Figure 23: A record of the claim Peirce made in 1896 for the design of a generator to 
generate acetylene and other gases  
Source: Houghton Library, Harvard University, USA 
 
This is an image taken from the ‘acetylene’ MS 1031 to which I have added a number of 
annotations. Note that there is also a doodle of a man’s head – such additions are common 
to Peirce’s manuscripts45. 
                                                          
45
 It is worth recalling Peirce’s position on the atom when viewing his chemical diagrams. Writing in 
1892 Peirce states that ‘we are logically bound to adopt the Boscovichian idea that an atom is simply 
a distribution of component potential energy throughout space (this distribution being absolutely 
rigid) combined with inertia’ (CP W8:167). And again in 1898, Peirce states ‘each object occupies a 
single point of space, so that matter must consist of Boscovichian atomicules’ (CP 6.82) 
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A possible schematic outline for the production of 
acetylene from (in today’s terms) dibromoethane. 
      Acetylene molecule showing the triple bond 
between the two carbon atoms and the two single 
carbon to hydrogen bonds. The diagram satisfies 
the valency of carbon being four and hydrogen 
one. 
There now appears a two-step sequence of 
molecular diagrams which appear to suggest how 
(in today’s terms) dibromoethane might be 
converted to acetylene. 
Step 1: Bromoethane which on eliminating a single 
HBr molecule yields bromoethene. Note there is a 
double bond between the two carbon atoms of 
bromoethene. 
Step 2: Bromoethene yields acetylene on the 
elimination of a second HBr molecule. The 
presence of ‘K’ suggests the use of a potassium 
reagent to effect the reaction – possibly potassium 
hydroxide. 
Figure 24: A schematic outline for the production of acetylene. 
Source: Peirce’s MS 1031 (c 1896) 
 
Whilst providing another example to Peirce’s continuing interest in chemistry these 
diagrams show how, as a chemist, Peirce understood the power of chemical diagrams to 
visualise the relations between the various atoms with a molecular structure - relations 
governed by the rules of chemical valency. In being able to visualise such relations Peirce 
was able to speculate on a possible synthetic route for acetylene – a gas with great 
commercial potential as a source of domestic lighting.  
 
To return to the question posed earlier: what does valency do for phaneroscopy? The 
chemical elements in Peirce’s chemical diagrams relating to acetylene are characterised by 
their valencies. Carbon with a valency of four is – as Peirce’s sketches show - able to form 
molecules with carbon to carbon triple, double and single bonds. Bromine and hydrogen, 
each with a valency of one, is able to form only single bonds to carbon atoms. Peirce is able 
to propose a possible synthetic route to acetylene based on these particular valency 
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relations between the chemical elements. Whilst each atom might be thought to be 
indestructible new substances can be postulated on the basis of a rearrangement of these 
bonding relations and governed by the rules of valency. I will attempt to show how Peirce 
transposes these chemical concepts to provide part of the conceptual framework for his 
phaneroscopy.  
 
The conceptual elements of Peirce’s phaneroscopy will be shown to be characterised by the 
number of connections or bonds they are able to form – their valency. These conceptual 
elements are incapable of being reduced to simpler forms – what Peirce describes as 
‘indecomposable’. Similarly elements such as carbon, hydrogen and bromine as depicted in 
Peirce’s ‘acetylene sequence’, are non-decomposable and yet able to form bonds one with 
another, governed by their valencies. The chemical concept of valency might be viewed as 
the machinery or mechanism of the conceptual framework that connects the concepts of 
Peirce’s phaneroscopy in order to bring it coherence and meaning.  
 
Returning to the essay ‘The Basis of Pragmaticism in Phaneroscopy’ (1905), here Peirce 
suggests to his readers that, ‘[a] doubt may, however, arise whether any distinction of form 
is possible’ when considering the ‘indecomposable elements’ of the phaneron (EP2:363). 
Peirce now falls back on his preferred mode of diagrammatic thinking within the context of 
chemistry to offer an explanation in terms of valencies. One of several compounds he 
chooses is marsh gas where four single valent – or monad - hydrogen atoms, are bonded to 
a single four-valent – or tetrad – carbon atom. Given what we have seen of Peirce’s practice 
of sketching out the structures of chemical substances and his admiration for Frankland’s 
formulation of valency it seems likely that he had the following diagrammatic 
representation of marsh gas in mind. Furthermore the editor’s note to this paper explains 
that ‘Peirce’s “planar” representation of methane has been retained [in the text]’ (EP2:542 
n3). That is to say Peirce’s original manuscript pictured a similar planar diagram for the 
methane (CH4) molecule.  
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In considering marsh gas Peirce (EP2:363) makes the point that 
atoms such as carbon are ‘quite indecomposable and 
homogeneous’ and differ from other atoms not ‘in internal form but 
in external form (emphasis in the original). The external form Peirce 
refers to here is the valency of the element concerned. Here carbon 
is tetradic with a valency of four. The elements of the phaneron are 
‘indecomposable’ by analogy to the ‘internal form’ of the indivisible 
chemical elements. Nonetheless ‘distinctions of form’ exist in their 
ability to establish relations – analogous to the tetradic carbon 
atom’s capacity for forming four bonds with four monadic hydrogen 
atoms. In pursuing his explanation, Peirce (EP2:363) makes the 
point that boron ‘is a triad’ and able to bond with three hydrogen 
atoms to give BH3.  
Figure 25: Peirce’s explanation of distinctions of form within the indecomposable elements 
of the phaneron  
 
Boron and carbon are both indivisible elements although their atoms demonstrate 
‘distinctions of form’ in their ability to form relations with differing numbers of hydrogen 
atoms. Peirce makes a similar case for dyadic (bivalent) elements such as magnesium, and 
monovalent (monads) elements such as lithium. To complete the sequence of valencies 
from four to one Peirce (EP2:363) includes the noble gases helium, neon, argon, krypton 
and xenon which he describes as, ‘medads, not entering into atomic combination at all’.  
 
In his invitation to his readers to ‘join me in a little survey of the Phaneron’ (EP2:362), 
Peirce is encouraging us, argues Gava (2011:239), to focus on the ‘formal relational 
structure[s] without which human thought would not be what it is’. I would argue that 
Peirce uses the chemical concept of valency as the machinery for phaneroscopy’s relational 
framework, to bring coherence and meaning to its conceptual framework. Gava (2011:239) 
argues that Peirce, ‘[b]y analysing thought and experience as they are manifest in human 
practices, phenomenology, or phaneroscopy, aims to abstract that structure of concepts 
that is necessary to account for those human practices.’ I would suggest that the chemical 
concept of valency aided Peirce in abstracting the formal relational structures at play in 
human thought. Peirce argues that if, ‘the Phaneron were to consist entirely of elements 
altogether uncombined mentally…[then]…we should have no idea of a 
Phaneron…[However]…if there is a Phaneron, the idea of combination is an 
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indecomposable element of it’ (EP2:364). As we have seen earlier, Peirce argues that the 
phaneron’s indecomposable elements have differences in external form that are analogous 
to the valencies of the chemical elements. This analogy conveys the crucial importance of 
the ‘idea of combination’ to Peirce’s phenomenology. Returning to Peirce’s work on 
acetylene, we note that this molecule exists only because two atoms of carbon and two 
atoms of hydrogen were able to combine in a relation governed by their valencies. The 
molecule of acetylene is formed by atoms establishing a relation determined by differences 
in their external form. 
 
Writing two years later and in 1907, Peirce again emphasises that ‘distinctions and 
classifications founded upon form are, with very rare exceptions, more important to the 
scientific comprehension of the behaviour of things than distinctions and classifications 
founded upon matter’ (CP 5.469). Here again Peirce draws on the concept of valency and 
Mendeleev’s periodic table to illustrate this important point,  
 
Mendeléeff's classification of the chemical elements, with which all educated men 
are, by this time, familiar, affords neat illustrations of this, since the distinctions 
between what he calls “groups,” that is to say, the different vertical columns of his 
table, consists in the elements of one such “group” entering into different forms of 
combination with hydrogen and with oxygen from those of another group; or as we 
usually say, their valencies differ; while the distinctions between what he calls the 
“series,” that is, the different horizontal rows of the table, consist in the less formal, 
more material circumstance that their atoms have, the elements of one “series,” 
greater masses than those of the other. Now everybody who has the least 
acquaintance with chemistry knows that, while elements in different horizontal 
rows but the same vertical column always exhibit certain marked physical 
differences, their chemical behaviours at corresponding temperatures are quite 
similar; and all the major distinctions of chemical behaviour between different 
elements are due to their belonging to different vertical columns of the table. 
(CP 5.469, 1907, emphasis in the original). 
 
The point Peirce is making through his extended analogy with Mendeleev’s scheme can be 
seen by referring to a copy of the periodic table46 of that period (1905): 
                                                          
46
 Taken from Chapter 15 of Mendeleev’s Principles of Chemistry 3
rd
 Edition (1905) and reprinted in 
Jensen (2002:275) 
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Peirce likens the more important 
behaviour based on ‘form’ to the 
valencies of the various groups – 
illustrated by the number of chlorine 
atoms an element is combined with, for 
example, 
Group I: LiCl, NaCl,  
Group II: MgCl2, CaCl2 
Horizontal rows (periods or series) 
demonstrate the ‘less formal, more 
material circumstances’ shown by the 
atoms. For example, He, Li, Be, B, C…. 
and Ar, K, Ca, Sc, Ti…, being analogous 
to classifications based on matter. 
Figure 26: Peirce’s explanation of distinctions founded upon form compared to those 
founded on matter 
Source: Jensen’s (2002) Mendeleev and the Periodic Law, page 275 
 
The elements of group I are all very reactive metals where the elements of group 0 are 
unreactive gasses. The vertical groups within Mendeleev’s scheme capture the most 
significant relations between the elements and are likened by Peirce to differences in form. 
The horizontal rows are less significant in terms of the relations between the elements – 
likened to differences of matter. Both Peirce and Mendeleev constructed systems which 
were founded upon the relations between their constitutional elements. In setting out his 
phaneroscopy Peirce likens classifications based on form to the relations between 
Mendeleev’s groups of elements where particular combinations are related to the valencies 
of the elements concerned. Classifications based on matter Peirce likens to the relations 
between elements with a particular row of Mendeleev’s table.  
 
3.7 Conclusion  
The connection between Mendeleev and Peirce in this respect is perhaps captured by the 
artist Paul Klee (1920:7) in his opening to his essay ‘Creative Confessions’ with the 
statement, ‘[a]rt does not reproduce the visible; rather, it makes visible’. Both Mendeleev 
and Peirce were committed to making visible the relations existing between the 
compositional elements of the world. In Mendeleev’s case these were the non-
decomposable chemical elements of the material world; for Peirce the indecomposable 
elements of thought concerning everything that is real or imagined and which informed his 
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phenomenology or phaneroscopy. From a nineteenth century perspective a material 
substance can be reduced only as far as its chemical elements of composition. From the 
perspective of Peirce’s phaneroscopy our thoughts of things real and imagined can be 
condensed only as far as a set of irreducible conceptual elements. The works of these two 
philosopher-chemists – Mendeleev and Peirce -  were not concerned with ‘reproducing the 
visible’ but with making clear the relations between the world’s material elements and 
between its cognitive elements. In this respect they were both concerned with the process 
of ‘making visible’.  
 
In this chapter I have argued that Mendeleev and Peirce, with their respective focus on the 
world’s material elements and its cognitive elements, are both dealing with the latent 
relations that lie behind observable phenomena. Furthermore I believe I have shown the 
importance of Peirce’s continuing involvement with chemistry to the structure of the 
conceptual relations at play in phaneroscopy. The chemical concept of valency and 
Mendeleev’s periodic table each has the capacity to depict relations diagrammatically. I 
would argue that Peirce puts this diagrammatic facility, within the context of chemistry, to 
work in an attempt to generate in the minds of his readers knowledge of the relations at 
work in his phenomenology. Diagrams pick out and enhance the intelligibility of those 
relations, whether between the conceptual elements of the phaneron or the chemical 
elements of some molecular structure such as acetylene. In one of the few references in 
the literature to chemistry and this aspect of Peirce’s thought, André De Tienne (2004:12), 
asks his reader to ‘mind the importance of the chemical analogy, as this explains why Peirce 
was for a while tempted to call his new science by the name of ‘phanerochemy’ for ‘it was 
with the eyes of the trained chemist and mathematician that he [Peirce] wanted to observe 
the phaneron’. Why mathematicians and chemists? I would suggest that the mathematician 
brings to phaneroscopy what Peirce describes as a ‘generalizing power’ (EP2:147/8, 1903), 
recording observations as acritical descriptive propositions. The chemist is skilled in 
observing, recording and depicting relations in diagrammatic form. 
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Chapter Four 
Dmitri Mendeleev’s inquiry into the chemical elements and Peirce’s 
theory of iconicity 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the earlier chapters I have argued that in pursuing chemistry Peirce immersed himself in 
a subject, founded on the nature of relations and visualised in diagrammatic form. In 
chapter three I showed that Peirce and Mendeleev were connected through their common 
interest in seeking an ordered system for the chemical elements; again one founded on 
relations. By using the diagrammatic representation of Mendeleev’s periodic table, as well 
as the spatial-relational associations of chemical valency, Peirce created a diagrammatic 
pathway to an understanding of phaneroscopy. Diagrammatic representations taken from 
chemistry were used by Peirce to create knowledge. In this chapter I will build on these 
arguments and explore Peirce’s notion of iconicity and the iconic diagram. Having argued 
that Peirce’s philosophy was in part developed through chemistry, I will now argue that this 
relationship is bi-directional; Peirce’s theory of iconicity offers an interpretative framework 
for viewing Mendeleev’s inquiry into the chemical elements and his periodic table.  
 
To begin with I will give a statement of Peirce’s three orders of signs and then introduce 
iconicity by taking Chiara Ambrosio’s (2014:256) claim that ‘Peirce characterized iconic 
representations as the dynamic constituents of scientific inquiry’. In seeking to capture the 
essence of Peirce’s iconicity, Ambrosio (2014:256) cites Hookway (2003:102): ‘[t]he key of 
iconicity is not perceived resemblance between the sign and what it signifies but rather the 
possibility of making new discoveries about the object of a sign through observing features 
of the sign itself’ (emphasis added). The epistemic fruitfulness that Hookway claims for 
iconic signs will first be illustrated by an examination of nineteenth century chemical 
graphs. By interacting with diagrammatic forms of chemical structures chemists gained 
knowledge of the objects they represented. A diagram is a sign which, states Stjernfelt 
(2007:29), is a ‘special icon providing the condition of possibility for general and rigorous 
thought’. This examination of chemical graphs will enable aspects of iconicity to be 
introduced ahead of a more detailed treatment within the context of Mendeleev’s early 
periodic table.  
 
Peirce's notion of iconicity in relation to the periodic table considered as a particular case of 
diagram also casts light on the broader issue of representation in science, for as Callender 
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and Cohen (2006:67) argue, ‘[t]here are now a variety of different accounts of how 
scientific models represent and, of course, the usual philosophical squabbling over which 
one is right’. I will show that Peirce and Mendeleev can contribute, as historical actors with 
precise views on the matter, to elucidate some of the terms of this debate. Also and ahead 
of a consideration of the early periodic table as an iconic sign I will consider Ursula Klein’s 
(2001) case study from chemistry of Berzelian formulae as ‘paper tools’. I will argue that 
Klein missed an opportunity by rejecting Peirce’s iconicity as an interpretative framework 
for part of her study. This will also serve as an opportunity to further explore iconicity 
ahead of the section on Mendeleev’s periodic table. 
 
4.2 Peirce’s three orders of signs 
In his essay ‘What is a Sign?’ (1894), Peirce gives three orders of signs, 
 
There are three kinds of signs. Firstly, there are likenesses, or icons; which serve to 
convey ideas of the things they represent simply by imitating them. Secondly, there 
are indications, or indices; which show something about things, on account of their 
being physically connected with them…Thirdly, there are symbols, or general signs, 
which have become associated with their meanings by usage. Such are most words, 
and phrases, and speeches, and books, and libraries. (EP2:5, emphasis added) 
 
We will first take Peirce’s formulation of a symbol and an index before moving to a more 
detailed treatment of iconicity. Consider potassium, an example of a chemical object, 
represented as an agreed convention by the symbol K. For as Peirce states a symbol, such 
as K, is a sign ‘because it is used and understood as such’ (CP 2.307). Thus KCl is understood 
to represent the salt potassium chloride – Cl being the conventional symbol for chlorine. A 
symbol such as K or Cl represents their respective objects as an agreed social convention.  
 
The bright lilac flame that forms when potassium is placed in water would be indexical of 
potassium. There is a causal connection between this soft reactive metal and the lilac flame 
– for Peirce states an index ‘signifies its object solely by virtue of being really connected 
with it’ (CP 3.360). The flame test is a common laboratory procedure for detecting 
potassium compounds. A lilac flame then, has an indexical quality in that it draws the 
chemist’s attention to the presence of potassium. 
 
Iconicity has been traditionally more problematic to define, precisely because Peirce often 
characterises it as a resemblance or likeness. For example Catherine Legg (2013:8) states 
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that defining the icon in terms of resemblance ‘immediately raises sceptical concerns in the 
minds of many. “Resemblance is cheap”, it is thought. Anything can be argued to resemble 
any other thing in some respect. For instance, a photograph of Richard Nixon might be 
thought to resemble other objects qua male (e.g. Brad Pitt)’. I will offer a detailed analysis 
of iconicity, drawing on chemical examples, in the next section. 
 
4.3 Examples of iconicity in chemistry 
This next section develops Hookway’s claim for the epistemic fruitfulness of iconicity from 
the perspective of nineteenth century graphical formulae, diagrams chemists construct to 
gain new information on their objects of study. Sami Paavola (2011:297) argues that, 
 
From the Peircean point of view, diagrams should be the heart of all reasoning. 
They are central in trying to understand the creative character of reasoning, 
especially because they are iconic signs. (emphasis in the original). 
 
The chemist Edward Frankland – previously discussed in chapter three – uses diagrams to 
create in his student reader knowledge of the change in structural relations to the reactant 
and product molecules during the course of a reaction. What we will see in Frankland’s use 
of chemical graphs is Hookway’s earlier connection of the possibility of making new 
discoveries ‘through observing features of the sign itself’, the epistemic fruitfulness of an 
iconic diagram. Our first introduction to Peirce’s writings on iconicity connects the icon with 
epistemic fruitfulness: 
 
A great distinguishing property of the Icon is that by the direct observation of it 
other truths concerning its object can be discovered than those which suffice to 
determine its construction’. (CP 2.279, c1895). 
 
Also relevant to any treatment of iconic diagrams are two further statements from Peirce.  
Firstly Peirce states that ‘[a] diagram is mainly an icon, and an icon of intelligible relations’ 
(CP 4.531, 1906). Secondly, from a Peircean perspective ‘[d]iagrams do not necessarily 
resemble their objects in looks, but only in respect to the relations of their parts (EP 2: 13, 
1895). I will develop these points in the next section. 
 
Let us now turn to this example from Frankland’s text Lecture Notes for Chemistry Students 
where he discusses the conversion of nitrobenzol to aniline: 
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Frankland describes 
how nitrobenzol is 
reduced to aniline 
by the action of 
sulphuretted 
hydrogen (H2S). This 
equation depicts the 
formulae for the 
reactants and 
products as well as 
their reacting ratios.  
Figure 27: The chemical reduction of nitrobenzol to aniline 
Source: Frankland’s Lecture Notes for Chemical Students: Embracing Mineral and Organic 
Chemistry (1866) page 241 
No information on the bonding relations between the atoms within reactants or the 
products is given by the formulae depicted above. These representations are of little use to 
the student chemist interested in which arrangement of atoms on the reactant molecule 
has been affected by the sulphureted hydrogen (H2S) in forming aniline. To show the 
different structural relations between the starting material nitrobenzol and the final 
product aniline, Frankland immediately includes this next diagram: 
 
 
These two graphical formulae Frankland 
notes, display ‘the relation between 
nitrobenzol and aniline’ (emphasis added). 
Earlier in the text there is a caution against 
interpreting the diagrams as a 
representation of the actual spatial 
arrangement of the atoms for each 
compound. Frankland (1866:25) also makes 
the point that chemical graphs  ‘are 
intended to represent neither the shape of 
the molecules, nor the relative position of 
the constituent atoms’ but ‘serve only to 
show the definite disposal of the bonds’ 
between the different atoms involved. 
Figure 28: graphical formulae of nitrobenzol and aniline 
Source: Frankland’s (1866) Lecture Notes for Chemical Students: Embracing Mineral and Organic 
Chemistry, page 242 
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It is possible to relate Frankland’s graphical formulae for nitrobenzol and aniline to the 
earlier points relating to a Peircean concept a diagram as an iconic sign. The number and 
type of each atom present in association with its valency form the basis of the ‘intelligible 
relations’ at play. Both nitrobenzol and aniline each have six atoms of carbon and one of 
nitrogen. In addition nitrobenzol has five hydrogen and two oxygen atoms, whilst aniline 
has seven hydrogen atoms. The bonding relations between the atoms composing aniline 
and nitrobenzol are controlled by the rules of chemical valency:- 
 
Atom Valency Number of single bonds 
C 4 4 
N 3 or 5 3 or 5 
O 2 2 
H 1 1 
 
These particular aspects of the relations underpinning the interpretation of the two 
chemical graphs make sense of a number of common structural features, as well as some 
differences between the two structures. Following Frankland’s statement (figure 28) that 
these graphical formulae illustrate the disposal of bonds between the atoms concerned we 
can assume that both nitrobenzol and aniline have five C—H single bonds and four C=C 
double bonds. A point of difference is that nitrobenzol has two N=O bonds which are 
replaced in aniline by two N—H bonds. Frankland (figure 28), in stressing that the chemical 
graphs do not depict the shape of each molecule but the distribution of bonds between the 
atoms, echoes Peirce’s point that an iconic diagram does not resemble its object in looks. I 
believe the iconicity of these two chemical graphs is demonstrated in the way they are 
central to the reasoning process involved in revealing new knowledge.  
 
To begin with the chemist has to physically construct - draw out on paper - the two 
chemical graphs on the basis of the relations described earlier. It is then possible to use the 
two chemical diagrams in order to infer something of the nature of the chemical change 
that occurs when nitrobenzol is converted into aniline by the action of zinc and 
hydrochloric acid. Firstly, the reaction proceeds by the reduction of nitrobenzol’s -NO2 
group to form an -NH2 group on the product aniline. Secondly, it is possible to reason that 
the valency of nitrogen alters during the reaction from being pentavalent in nitrobenzol to 
trivalent in aniline.  
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Another example of experimenting on an iconic graphical formula to ‘discover unnoticed 
and hidden relations among the parts’ – here a molecule’s atoms of construction – can be 
seen in this problem on isomers taken from Crum Brown’s paper ‘On the Theory of Isomeric 
Compounds’ (1865). By reasoning with diagrams Crum Brown is able to show that fumaric 
and maleic acids (C4H4O4) can be represented by a single graphical formula and thus are 
absolute isomers. In coming to this conclusion he relies on the explanatory power of the 
concept of atomicity or valency.  
 
 
Graphic formula A 
 
Graphic Formula B  
Both the chemical graphs shown here conform to the 
formula C4H4O4. 
 
Both formulae A and B, drawn using the conventional 
valencies for the elements involved, will support the 
chemical properties of fumaric acid and maleic acid.  
Formula A is ruled out as one of the carbon atoms has two 
spare or unused bonds – or ‘affinities’.  
 
In formula B the spare bond on each carbon atom will 
unite to result in a carbon to carbon double bond (in 
modern terms). It is formula B that represents both 
fumaric acid and maleic acid as explained below. 
 
This single formula represents 
both fumaric acid and maleic 
acid. 
Of the two alternatives above, Crum Brown (1865:234) 
argues that only this one ‘is admissible, for the theory of 
atomicity taken strictly does not admit of free affinities in a 
molecule.’ As both fumaric acid and maleic acid can be 
represented by a single graphical formula, they are 
therefore examples of absolute isomers. 
Figure 29: Isomeric forms of fumaric and maleic acids 
Source: Crum Brown’s On the Theory of Isomeric Compounds (1878) page 234 
 
It is important now to make the connection between observations made on an iconic 
diagram and the discovery that fumaric and maleic acids are absolute isomers. In order to 
reveal something hidden within these graphical formulae – an ‘other truth’ hidden within 
the two molecules – Crum Brown performs an experiment on the two graphical formulae. 
By drawing out the two graphical formulae Crum Brown (1865:234) is able to reason that of 
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the two alternatives graphic formula A has to be rejected because ‘the theory of atomicity 
taken strictly does not admit of free affinities in a molecule’; an inspection of formula A 
(figure 29) shows one of the carbon atoms to have two bonds not connected to any other 
atom. It is for this reason that Crum Brown rejects formula A as a possibility, thereby 
concluding that as both fumaric and maleic acids can be represented by only formula B they 
are ‘absolute isomers’. In this introduction to Peirce’s formulation of iconicity, it is worth 
noting that the way in which Crum Brown and Frankland use graphic notations – diagrams 
in chemistry – to disclose knowledge of their chemical objects aligns with Stjernfelt’s 
(2007:90/91) account of an icon as,  
 
[T]he only kind of sign involving a direct presentation of qualities pertaining to its 
object…[and]…the only sign by the contemplation of which more can be learnt than 
lies in the directions for its construction…[whereby]…in order to discover these 
initially unknown pieces of information about the object hidden in the icon, some 
deductive experiment on the icon must be performed. 
 
More examples exist in the writings of Frankland (1866) and Crum Brown (1861, 1865) 
where chemical graphs act as iconic signs and a vehicle for creative thought, leading to the 
unveiling of new knowledge about the chemists’ objects of study.  
 
4.4 Arguments against iconicity 
Having offered a brief étude into iconicity I will now take the second point indicated in the 
introduction to this chapter: the issues around representation in science and in particular 
the arguments against iconicity. Earlier we encountered Hookway accounting for Peirce in 
terms of the ‘resemblance between a sign and what it signifies’. The Peirce scholar Randall 
Dipert (1996:373) states that it was ‘C. S. Peirce's claim that resemblance or similarity, what 
he termed 'iconicity', is an important part of the general phenomenon of linguistic, artistic, 
and even mental representation’. The connection between iconicity and resemblance and 
similarity is supported by Peirce’s writings: ‘I call a sign which stands for something merely 
because resembles it, an icon (W5:163, 1885; emphasis in the original). Peirce seems to 
suggest that icons represent by resembling their objects. There is however a longstanding 
problem in the philosophy of science with this approach predicated on resemblance. Before 
developing a claim for the periodic table as an iconic representation, some of the 
arguments against iconicity on the grounds of resemblance need to be considered. 
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Some of the recent debate around representation has been concerned with qualifying the 
relation of ‘resemblance’. One of the strongest critiques of resemblance in this context was 
made nearly fifty years ago by  Nelson Goodman (1968) who Daniel Cohnitz and Marcus 
Rossberg (2016) describe as ‘one of the most influential philosophers of the post-war era of 
American philosophy [whose] philosophical interests ranged from formal logic and the 
philosophy of science to the philosophy of art’. Goodman’s objections to resemblance as a 
necessary condition for representation remain influential and feature in the current 
literature on representation. For example, Michael Newall (2010:91) states, ‘Nelson 
Goodman is the most famous critic of resemblance theories’. In his Languages of Art 
Goodman argues that resemblance is an insufficient condition for depiction.  
 
 
In a much quoted example Goodman 
(1968:5) argues that for any picture - 
such as Edward Hopper’s painting of 
a lighthouse – to represent an actual 
lighthouse, then Hopper’s painting, 
 ‘must be a symbol for it, stand for it, 
refer to it; and that no degree of 
resemblance is sufficient to establish 
the requisite relationship of 
reference. Nor is resemblance 
necessary for reference; almost 
anything may stand for almost 
anything else. A picture that 
represents—like a passage that 
describes—refers to and, more 
particularly, denotes it. Denotation is 
the core of representation and is 
independent of resemblance’ 
(emphasis in the original). 
Figure 30: ‘Lighthouse Hill’ by Edward Hopper (1927) 
Source: Dallas Museum of Art, USA 
 
Goodman rejects the significance of ‘resemblance’ as the mandatory relation between a 
picture and what it represents. This is because for Goodman resemblance is a symmetrical 
relationship (if A resembles B then B resembles A). This is not the case for one of Hopper’s 
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lighthouse paintings. Hopper’s canvas represents a lighthouse; the lighthouse does not 
represent Hopper’s canvas: the relationship between the two is asymmetric. Also according 
to Goodman (1968:4) resemblance unlike representation is reflexive, ‘an object resembles 
itself to the maximum degree but rarely represents itself’. From Goodman’s (1968:4) 
perspective, the representational relationship between Hopper’s painting and the 
lighthouse is one of denotation and not one of resemblance which ‘in any degree is no 
sufficient condition for representation’.  
 
There have been a number of counter-arguments against Goodman’s position. Randall 
Dipert argued against Goodman’s position that resemblance is independent of 
representation on the grounds of the symmetry of the relations involved. In taking the 
symmetric relation ‘sibling-of’ and the asymmetric relation ‘uncle-of’, Dipert (1996:381) 
argues: 
 
We might then conclude, using Goodmanian logic and language, that the uncle-of 
relation is "independent" of the sibling-of relation; that is, that a useful conceptual 
analysis of the relation "uncle" does not involve the notion of "sibling". 
 
Resemblance and representation are founded on different symmetry relations. So too are 
‘uncle-of’ and ‘sibling-of’. Dipert argues that rejecting resemblance (symmetric) as being 
wholly independent of representation (asymmetric) is as invalid as claiming that the 
brother relation (symmetric) is wholly independent of the uncle (asymmetric) relation. 
Dipert (1996:380)  concludes that Goodman’s arguments based around the symmetry of 
relations ‘would be a useful contribution to the discussion if anyone had ever seriously 
proposed that the signification relationship  is exactly and only the resemblance 
relationship. So far as I am aware, no one ever has’. From a different perspective Steven 
French (2003:1478) argues, ‘transporting Goodman’s approach into the scientific context is 
not unproblematic’. In response to Goodman’s rejection of resemblance as a condition of 
representation in not being reflexive or symmetric, French (2003:1478) argues that in 
science ‘we do not simply model a phenomenon, we model it as something’. Part of 
Goodman’s (1968:5) objection to resemblance as a necessary condition for representation 
is that, ‘almost anything may stand for almost anything else’. This, argues French 
(2003:1478), might be agreed ‘when it comes to artistic objects’ but is not the case for 
scientific representation or model for ‘if the appropriate relationships are not in place 
between the relevant properties then the ‘‘model’’ will not be deemed scientific’. Returning 
to Frankland’s graphical formula for aniline (Figure 28), French’s ‘appropriate relationships’ 
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between ‘the relevant properties’ might include the type of each atom present (C, H, and 
N) and the number of each atom present in the molecule (6, 7 and 1 respectively) as well as 
their respective valencies. A representation based on a graphical formula with a different 
set of atoms, or the same set but in different numbers, would not correspond to an 
empirical analysis for aniline and so, in French’s words, ‘would not be deemed scientific’.  
 
There have been other objections to iconicity around similarity or likeness. For example 
Arthur Bierman (1962:245) went as far as to say that, ‘there are no iconic signs at all’ for 
the reason that, ‘[t]here are no signs whose denotation and signification depend solely on 
their resemblance to that which they denote’. In stressing the connection between iconicity 
and resemblance Bierman (1962:245) further argues that even if resemblance exists 
between an object and its sign, it is still not possible to make ‘the further claim that the 
resemblance is the basis for one of the resembling terms being a sign’. Also, as Ambrosio 
(2010:153) recalls, ‘Umberto Eco stated that “the category of iconicity is useless”. In his 
Theory of Semiotics, Eco (1976:191) writes of ‘six naïve notions’ around iconicity with one 
being ‘that the so-called iconic sign is similar to its object’ (emphasis in the original). One of 
the puzzlements around the notion of the icon for Eco (1976:193) is, can ‘one [be] really 
sure that iconic signs are ‘similar’ to the objects they stand for? Indeed, is one sure they 
stand for objects at all? By referring to a picture of a glass of cold beer Eco challenges the 
relation of similarity between the picture and a cold glass of beer by stating, ‘[t]here is 
neither beer nor glass on the page, nor is there a damp icy film’. The relation between the 
picture and its object is for Eco is a perceptual mechanism. The picture and the cold beer 
itself, Eco (1976:193) argues, ‘rely on the ‘same’ perceptual ‘structure’, or on the same 
system of relations’.  
 
Another response to what Callender and Cohen (2006:68), characterise as ‘‘the 
constitutional question’: what constitutes the representational relation between a model 
and the world’, was provided in terms of ‘similarity’ by Ronald Giere (2004:742) when he 
argues that, ‘scientists use designated similarities between models and aspects of the world 
to form both hypotheses and generalizations’ (emphasis added). In advancing his argument 
Giere stresses the importance of the scientist’s intention in ‘exploiting similarities between 
a model and that aspect of the world it is being used to represent’ (emphasis in the 
original). This emphasis on the scientist’s intention is a defence against the objection that 
similarity is a weak form of correspondence, as any one thing might be similar to any other 
in a number of respects. In reinforcing the importance of intention Giere (2004:747) lays 
stress on how the model or representation is used when he states, ‘[i]t is not the model 
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that is doing the representing, it is the scientist using the model who is doing the 
representing’. From Giere’s perspective when considering the ‘constitutional problem’ on 
how a model or diagram ‘represents’ we must consider intention: Crum Brown (see above) 
uses graphical formulae to represent fumaric acid and maleic acid for the purpose of 
determining whether they are absolute isomers. Taking Giere’s approach here we are 
connecting Crum Brown’s graphic formulae as representations of their chemical objects 
with his practice of representing.  
 
A view on how a scientific model or diagram relates to the world founded on partial 
isomorphism is offered by Steven French and Newton Da Costa (2003:49), where ‘A is 
partially isomorphic to A1 when a partial substructure of A is isomorphic to a partial 
substructure of A1’. Returning to Crum Brown’s use of graphical formulae to show absolute 
isomerism, the ‘partial substructures’ present in the target molecules of fumaric and maleic 
acids - the types of atoms present (C, H and O), the number of these atoms and their 
bonding relations - are isomorphic to the graphical formula as depicted. Expressed slightly 
differently and with reference to maleic acid, the number of atoms, the types of atoms and 
their bonding relations as depicted by the graphical formulae, stand in a one-to-one 
correspondence to the equivalent partial substructures within the maleic acid molecule – 
4C, 4H and 4O atoms with their bonding relations as depicted. Where Giere’s account 
advances representation as a form of similarity founded on intention and use, French and 
da Costa offer a view of similarity in terms of partial structural isomorphism. 
 
I would argue that objections to iconicity around resemblance and likeness should not 
necessarily lead to a rejection of Peirce in this context as he does not always use likeness as 
a superficial similarity or appearance. He makes this clear in his example of a drunken man 
demonstrating the virtues of self-restraint, 
 
It may be questioned whether all icons are likenesses or not. For example, if a 
drunken man is exhibited in order to show, by contrast, the excellence of 
temperance, this is certainly an icon, but whether it is a likeness or not may be 
doubted. The question seems somewhat trivial. (CP 2.282, 1895) 
 
The power of the iconic drunk to present the benefits of sobriety is dependent on the 
onlooker’s ability to interpret and to project: don’t drink to excess! The drunken man is a 
metaphor for the benefits of moderation and thus a mediated icon. Peirce would maintain 
that we never experience pure icons, but only mediated ones; he writes, ‘for a pure icon 
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does not draw any distinction between itself and its object. It represents whatever it may 
represent, and whatever it is like, it in so far is. It is an affair of suchness only’ (CP 5.74, 
1903).  
 
Likeness is also a term Peirce uses when dealing with certain mathematical representations, 
 
The reasoning of mathematicians will be found to turn chiefly upon the use of 
likenesses, which are the very hinges of the gates of their science. The utility of 
likenesses to mathematicians consists in their suggesting in a very precise way, new 
aspects of supposed states of things… (EP2:6, 1894) 
 
In this way a mathematical function is able to operate iconically [likenesses] in facilitating 
the disclosure of a novel relation. The relationship between mathematical functions and 
‘likeness’ can be seen here when Peirce states, 
 
Particularly deserving of notice are icons in which the likeness is aided by 
conventional rules. Thus, an algebraic formula is an icon, rendered such by the rules 
of commutation, association, and distribution of the symbols. (CP 2.279, c1902) 
 
To illustrate this consider the quadratic expression, x2 – 3x – 10 = 0. In order to solve this 
equation we need to be familiar with certain conventional rules such as what it meant by 
‘x-squared’, a ‘minus’ or an ‘equals’ sign. With the aid of these conventional rules plus the 
knowledge of how to solve a quadratic equation (not detailed here), a rearrangement of 
this mathematical relation reveals the previously unknown roots of the equation to be x = 5 
and x = -2. In gaining this new knowledge Peirce stresses the iconicity of the original 
function – note again the facility of an iconic representation to reveal novel facts, 
 
This capacity of revealing unexpected truth is precisely that wherein the utility of 
algebraical formulae consists, so that the iconic character is the prevailing one.  
(CP 2.279, c1902) 
 
I hope in this section to have shown something of the range played by similarity, or 
‘likeness’, in Peirce’s account of iconicity. In his account of representation Peirce is not 
using ‘likeness’ in a way that sits within the realm of Goodman’s objections to the use of 
resemblance in art theory or Eco’s earlier rejection based on the relations between a cold 
glass of beer and its image.  
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4.5 Mauricio Suárez’s approach to representation 
Before approaching the periodic table in the context of iconicity it is worth considering in 
greater detail arguments around isomorphism, similarity and resemblance in the context of 
representations. A fuller understanding of these terms, and isomorphism in particular, will 
be helpful when later arguing the case for iconicity in relation to Ursula Klein’s (2001) 
development of Berzelian formulae as ‘paper tools’. These terms form part of Mauricio 
Suárez’s approach to representation. Suárez (2010:91) considers two approaches to 
representation:  
 
The interest from analytical philosophy is related to the notion of reference, and 
the metaphysics of relations; the interest from philosophy of science is related to 
an attempt to understand modelling practices. These two distinct forms of inquiry 
into the nature of representation may be distinguished as the ‘analytical inquiry’ 
and the ‘practical inquiry. 
 
The periodic table appears to offer a bridge between Suárez’s two approaches. Firstly 
Mendeleev was concerned with ‘reference and the metaphysics of relations’ - how the 
term element as depicted by the various symbols within the table refers to the substances 
encountered in the laboratory – for example Hg and the silvery coloured liquid mercury 
metal. In chapter three I argued that the concept of relations was important to Peirce and 
to Mendeleev. We saw how Mendeleev accounted for compounds such as mercury oxide in 
terms of the meaning of the term ‘element’: the relations between the free elements 
mercury and oxygen and the compound mercury oxide. In particular we saw Mendeleev 
address the puzzle that when silvery coloured liquid mercury and colourless oxygen gas 
combine, the free elements are not apparent in the red coloured product of mercury oxide. 
The free elements – here mercury and oxygen – Scerri (2013:30) refers to as ‘elements 
existing as simple substances’ and when combined as red mercury oxide as ‘the 
metaphysical element, abstract element, transcendental element…element as a basic 
substance’. Continuing Scerri’s argument, mercury considered as a ‘basic substance’, is an 
abstract bearer of properties whilst lacking its phenomenal properties such as its silvery 
liquid appearance, that is mercury as a simple substance. In concerning himself with the 
identity of a chemical element Mendeleev is engaging with a metaphysical aspect of 
chemistry.  
 
In this next example we see Mendeleev (1871:43) keen to distinguish between the terms 
‘simple substance’ and ‘element’. A simple substance, Mendeleev (1871:43) argues, ‘is 
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something material – metal or metalloid – endowed with physical properties’… [whereas] 
…the term “element” designates those material particles of simple and compound 
substances which determine their behaviour from a chemical and physical point of view’. 
Thus carbon is an element but coal, graphite and diamond are simple substances. Returning 
again to chapter three we saw how Mendeleev frames the purpose of chemistry in terms of 
understanding the relations between the chemical and physical properties of simple and 
compound substances – such as mercury, oxygen and mercury oxide – and the intrinsic 
qualities of the elements contained in them. We see here Mendeleev engaging both with 
the simple and compound substances encountered in the laboratory and with what Scerri 
earlier described as ‘the metaphysical element’ or ‘element as a basic substance’.  As 
Gordin (2012:83) explains, ‘[s]ubstances found in nature were merely instantiations of the 
abstract notion of an element which was truly the organizing principle of matter’ – and 
subsequently arranged by Mendeleev in order of atomic weight as the periodic table. For, 
as Scerri (2008:170) states, Mendeleev ‘insisted that his periodic classification was primarily 
concerned with this sense of the term ‘element’ and not as observable simple substances’.  
 
Secondly, the periodic table would appear to bridge the second of Suárez’s two approaches 
in terms of ‘practice’ – where the practical inquiry, as Suárez (2010:92) states, is concerned 
with a particular representation’s ‘context of application…[with an]…emphasis on use’ 
(emphasis in the original). The practical inquiry focusses upon the many different ways 
representations are used in science with an emphasis on the context of their application. 
Suárez’s approach chimes with the context of Mendeleev’s inquiry where he put the 
periodic table to use in the search for novel knowledge of the chemical elements – to be 
discussed in greater detail in the following chapters. Also, and in relation to context, one of 
the main origins of Mendeleev’s system, as with Cooke before him, was pedagogic: to 
provide a scheme that made the assimilation of chemical knowledge more accessible to 
their students. Mendeleev’s first paper on the periodic table was published in February 
1869 and shortly before volume two of his Principles of Chemistry (Kaji 2002). Thus it might 
be argued that the initial purpose of the periodic table was linked to that of the Principles 
which Mendeleev (1901:vii) expresses in pedagogical terms as: ‘to acquaint the student not 
only with the methods of observation, the experimental facts, and the laws of chemistry, 
but also with the insight given by this science into the unchangeable substratum underlying 
the various forms of matter’.  
 
Whilst Suárez (2010:91) concedes that his categories of analytical and practical inquiry ‘are 
not exclusive’ it is interesting that Mendeleev’s periodic table appears, initially at least, to 
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draw on them both. Following a brief tour of Suárez’s analytical and practical conceptions 
of inquiry I will re-introduce Peirce’s formulation of iconicity which I argue, in support of 
Ambrosio (2014), offers a way of avoiding Suárez’s polarising approach – demonstrating 
also the virtue of taking scientific representation as being integrated within the whole 
creative enterprise of inquiry. I hope to show that by using the periodic table as a case 
study, Peirce’s iconicity bridges Suárez’s two categories of analytical and practical inquiry; 
the middle way suggested by Ambrosio (2014) between Suárez’s (2010) two approaches. 
 
Analytical and Practical inquiries into representation 
There are, Suárez (2010:95) argues, two conceptions of representation within the analytical 
inquiry and which draw on the concepts of ‘similarity’ and ‘isomorphism’ we came across 
earlier, 
 
The similarity conception of representation [sim]: A represents B if and only if A and 
B are similar [and] [t]he isomorphism conception of representation [iso]: A 
represents B if and only if A and B instantiate isomorphic structures. 
 
We will see later how Suárez rejects attempts to reduce the necessary constituents of 
scientific representation to similarity and isomorphism. Nevertheless Suárez’s ‘analytical’ 
approach is useful to this project as it frames an aspect of Mendeleev’s own inquiry: his 
concern with exploring the nature of the mutual relations between the chemical elements 
framed in terms of their physiochemical properties, and how this was to be best 
represented.  
 
The analytical approach treats representation as an analysis of the relations between the 
target or object of investigation and the form of representation, sometimes referred to as 
the source. In simple form if X is the source and Y its target then it can be said that ‘X 
represents Y’. Representation is then a relation, R, such that the statement ‘X represents Y’ 
is equivalent to ‘R holds between X and Y’. The nature of R, what Suárez (2010:92) refers to 
as the ‘constitutional question’, is comprehended as a detailed conceptual analysis of the 
relations existing between the source and the target. As part of his analysis Suárez (2010) 
offers two reductionist accounts. The first reduces representation to similarity and the 
second to isomorphism. Both accounts are substantive which, explains Suárez (2010:94), 
‘takes it that representation is a robust property or relation of sources and targets’. This is 
in contrasts to Suárez’s (2010:94) deflationary account where ‘representation is not a 
robust property or relation of sources and targets’. In this case representation focusses on 
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some of the functional relations between source and target within the context of a 
particular inquiry. Suárez’s account deploys the terms similarity and isomorphism which are 
mathematical concepts. Examining each term within this context offers an insight into their 
differences of emphasis and meaning. 
 
Two similar triangles have the same shape, but can be different sizes. Their similarity is 
retained in that their angles are all equal even though one triangle may be larger than the 
other. By definition two triangles are similar if two sides are in the same proportion and the 
included angle is equal. One similar triangle may then act as the representation of the other 
– or vice versa as this is both a reflexive and a symmetrical relation. In abstract algebra, 
isomorphism is a bijective map f, such that both f and its inverse f −1 are structure-
preserving mappings. As with similarity, isomorphism is also a reflexive and symmetrical 
relation. Isomorphism is a mathematical concept and it is difficult to see it as a test of 
representation outside of this domain. Graphs can be tested for isomorphism using 
complex algorithms.  
 
  
Are these two graphs47 isomorphic? An algorithm shows the answer to be ‘yes’  
Figure 31: Isomorphic graphs  
 
The two graphs are said to be isomorphic because the relevant algorithm rearranges their 
vertices so that the corresponding edge structure is exactly the same. As can be seen 
bijective mapping between these two mathematical structures makes the object identical 
to the target. Representations in science are often not mathematical entities – and the 
process of representation is not reflexive or symmetrical. Isomorphism best applies where 
the source and its target are mathematical objects. In terms of representations in science 
Suárez (2010:96) argues that, isomorphism ‘has a problem with under-determination’ in 
that ‘the physical world underdetermines its mathematical structure – which may only be 
ascribed under a particular description’. Take for example mathematical representations of 
                                                          
47
 URL: http://www.dharwadker.org/tevet/isomorphism/ last visited 3/10/13 
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unobservables, such as atoms or electric fields. One of the foundations of quantum 
mechanics is a model of electron behaviour given by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle:  
 
 
Δx Δpx ≥ h/2π 
 
Without delving into the mathematics, this 
can be interpreted as, the more precisely 
the position of an electron is known, the 
less precisely the momentum is known at 
that instant. 
Figure 32: Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation 
 
It is hard to see how isomorphism applies here. Bijective mapping of the electron (target) 
onto the equation (source) is impossible. Isomorphic graphs can be mapped bijectively – 
but how can the uncertainty relation be mapped? What this particular approach appears to 
ignore is the context of scientific practice; how a physicist might use this particular 
representation of an electron. In an earlier paper Suárez (2003:225) is critical of theories of 
representation ‘that attempt to reduce scientific representation to similarity or 
isomorphism’ for the reason that such ‘reductive theories aim to radically naturalize the 
notion of representation, since they treat scientist’s purposes and intentions as non-
essential to representation’. The analytical approach makes no reference to the context in 
which a particular representation is used by science. Suárez (2010:99) argues that by 
including ‘intentionality’ representation is no longer ‘a simple dyadic relation’ between an 
object and its representation, but ‘essentially triadic’ between the object, its representation 
and the mind of the scientist.  
 
By way of contrast the practical inquiry forsakes an analysis of representational relations. It 
takes instead a view on the context within which a particular scientific representation is 
used – representations, Suárez (2010:92) explains, ‘must be properly understood in their 
context of application’. Examples here might include a three dimensional model for the 
methane molecule, Kekulé’s structural formula for benzene, or one of Newton’s equations 
of motion. The practical inquiry understands these models within the context of how a 
scientist might use them. Take for example these two different representations for the 
benzene (C6H6) molecule. 
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This model48 depicts the ring 
structure of benzene with a π-
cloud of delocalised electrons 
above and below the plane of 
the ring.  
The two equivalent hybrid structures of 
benzene are depicted as Kekulé structures49 
demonstrating the distribution of the single and 
double bonds to the resonant structure of the 
molecule. 
Figure 33: Diagrammatic representations of the benzene molecule 
  
These two models have different uses depending on the aspect of benzene that is the focus 
of study. The first provides some description of electron distribution. The second depicts 
the type of covalent bonds (single and double) and illustrates the nature of the ‘resonant 
hybrid’. This in turn goes some way to explaining why benzene’s chemistry is not typical of 
other organic molecules with carbon to carbon double bonds such as cyclohexene. From 
this it is important to recognise, within the context of Suárez’s practical inquiry, that there 
are different ways by which a scientific model is able to represent. The context of use 
cannot be separated from how the model functions in mediating between ourselves and 
the world. Questions for example concerned with the distribution of electrons around the 
benzene nucleus are best considered using the delocalised π-cloud representation, whilst 
questions focussing on the reaction mechanism of between benzene and chlorine and the 
seemingly lack of chemical reactivity of benzene as an unsaturated organic molecule are 
better considered from the perspective of the Kekulé structures. 
 
Having rejected the analytical approach to representation Suárez makes the case for a non-
reductive deflationary account. Non-reductive implies that an analytical definition of the 
representational relation R in terms of something else does not apply; deflationary in that 
representation highlights some of the dependencies that exist between the target and the 
object and also that R is assumed rather than spelled out. The robustness or mathematical 
exactness required of isomorphism does not apply. The deflationary account depicts 
                                                          
48
 URL: http://www.isis.stfc.ac.uk/science/bioscience/benzene-thumbnail10870.jpg last visited 
25/05/2016 
49
 URL: https://paulingblog.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/benzene-structures.jpg last visited 
25/05/2016 
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representation as a practice embedded within the context of use. Suárez (2010:97) sets out 
a number of conditions that his preferred non-reductive and deflationary account must 
meet. Firstly in terms of the inferential conception, ‘representation is a ‘two vector’ notion, 
requiring on the one hand representational force and on the other hand inferential 
capacities’. By using the term ‘vector’ Suárez establishes the non-symmetric and directional 
character of his preferred method – i.e. SourceTarget. His second condition relates to 
inferential capacity. For example in chemistry, the source must enable an experienced 
chemist to draw valid inferences about the target – to allow surrogative reasoning50. This 
underlines the important part played by context within the practical inquiry. 
 
 This is a representation51 of the anti-cancer drug cis-platin. 
The directional assumption Suárez makes is that the 
image points to the drug molecule. The chemist by 
reasoning surrogatively is able to determine the number 
and type of atoms present. By applying the conventions of 
perspective the molecule is ‘flat’, square-planar with the 
chlorine atoms described as ‘cis’ to one another. This 
specific shape is essential to the molecule’s anti-cancer 
activity and again by surrogative reasoning the drug is 
thought to act by bonding to the cell DNA in forming 
cross-links between adjacent purine bases on the same 
strand of the double helix. This process of representation 
is non-reflexive and non-symmetric. 
Figure 34: Diagrammatic representation of the cis-platin molecule 
 
This representative account for cis-platin and its anti-cancer action seems plausible enough 
and might be found in any chemistry text book. The problem here, argues Ambrosio 
(2014:266), is that ‘Suárez considers directionality as a requirement of representation and 
treats it as a precondition for representation’. Taking the case of cis-platin as an example, 
directionality need not, in my view, be assumed. How chemists construct a model for the 
molecule cis-platin, and then go on to infer how it might bond to DNA in order to disrupt 
                                                          
50
 The original connection between surrogative reasoning and scientific representation is due to 
Chris Swoyer (1991). The process functions, Swoyer (1991:452) claims, because ‘the arrangements of 
things in the representation are like shadows cast by the things they portray’. Surrogative reasoning, 
states Swoyer (1991:453), ‘is reasoning about a structural representation in order to draw inferences 
about what it represents’. 
51
 URL: http://www.chemicalconnection.org.uk/chemistry/topics/images/mm8c.jpg last visited 
4/10/13 
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processes within the mutated cells, is integral to the surrogative reasoning process whereby 
novel information on its possible anti-cancer mechanism is discovered. The very nature of 
directionality arises out of how the model of cis-platin is constructed and then used to 
uncover information about its therapeutic action – how for example it bonds on to DNA. 
This in turn comes back to an issue of constitution of relations – a part of the previously 
dismissed analytic approach.  
 
How to resolve this impasse? Ambrosio (2014:226) emphasises the need to move away 
from a focus on justifying representative relations (analytical inquiry), or the ways in which 
representations are used (practical inquiry), and recognise that ‘what we do with 
representations depends on how we construct them’ (emphasis in the original). I will show 
how Mendeleev came to discover the relations pertaining to the chemical elements 
through the construction of the periodic table; through his process of representing. In 
addition I will show that this accords with Peirce’s account of iconic representations which 
as Ambrosio (2014:270) states, ‘entail the discovery of a common relational structure 
between representations and the objects they stand for, and this discovery happens 
through the process of representing’. Importantly I will show that for Mendeleev this begins 
as a practical pencil and paper exercise of constructing and experimenting on diagrams 
attempting to depict the physiochemical relations between the chemical elements. We will 
see that the fruitfulness of the periodic table, for example in predicting the occurrence of 
the three novel eka-elements, surfaced through Mendeleev’s process of representing 
diagrammatically the physiochemical relations between the chemical elements. It is here 
that Charles Peirce’s formulation of iconicity, and through a study of Mendeleev’s inquiry, 
can offer an account that recognises aspects from both the analytical as well as the 
practical inquiry. For as we will see Mendeleev, in constructing his table, dealt with the 
structural relations between the chemical elements as well as using the table to draw 
inferences. 
 
Before moving on to consider Mendeleev’s periodic table in detail I should like to explore 
Peirce’s iconicity further still. In order to do this I will re-examine an earlier case study: 
Ursula Klein’s (2001) investigation of Berzelian formulae as paper tools in chemistry. This 
study is relevant to this chapter as it develops some of the earlier points made on the 
constitution of representation. Klein rejects Peirce’s formulation of iconicity as a means of 
framing the representational relation between Berzelian formulae and their chemical 
objects. I hope to show how Peirce’s formulation of iconicity might have offered a secure 
analytical framework for Klein’s inquiry. 
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4.6 Iconicity and ‘paper tools’ 
Ursula Klein’s (2001) work on Berzelian formulae introduces the term ‘paper tool’. Whilst 
alluding to Peirce’s sign system, Klein rejects Peirce’s formulation of iconicity as an 
interpretative framework, preferring instead her own term iconic symbol. Klein’s study is 
relevant as it focusses on a study where scientific representations are seen to be generating 
new knowledge but one which rejects Peirce’s formulation iconicity as an interpretive 
framework. In this section I apply the concept of iconicity to Berzelian formulae and argue 
that Klein misunderstood Peirce’s concept of the iconic sign. Recalling a number of points 
developed in earlier chapters, a key characteristic of an iconic representation is its 
epistemic fruitfulness in revealing new information about its object of study. It is this that 
differentiates iconic from indexical and symbolic representations.  
 
Klein’s particular study deals with an inquiry beginning in the early decades of the 
nineteenth century into organic compounds such as ether, using chemical formulae first 
published in 1813 by the Swedish chemist Jacob Berzelius (1779 – 1848). European 
chemists at this time, argues Klein (2001:14), ‘applied Berzelian formulas as enormously 
productive tools on paper or “paper tools”’ (emphasis added). Klein compares Berzelian 
‘paper tools’ to the usual laboratory tools, such as glassware and the chemical balance, as 
means of creating new knowledge. These epistemically fruitful paper tools might be 
considered iconic in the Peircean terms described earlier. However, Klein (2001:16) in a 
passing reference to Peirce argues that, ‘the distinction between icons and symbols does 
not work for Berzelian formulas’ preferring instead the conflated term ‘iconic symbols’. The 
reasons for Klein not deploying Peirce’s notion of iconicity will be considered in a moment.  
 
I argue that in rejecting Peirce’s sign system as ‘not work[ing]’ in this case, Klein has lost the 
opportunity of using the rich interpretative framework offered by Peirce’s formulation of 
signs in her arguments for Berzelian formulae as paper tools. Klein prefers instead her own 
term iconic symbol. Peirce recognised that a particular sign, such as a chemical formula, 
need not operate solely indexically, iconically or symbolically. For example Peirce 
acknowledged that 'it would be difficult if not impossible to instance an absolutely pure 
index or to find any sign absolutely devoid of the indexical quality' (CP 2.306). Furthermore, 
Peirce held that a representation that is solely iconic makes no distinction between itself 
and its object of study and in that sense is not a likeness. An icon, explains Peirce, ‘can only 
be a fragment of a completer sign’ and a pure icon ‘is independent of any purpose [as] it 
serves as a sign solely and simply by exhibiting the quality it serves to signify’ (EP2: 306, 
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1904). I will show that whilst being symbolic is an aspect of Berzelian formulae, they also 
function as iconic representations. In short, there was no need for Klein to invent the new 
category of iconic signs whilst rejecting Peirce’s formulation.   
 
Why then does Klein not accept Peirce’s formulation of iconicity when describing Berzelian 
formulae as paper tools, preferring to invent the new category, iconic symbols, instead? It is 
I believe Klein’s (2001:16) view of iconic signs as ‘represent[ing] their objects by virtue of 
being isomorphic to them’ that prompts her not to develop Peirce’s formulation of 
iconicity. I would argue that isomorphism is not necessary for iconicity. I will later argue 
that iconicity is founded on homomorphism – a partial but structure preserving mapping 
from source to target – which surfaces through the process of representing. 
 
Recalling a couple of the main arguments from earlier in this chapter, the term isomorphic 
describes a relation between mathematical sets; in this case A and B as mathematical 
structures stand in equivalent relation one to the other. Isomorphism is a controversial 
notion amongst philosophers of science. However, such a situation, argues Suárez, 
(2003:228) ‘demands that there be a one-to-one function that maps all the elements in the 
domain of one structure onto the elements in the other structure’s domain and vice versa, 
while preserving the relations defined in each structure’. Returning to Peirce’s drunken man 
as an icon of temperance, it is hard to see how the relational frameworks of the drunk and 
the sober can be mapped as a one-to-one function; isomorphism is not a necessary 
condition of the iconicity at work here. Furthermore, consider these two statements by 
Peirce: firstly that an icon is ‘sign which stands for something because it resembles it’ (CP 
3.362) and secondly that many diagrams – and I would also include Berzelian formulae here 
– ‘resemble their objects not at all in looks; it is only in respect to the relations of their parts 
that their likeness consists’ (CP 2.282). The particularly controversial issue here of how 
Peirce characterises iconicity as relation of resemblance or likeness was discussed earlier. 
Conditions of ‘resemblance’ between the (chemical) object and its sign (Berzelian formulae) 
in terms of the ‘relations of their parts’ is as I will argue later iconic, but not an isomorphic 
relation as Klein claims. Such a relation between the object and its sign is better described 
as homomorphic. It is worth pursuing the homomorphic character of iconicity a little 
further in order to challenge Klein’s rejection of Peirce’s iconicity on the grounds of it being 
an isomorphic form of representation.    
 
Ambrosio (2014:269) argues that Peirce’s theory of iconic representations is better 
expressed ‘as homomorphic representations [which] accounts for structure preservation as 
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a relation which is discovered through the process of representing’. Following Ambrosio’s 
account, homomorphism does not involve an isomorphic one-on-one mapping but the 
mapping of the larger source domain onto a smaller target domain with the essential 
structural relations preserved – a weaker form of morphism than isomorphism. For 
example the famous London Underground map is an iconic diagram that shares spatial 
relations with the stations it represents and allows the traveller to experiment on different 
routes of travel between two fixed stations. The relation between the map and the actual 
underground system is at best homomorphic, not isomorphic. There is not a one-to-one 
(isomorphic) relation in terms of distances or exact special locations of the many stations 
represented. In more general terms an icon is a construction of a specific set of relations 
and properties that are also maintained by its target. Support for this approach is offered 
by Sun-Joo Shin (2002:31) who also treats iconicity as a case of ‘homomorphism between 
representing and represented facts’. I later hope to show that a Berzelian formula acts as 
an iconic sign with a homomorphic mapping of relations between it and the chemical object 
represented.  
 
The Berzelian formula for water is H20. This formula has a symbolic aspect in that a chemist, 
understanding the conventions around its construction, recognises that it represents a 
compound of the elements hydrogen and oxygen in a 2:1 ratio such that the combining 
weights of these two elements is also known. The Berzelian formula preserves the relations 
of elemental composition and their relative proportions with water as the object. The 
formula makes no attempt to map or represent other possible relations such as the spatial 
distribution of atoms within the molecule represented. I would therefore argue for a 
homomorphic relationship between the Berzelian formula and its chemical object of water. 
As well as acting as symbols, early nineteenth century chemists, by formulating and writing 
Berzelian formulae on paper, used these as a basis for thought experiments to propose the 
structure of organic compounds such as acetal. In this way Berzelian formulae acted as 
iconic signs having a homomorphic relation to their objects. This can be seen in Klein’s own 
case study drawn from nineteenth century investigations into the character of organic 
compounds. In modern terms the action of sulphuric acid on ethanol (alcohol) yields ether - 
of interest as an early anaesthetic - plus a number of by-products. In today’s terms, 
 
2CH3CH2OH   --(concentrated H2SO4)  CH3CH2-O-CH2CH3 +  H2O 
ethanol      diethylether   water 
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In 1827 Jean Dumas and Polydore Boullay52 investigated this reaction subsequently 
publishing a paper53 which Klein (2001:19) claims to be ‘one of the first historical 
documents in which Berzelian formulas were widely used as paper tools for modelling 
organic reactions and the binary constitution of organic compounds’. For example Dumas 
and Boullay (1827:309) make the following claims and offered the following Berzelian 
formulae to represent the binary composition of three of the organic compounds involved 
in their study, alcohol, ether and the by-product ‘sweet wine oil’: 
 
 
Figure 35: Berzelian formulae for alcohol, ether and ‘sweet wine oil’ 
Source: Jean Baptiste Andre Dumas and Polydore Boullay, ‘Memoire sur la Formation de 
l'Ether sulfurique’, Annales de Chimie et de Physique 36 (1827): 294-310. 
 
A year later (1828) these authors published a second paper54 where, as Klein (2001:21) 
explains, they ‘concluded with formula models of the binary constitution of the organic 
compounds, which they constructed by manipulating formulas on paper’. For example 
Dumas and Boullay offered the following Berzelian binary-formulae for alcohol, ether and 
the by-product ‘sulfovinic acid’ as,  (4 H2C2 + 2 H20), (4 H2C2 + H20) and (4 H2C2 + 2 S03)  
respectively; another example of the use of Berzelian formulae as paper tools for 
demonstrating organic reactions and the binary constitution of their reactants and 
products. 
 
The composition of ‘sulfovinic acid’, also a by-product of the distillation of alcohol, had long 
been a subject of interest to chemists. Later and in 1833, Theophile Pelouze investigated 
the formation of ether by the action of phosphoric acid on alcohol which also produced the 
by-product ‘phosphovinic acid’ and believed to be analogous to ‘sulfovinic acid’. In Klein’s 
(2001:23) account, Pelouze arrived at the Berzelian formula of phosphovinic acid 
‘exclusively on the basis of the quantitative analysis of the new compound, without carrying 
                                                          
52
 Jaime Wisniak (2010:59) describes how Boullay died aged twenty nine from the burns he received 
when a bottle of ether he was holding broke and was ignited by a nearby flame. 
53 Jean Baptiste Andre Dumas and Polydore Boullay, "Memoire sur la Formation de l'Ether 
sulfurique," Annales de Chimie et de Physique 36 (1827): 294-310 cited in Klein (2001:32) 
54 Jean Baptiste Andre Dumas and Polydore Boullay, "Memoire sur les Ethers composes," Annales de 
Chimie et de Physique 37 (1828): 15-53 as cited in Klein (2001:32) 
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out the usually customary experiments to study the reactions of ‘phosphovinic acid’. In 
place of the ‘customary experiments’, Klein (2001:23) argues that ‘the successive 
transformation of inscriptions [Berzelian formulae] were the decisive steps of Pelouze's 
model construction’. I would argue that by manipulating the Berzelian formulae in order to 
determine the formula for ‘phosphovinic acid’ (in the absence of any study of its chemical 
properties) Pelouze was performing experiments on (Peircean) icons as represented by the 
Berzelian formulae. This particular case study concludes with Klein (2001:24) claiming, 
 
Pelouze's rhetoric represented his formula model of the binary constitution of 
phosphovinic acid from phosphoric acid and alcohol as if it were a necessary 
consequence of the experimental data. Finally he argued that it could be concluded 
from this result that the analogous sulfovinic acid must also consist of sulfuric acid 
and alcohol. 
 
The manipulation of Berzelian formulae was a substitute for the type of supporting 
evidence usually gathered empirically in the laboratory – these manipulations of Berzelian 
formulae can also be thought of as experiments on iconic-representations resulting in the 
creation of new knowledge – the formulation of  ‘sulfovinic acid’. Finally Klein (2001:26) 
deals with Leibig’s investigations into the organic compound acetal, and concluding, 
 
Liebig did not perform any experiments to study the reactions of acetal in order to 
support the model. As Pelouze had done in the case of phosphovinic acid, he 
constructed the model merely by manipulating chemical formulas. 
 
Again a formulation is offered for a novel substance not as the result of laboratory 
experiments but by experimenting on Berzelian formulae which I argue are iconic 
representations. By 1833 and by various manipulations of Berzelian formulae, Liebig had 
proposed formulas for phosphovinic acid, acetal, spirit of wood, and acetic acid ether – new 
knowledge arrived at through experimenting on iconic Berzelian formulae. I would suggest 
that in their study of organic chemistry Dumas, Boullay and Liebig used Berzelian formulae 
to prompt surrogative reasoning from which they inferred the formulation of substances 
such as sulfovinic and phosphovinic acids. The process here is described by Klein (2001:23) 
as depending on the ‘manipulation of Berzelian formulas [as] the decisive means’ whereby 
the formulation of these compounds are discovered; the construction, inspection and 
manipulation of formulae leading to novel knowledge. I would argue that the process Klein 
describes here is consistent with the dynamic act of constructing and scrutinizing an iconic 
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representation. Klein (2001:30) indicates the iconic-like fruitfulness of Berzelian formulae 
when she states that, when in 1834 Dumas introduced into chemistry the concept of a 
substitution reaction, it was ‘the particular epistemic constellation of a controversy over 
rival models of binary constitution, the manipulations of formulas and their visual display of 
possible recombination had suggestive power for Dumas’ (emphasis added). In brief, 
Dumas was inquiring into the reaction between chlorine and alcohol and proposed a 
scheme where atoms hydrogen that formed part of the alcohol molecule were replaced or 
substituted for in a step-wise fashion by chlorine atoms and carried away (in modern terms) 
as hydrogen chloride (HCl). Dumas, states Klein (1999:165), ‘was not looking for a new 
explanation of organic reactions when he started…it was ‘suggested’ by the manipulation of 
[Berzelian] chemical formula’: Berzelian formula functioning as iconic representations in 
revealing novel knowledge. 
 
As has been argued earlier, iconic representations are integral to the creative process of 
scientific inquiry. They are however not purely iconic but contain symbolic and indexical 
qualities as well, having homomorphic relations with their objects of study. Berzelius used 
the conventionally agreed symbols to represent the elements, with numbers acting as 
indexical signs, drawing attention to the combining ratios. There was in my view no 
necessity for Klein to reject Berzelian formulae as iconic and to create the new category of 
iconic symbol. I believe iconic symbol is a redundant term: from a Peircean position all 
symbols are partly iconic – just as all icons are partly symbolic.  The term iconic symbol does 
not allow us to discriminate what makes Berzelian formulae – described by Klein (2001:29) 
as ‘quasi-algebraic’ – and their construction into equations particularly interesting. Earlier 
we saw how Peirce reasoned that equations as well as diagrams are iconic. I would argue 
that Berzelian formulae, by the way they support surrogative reasoning, their inferential 
capacity and epistemic fruitfulness, have much in common with Peirce’s iconic diagrams. 
Berzelian formulae, argues Klein (2001:30) not only conveyed information of ‘chemical 
proportions’ but also aided chemists ‘with their experimental investigations of organic 
chemical reactions’. Whilst not disagreeing with Klein here I would add that their value to 
chemists was also their functioning as iconic representations: disclosing novel features of 
the chemical reactions they were engaged with.  
 
This section addresses one of the few accounts in the literature to make reference to 
Peirce’s theory of signs as part of a case study in to scientific inquiry. I have also sought to 
further develop Peirce’s notion of iconicity, its connection with surrogative reasoning, and 
to extend iconicity to a broader range of chemical representations. In the next section I will 
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develop Peirce’s formulation of iconicity in greater detail and then to use this as a lens 
through which to examine Mendeleev’s periodic table. 
 
4.7 Three aspects of iconicity and the process of inquiry 
Winfried Nöth (2008:83) points out that Peirce has ‘given innumerable definitions of the 
icon’, a view shared by Michael Shapiro (2008:817) when he states that, ‘Peirce attempted 
many definitions of icon over the entire span of his life’ (emphasis in the original). At this 
point I should like to propose three key aspects of Peirce’s formulation of iconicity which 
would need to map on to the periodic table for it to function as an icon. These key aspects, 
supported by others, will be applied to the very early stages in the development of 
Mendeleev’s table and its first published edition in 1869. Later developments of 
Mendeleev’s inquiry will be the subject of chapters to follow. There now follow three 
criteria which I believe capture a number of key functions of an iconic representation such 
as the periodic table and its part in Mendeleev’s inquiry:- 
 
a) epistemic fruitfulness 
Peirce’s formulation of iconicity is associated with epistemic fruitfulness and as described 
earlier, 
 
A great distinguishing property of the Icon is that by the direct observation of it 
other truths concerning its object can be discovered than those which suffice to 
determine its construction. (CP 2.279, 1895) 
 
The epistemic fruitfulness of this formulation of is emphasised by Stjernfelt (2007 and 
2011) when taking it as part of the basis for his operational account of iconicity. Stjernfelt 
(2011:397) argues that here Peirce captures an ‘epistemologically crucial property of the 
icon: it is an operational specification of the concept of similarity’. Following Stjernfelt, an 
iconic sign, whilst representing a number of qualities of its object, is also capable of 
engaging our thought processes so that more can be learned than was necessary for the 
sign’s construction. Later I will show how Mendeleev’s earliest attempts at a systematic 
arrangement of the chemical elements enabled him to propose knowledge that went 
beyond what was known at the start of the process. Such an operational approach to 
iconicity argues Stjernfelt (2011:397), ‘separates the icon from any psychologism: it does 
not matter whether sign and object for a first (or second) glance seem or are experienced 
as similar; the decisive test for iconicity lies in whether it is possible to manipulate or 
develop the sign so that new information as to its object appears’.  From his operational 
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perspective, Stjernfelt (2011:398) states that icons are epistemically fruitful being ‘signs 
with implicit information that may be made explicit’, describing this as a ‘non-trivial 
[definition of an icon] because it avoids the circularity threat in most definitions of 
similarity’ – something we encountered earlier in the chapter. Later in the chapter we will 
see how Mendeleev and others made explicit information that was implicit within the form 
of the periodic table. 
 
As was stated at the start of the chapter, Peirce positions iconic representations as a 
dynamic constituent of scientific inquiry. For as Ambrosio (2014:256) argues, ‘the very 
process of constructing and inspecting an iconic representation (a process that for Peirce 
involves a dynamic act of interpretation) discloses novel features of the objects or states of 
affairs being investigated through the representation’. We will later see how Mendeleev 
arrived at his first published table by a process of ‘construction’ which involved working 
with a number of preliminary sketches. Furthermore, for the periodic table to act as an 
iconic sign we will need to show that a similarity of relations was discovered between the 
elements of its construction and the chemical elements themselves that enabled 
Mendeleev to perform successful thought experiments in order to reveal knowledge 
previously hidden. The capacity to generate new knowledge, claims Hookway (2003:102),  
is ‘the key to iconicity [which] is not perceived resemblance between the sign and what it 
signifies but rather the possibility of making new discoveries about the object of a sign 
through observing features of the sign itself’. It is by observing the antics of the (iconic) 
drunk that we might discover the benefits of not binge-drinking. 
 
b) surrogative reasoning 
Peirce stated, 
Remember it is by icons only that we really reason, and abstract statements are 
valueless in reasoning except so far as they aid us to construct diagrams. (CP 4.127, 
1893) 
I would argue that one of the most useful features of an iconic representation is its capacity 
for enabling surrogative reasoning (Swoyer 1991), to facilitate what Gabriele Contessa 
(2007:48) describes as drawing ‘surrogative inferences from the model to the system’. By 
examining the process of construction I hope to show that the periodic table was iconic in 
enabling Mendeleev to use his diagrammatic representation to infer something of the 
relations between the chemical objects it represents. Furthermore I will show that this was 
very much a practical activity as Mendeleev engaged in ‘pencil and paper’ experiments on 
two sketched proto-forms of his first periodic table published in 1869.  
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The importance of visual representations to both the generation and communication of 
new knowledge was emphasised by David Gooding. As we will see Mendeleev’s 
arrangement of the chemical elements as the periodic table served both to promote his 
creative thought processes and as a means of communicating his periodic law. Gooding 
(2004b:10) names, ‘interpretative images whose cognitive (generative) and social 
(communicative) functions are inextricably linked [as]…construals’ (emphasis in the 
original). In the coming section I will show how Mendeleev experimented by sketching out 
a number of arrangements of the chemical elements in order to explore the pattern of their 
physiochemical relations which led on to the first published arrangement in February 1869. 
These early proto-forms of Mendeleev’s arrangements might be thought of as construals by 
fulfilling the function the Gooding (1990:115) describes as ‘enabl[ing] the earliest stages of 
the interpretation of a new phenomenon’. This connection with Gooding’s work will be 
taken up again later in the chapter.  
 
c) a system of relations 
The third criterion relates to diagrams such as the periodic table, 
 
A Diagram is a representamen which is predominantly an icon of relations and is 
aided to be so by conventions. Indices are also more or less used. It should be 
carried out upon a perfectly consistent system of representation, one founded 
upon a simple and easily intelligible basic idea. (CP 4.418, 1903, emphasis added) 
 
For the periodic table to be considered as an iconic diagram I will need to show that is 
constructed as a system of relations. Furthermore the periodic table is not a purely iconic 
sign. I will show that it depends upon ‘conventions’ [symbols] and indices as part of its 
construction. All three of Peirce’s triad of signs operating as the periodic table – symbol, 
index and icon – will need to be shown as founded on well-defined and easily 
comprehended principles. Indexical and symbolic signs differ from iconic signs are 
necessary to the periodic table functioning as an icon by providing a form and structure to 
work within. For example, elements such as the alkali metals lithium, sodium and 
potassium, which Mendeleev placed at different positions in his proto-scheme are 
represented in conventionally symbolic form – Li, Na and K. The positioning of the alkali 
metals as a common row or group of elements is indexical as this is understood to bring 
together a set or family of elements with similar chemical properties. Atomic weight values 
are indexical in drawing attention to the organising principle underlying the arrangement. 
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Interestingly I will show how Mendeleev occasionally used only the atomic weight 
(indexically) without the accompanying symbol to draw attention to the position of an 
element within the scheme. 
 
4.8 Iconicity and the early periodic table  
As with many discoveries, the periodic system had a number of antecedents such as 
Alexandre‐Émile Béguyer de Chancourtois (1820‐1886), John Newlands (1837-1898), 
William Odling (1829-1921) and Josiah Cooke. The debt he owed to these earlier 
researchers is acknowledged by Mendeleev whose own success is described by Heinz 
Cassebaum and George Kauffman (1971:326) as repeatedly demonstrating ‘the use of the 
system in solving the chemical problems of the time’ so that ‘the scientific world first 
learned of this discovery, so pregnant with future possibilities, from Mendeleev and Meyer, 
whereas Odling underrated his own efforts’. The mention of future generative power is 
here again a tilt towards the periodic table’s iconic status. 
 
The periodic law developed in early 1869 as a part of Mendeleev’s two volume book The 
Principles of Chemistry. The book’s purpose was an attempt to systemise the extensive 
corpus of inorganic chemistry so as to make it more accessible to his students. Mendeleev 
began with valency as his organisational framework. Volume one ended with the halogens 
with the alkali metals forming the first chapter of volume two. It is here that Mendeleev is 
thought to have paused in search of an alternative organising scheme – volume one had 
covered only eight elements leaving the remaining fifty five to the second volume. 
Mendeleev then adopted atomic weight as his new organisational criterion. In a single day, 
February 17th, 1869, Eric Scerri (2007:106) records ‘Mendeleev not only began to make 
horizontal comparisons but also produced the first version of a full periodic table that 
included most of the known elements’.  
 
I would argue that it is only by considering the creative endeavour – the inquiry – that 
Mendeleev was engaged in that the full representational impact of his first table can be 
appreciated. Only four useful documents are thought to survive from Mendeleev’s earlier 
work leading up to this publication – appropriately held by the Mendeleev Library in St 
Petersburg. The Russian scholar Bonifatii Mikhailovich Kedrov’s (1903-1985) highly 
authoritative Day of a Great Discovery55(1958), is a detailed account of Mendeleev’s work 
based on an analysis of primary sources. These include a number of early working drafts of 
                                                          
55
 Bonifatii Mikhailovich Kedrov, Den’ odnogo velikogo otkrytia (Moscow, 1958). 
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Mendeleev’s table. Some of these primary sources are reproduced as facsimiles in 
Cassebaum and Kauffman (1971) and are used in what follows. The earliest known attempt 
by Mendeleev to build a scheme based on atomic weight rather than on valencies was 
identified by Kedrov as having been written on the back of a letter sent to Mendeleev on 
February 17, 1869, by Aleksei Ivanovich Chodnev, Secretary of Russia’s Imperial Free 
Economic Society. These early sketches are a practical pen and paper exercises which reveal 
something of Mendeleev’s surrogative reasoning: 
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The organisation and analysis of the 
information shown here has the feel of 
a pencil and paper experiment. Notice 
that Mendeleev has positioned 
potassium (K) under chlorine (Cl) – both 
elements have very different 
chemistries but similar atomic weights 
and valency.  
Mendeleev has also brought together 
the atomic weights of the alkali metals 
and as well as the elements related to 
Zn – two sets of elements with similar 
properties. He calculates the difference 
in atomic weights between pairs of 
elements in the same column.  
23(Na)  39(K)     85(Rb)   133(Cs)  
14 (?)    24(Mg)  65(Zn)   112 (Cd) 
9            15           20          21 
Notice too that Mendeleev’s is using 
both chemical properties and atomic 
weights as organising principles. 
Figure 36: The first of Mendeleev’s two incomplete tables of February 17th, 1869 
Source: B. M. Kedrov and D. N. Trifonov, ‘Zakon periodichnosti…, Moscow: Izdatel’stvo 
“Nauka”,1969’ (via Heinz Cassebaum and George B. Kauffman,1971, ‘The Periodic System of the 
Chemical Elements: The Search for Its Discoverer’, Isis 62(3)  
 
Notice in figure 36 how on occasion Mendeleev used atomic weight as an indexical sign to 
draw attention to the position of a particular element. For example 23 and 39 stand as 
placeholders for the elements sodium and potassium. 
A second incomplete table of February 17, 1869 is recorded by Cassebaum and Kauffman 
(1971:322) and again from Kedrov’s primary sources.  
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Here again Mendeleev appears to be 
engaged in a pen and paper practical 
experiment - reasoning surrogatively - on 
how to best position the elements. The 
alkali metals (Li, Na, K, Rb, Cs) which are 
first near the bottom of the upper table 
have been placed between the alkali 
earth metals and the halogens in the 
lower table. In the top table the atomic 
weights run left to right. In the lower 
table from top to bottom. In the bottom 
table chemically similar elements are 
brought together in rows and there is a 
more ordered arrangement of atomic 
weights. There is also the suggestion of 
an unknown element (?3) at the start of 
the halogen sequence. 
From the bottom table, for example, 
           Mg (24) Ca(40)  Ba(137) 
Li(7)    Na(23)   K(39)   Rb(85)    Cs(133) 
?(3)     F(9)       Cl(35.5) Br(80)    J(127) 
Figure 37: The second of Mendeleev’s two incomplete tables of February 17th, 1869 
Source: B. M. Kedrov and D. N. Trifonov, ‘Zakon periodichnosti…, Moscow: Izdatel’stvo 
“Nauka”,1969’ (via Heinz Cassebaum and George B. Kauffman,1971, ‘The Periodic System 
of the Chemical Elements: The Search for Its Discoverer’, Isis 62(3) 
 
I would argue that these two drafts served as iconic representations enabling Mendeleev to 
engage in surrogative reasoning. I believe what we are witnessing here is Mendeleev’s 
practical process of representing as a pencil and paper exercise involving both constructing 
and experimenting on his diagrams. Through these practical experiments Mendeleev seeks 
out the representative relations which he will infer also hold for the chemical elements. 
Importantly it is iconicity that characterises the perspicuousness of these diagrammatic 
proto-forms of the periodic table and makes surrogative reasoning possible. With respect 
to the second criterion of iconicity given earlier, these iconic diagrams are at the heart of 
Mendeleev’s surrogative reasoning as he decides how to arrange the elements. For 
example in figure 36 Mendeleev experiments by placing the gas chlorine above the reactive 
metal potassium. A line seemingly separates the chemically similar elements potassium and 
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sodium. In figure 37 Mendeleev brings together the chemically similar metals sodium and 
potassium as horizontal row of elements along with lithium, rubidium and caesium. Other 
chemically similar elements such as the halogens fluorine, chlorine, bromine and iodine are 
also grouped together in rows.  
 
These, the very earliest results of Mendeleev’s pen and paper experiments, might be 
thought of in Gooding’s (1990:115) term as a ‘construals’, being a representation 
‘articulating interpretative possibilities’. Such representations or construals Gooding 
continues, ‘enter discourse as the practical basis for realizing and communicating novel 
experience…[u]ntil the wider significance of novel information has been sketched out’. I 
believe that these very early sketches capture and contextualise the results of Mendeleev’s 
exploratory surrogative reasoning on the relation between the physiochemical properties 
of the chemical elements. Furthermore that these earliest ‘construals’ – signifying 
Mendeleev’s embryonic communication of his thought processes – later gave rise to more 
complete representations of the periodic relations between the chemical elements such as 
his first published scheme of 1869. 
 
With regards to the third criterion of iconicity, these proto-forms of Mendeleev’s system 
are based upon a system of relations founded on atomic weights which Scerri (2006:116) 
describes as Mendeleev’s ‘key to classifying the elements’. The diagrams are, in Peirce’s 
earlier words, ‘aided…by conventions’ in that the elements are identified by an agreed 
convention of symbols. The atomic weight values included are indexical in drawing 
attention to the intelligible system of relations upon which the table is based. Finally 
looking at figure 37 there is also the suggestion of new knowledge – epistemic fruitfulness – 
in Mendeleev’s suggestion of an additional halogen preceding fluorine and shown with an 
atomic weight of three and as the indexical sign ‘?3’.  
 
In his essay ‘Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism’ (1906) Peirce writes in relation 
to iconic diagrams, ‘chemists have ere now, I need not say, described experimentation as 
The putting of questions to Nature. Just so, experiments upon diagrams are questions put 
to The Nature of The relations concerned’ (CP, 4.530). The two tables above enabled 
Mendeleev to ‘ask of nature’ what are the most effective organising criteria for the 
elements. By experimenting on his (iconic) diagram Mendeleev seems to be working 
towards an answer in terms of a system of relations founded on atomic weight and aided 
by what Scerri (2006:120) describes as an ‘understanding of the individual chemical natures 
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of the elements, and their compounds..[which]…gave him an intuitive sense of how the 
elements should be grouped’. 
 
4.9 The first published form of Mendeleev’s system of elements (1869) 
The first form of Mendeleev’s periodic system was published on 17th February 1869. Copies 
were printed in both Russian and French under the title of An Attempt at a System of 
Elements, Based on their Atomic Weights and Chemical Affinities – hereafter referred to as 
the Attempt. 
 
 
 
 
 
Mendeleev’s use of ‘system’ 
underlines his belief that his 
arrangement was founded upon a set 
of principles – established by inquiry 
and using the preliminary iconic 
diagrams discussed earlier. 
Figure 38: Mendeleev’s first table as a single sheet handout, 17th February 1869  
Source: Persistence and Periodicity: a study of Mendeleev’s contribution to the Foundations of 
Chemistry  by John Russel Smith, PhD thesis Chelsea College, University of London 1976, page 217 
 
This single sheet hand-out of Mendeleev’s appeared shortly afterwards in the Russian 
journal Zhurnal Russkago Fiziko-Khimicheskago Obshchestva. Soon after this Mendeleev’s 
system was published the German journal Zeitschrift für Chemie56  where the table is also 
accompanied by a brief introduction and eight short notes. To begin Mendeleev (1869b:25) 
makes the following claim, 
 
If one arranges the elements in vertical columns according to increasing atomic 
weight, such that the horizontal rows contain analogous elements, also arranged 
                                                          
56
Mendelejeff, D. 1869. ‘On the Relationship of the Properties of the Elements to their Atomic 
Weights’. Zeitschrift für Chemie 12:405-406  
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according to increasing atomic weight, one obtains the following table, from which 
it is possible to derive a number of general deductions. 
 
Not surprisingly given the earlier discussion around Mendeleev’s earlier hand-drawn proto-
tables, this opening statement establishes atomic weight as providing the framework of 
relations upon which his iconic table is based. Firstly note that Mendeleev sets out the 
founding rationale for the periodic table – elements arranged as ‘vertical columns according 
to increasing atomic weight’ - as the ‘simple and easily intelligible basic idea (CP 4.418)’ that 
also forms a part of the third criterion of iconicity. Furthermore Mendeleev sets out the 
two-fold relations between the chemical elements and his diagrammatic representation: 
increasing atomic weight with elements of similar chemical properties collected in sets as 
horizontal rows. Again as with the earlier discussion, in line with the third criterion of 
iconicity, Mendeleev’s diagrammatic table is ‘aided by conventions’ or chemical symbols. 
The meaning of each chemical symbol is understood by chemists across national frontiers 
as a matter of convention. For example the original table is printed in Russian which 
includes symbols such as Be, B and C which his international readers would understand by 
convention to indicate the elements beryllium, boron and carbon. Indexical aspects of the 
table include: horizontal rows of individual symbols for the chemical elements which draw 
attention to the various families of elements such as the alkali metals (Li, Na, K, Rb, Cs) and 
the halogens (F, Cl, Br, I). Also and as mentioned earlier, atomic weight values are indexical 
in pointing to the table’s underlying feature of organisation. Other indexical signs will be 
considered below. 
 
His opening remarks completed, Mendeleev (1869b:26) then sets out eight ‘general 
deductions’ that follow from his periodic arrangement of the elements. The final three 
point towards the possibility of new discoveries thereby indicating the likelihood of the 
periodic table to be epistemically fruitful, a critically important characteristic of an icon and 
the first criterion of iconicity given earlier: 
 
6. It [the periodic table] allows one to foresee the discovery of many new elements, 
e.g analogs of Si and Al with atomic weights between 65 and 75 
7. It is to be expected that some atomic weights will require correction, e.g., Te 
cannot have an atomic weight of 128, but rather one between 123 and 126. 
8. The above table suggests new analogies between elements. Thus Bo(?) [Ur] 
appears as an analog of Bo and Al, which is well-known, has long been firmly 
established by experiment. 
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In point (6) Mendeleev suggests that the periodic table points to the discovery of new 
elements, recorded in the table as the indexical signs ?68 and ?70. These elements were 
later discovered to be gallium (69.2) and germanium (72) respectively. Mendeleev includes 
a third prediction recorded in the table as ‘?45’ – also an indexical sign - which was later to 
be shown to be scandium (Sc=44.6). These are Mendeleev’s three now famous predictions 
and sometimes known as the eka-elements: eka-boron (scandium), eka-aluminum (gallium) 
and eka-silicon (germanium). There is also the lesser known prediction ‘?180’ which was 
later shown to be hafnium. In point (8) Mendeleev emphasises the iconic fruitfulness of his 
scheme in suggesting the likelihood of new chemical similarities between the elements.  
 
In order that the elements tellurium (Te) and iodine (I) are placed with their chemical 
analogs it was necessary for Mendeleev to reverse their order of appearance as determined 
by their atomic weights. This explains point (7) where Mendeleev predicts that tellurium’s 
atomic weight will need correcting from 128 to a value somewhere between 123 and 126. 
This would place tellurium in correct numerical sequence between antimony (Sb=122) and 
iodine (I=127). Time was to prove Mendeleev incorrect although he held that the atomic 
weight of tellurium to be incorrect at 128 for the whole of his life.   
 
In time the three eka-elements were discovered: eka-aluminium (gallium) 1875, eka-boron 
(scandium) 1879 and eka-silicon (germanium) 1886. After these discoveries Mendeleev 
continued to point out the continuing fruitfulness (iconicity) of his system. For an example 
in his Faraday Lecture of 1889 Mendeleev refers to the problematic case of beryllium. 
Discovered in 1798 beryllium resembled the trivalent metal aluminium in its properties. As 
the formula of aluminium oxide was Al2O3, the formula of beryllium oxide was thought to 
be analogous to this as Be2O3. As Mendeleev (1889:650) states there was some support for 
this in terms of ‘the specific heats of the metals and the isomorphism of the two oxides’. 
Nevertheless during the construction of his first periodic table (1869) Mendeleev placed 
beryllium with the divalent metal magnesium. On this basis the formula for beryllium oxide 
would be analogous to magnesium oxide (MgO) as BeO. Deciding which particular formula 
to support, Be2O3 or BeO, gave rise to what Mendeleev (1889:651) describes as ‘a 
divergence of opinion [that] lasted for years’. The success of the iconic periodic table in 
correctly projecting beryllium as a divalent metal with an oxide BeO was confirmed, as 
Mendeleev (1889:650) describes, by ‘Nilson and Petterson [who showed] the density of the 
vapour of beryllium chloride [to be] BeCl2 [which] obliges us to regard beryllium as a 
bivalent metal’. With the resolution of this dispute, Mendeleev (1889:650) claims that, ‘the 
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mutual relations of the elements became more apparent than ever before’ – note again 
Mendeleev’s reliance on the concept of relations as described in chapter three. Finally 
Mendeleev (1889:650) claims that the confirmation of beryllium being divalent was as 
significant to the periodic table ‘as the discovery of scandium’. 
 
4.10 Conclusion 
Writing in the New Scientist (12 February 1994) Dennis Rouvray states, ‘chemistry without 
the periodic table is as hard to imagine as sailing without a compass’. This description is apt 
since sailing and chemistry are both practical activities engaged in voyages of discovery. 
This chapter has, I would argue, demonstrated the value of considering scientific 
representations as described by Charles Peirce’s account of iconicity, being wholly 
integrated into the creative process of inquiry. I would argue that ‘likeness’ as qualified by 
Peirce, does not exhaust the relations of representation but helps to highlight some 
distinctive features of particularly fruitful kinds of representations – such as the periodic 
table. I would agree with Stjernfelt (2015:37) when he states that, ‘Peircean iconicity is not 
restricted to visual nor perceptual similarity, nor to easily recognizable resemblance’. 
Furthermore I would argue that iconicity is about process rather than completed products. 
This study of Mendeleev shows that we can reformulate even constitutional questions 
through iconicity by focussing on relations as dynamic and dependent on particular 
representative purposes, rather than being all consumed with ‘the’ relation of 
representation. Through his constructions of the periodic table, Mendeleev engaged in a 
process of enunciating and interpreting the physiochemical relations between the chemical 
elements, subsequently positing undiscovered elements and revised atomic weights. 
Mendeleev presented his novel findings as published forms of the iconic periodic table. 
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Chapter Five 
The Periodic Table and Iconic Robustness:  
Novel questions and new predictions in the light of nature’s resistance 
 
5.1 Introduction 
A precise summary of Peircean iconicity is given by Peter Skagestad (2004:254) who states, 
‘the value of the iconic representation, [as] Peirce repeatedly insisted, lay in the possibility 
it afforded of performing experiments on our thoughts, by changing some elements in the 
diagram and literally seeing new relations appear’. In this chapter I will introduce the term 
iconic robustness to describe how, as an iconic sign, the periodic table retains its fruitful 
capacity to promote thought experiments and predictions whilst also undergoing a number 
of reconfigurations in response to what will later be described as ‘nature’s resistance’. As 
we shall see Mendeleev’s original table of 1869 underwent a number of changes, both in 
response to the need to better accommodate existing elements such as the rare earths, as 
well as to the discovery of new elements such as the noble gases. In the previous chapter a 
case was made for the periodic table being an iconic diagram. My hypothesis here is that 
the periodic table can be shown to have demonstrated iconic robustness through these 
various restructurings. I define iconic robustness as: the continuing capacity to generate 
knowledge of novel relations between the chemical elements without being thwarted by 
nature’s resistance and within the context of a fallible inquiry. Before this, however, I will 
examine more closely two aspects of Mendeleev’s inquiry that are relevant to my claim for 
iconic robustness. Firstly, how are the factors that necessitated a change in the format of 
Mendeleev’s table characterised? Secondly, how might we describe the epistemic approach 
of inquirers such as Mendeleev as they encountered these factors? Encounters that 
changed the way the relations between the chemical elements were depicted 
diagrammatically, whilst not impeding the epistemic fruitfulness – the iconicity – of the 
periodic table.   
 
5.2 The periodic table – nature strikes back 
When an increasing force is applied to a metal or plastic it will often change shape or 
deform – a thin sheet of aluminium can be deformed into a useful food container – before 
eventually failing entirely. This section considers the ‘forces’ of nature at play in the form of 
novel knowledge that resulted in a number of ‘deformations’ – or changes of format – to 
the periodic table and the effect this had on its iconicity. Before proceeding further it is 
worth sketching out something on Chang’s (2012a and 2012b) formulation of active 
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scientific realism as I shall be drawing on some of the concepts he develops later in this 
section. 
 
In his book Is Water H2O?: Evidence, Realism and Pluralism, Chang (2012:205), having first 
reviewed the basis for the claim that water is H2O states: ‘I will propose a doctrine called 
active scientific realism , which maintains that science should strive to maximize our contact 
with reality and our learning about it’. Where Chang (2012:205) appeals to active realism to 
‘help make better philosophical sense of the seemingly haphazard and untidy development 
of the sciences of water’, my hope is that aspects of his approach will work in similar way 
for the development of Mendeleev’s periodic table in terms of its iconic robustness. Chang 
(2015a:203) formulates an operational definition of reality as ‘whatever is not subject to 
one’s will’, and of knowledge as ‘an ability to act without being frustrated by resistance 
from reality’. The metaphorical use of ‘resistance’ is further extended when Chang 
(2015:215) states that ‘[o]ur epistemic activities can be successful only if nature, or reality, 
does not prevent what we are trying to achieve’; what Chang describes as ‘nature’s 
resistance’ (emphasis in the original). As an example Chang (2012:216) argues that if an 
attempt to synthesise pure water by reacting exact stoichiometric quantities of hydrogen 
(1g) and oxygen (16g) fails, ‘this is because nature did not cooperate with our plans’ - 
nature has resisted or kicked back against our attempt.  
 
It is now possible to take elements of Chang’s arguments and to apply these to the periodic 
table: if an attempt to accommodate a novel element or family of elements into the 
periodic table seemingly fails, I take this also to be a case of ‘nature’s resistance’ or 
kickback. Nature has refused to cooperate with our attempt to position the novel elements. 
Part of my argument for the iconic robustness of the periodic table is to do with the effect 
of nature’s refusal to cooperate, kicking back at attempts to better accommodate existing 
elements or to assimilate novel ones. Chang (2012:216) argues ‘knowledge can be seen as a 
state of ability to do things without being foiled by significant resistance from reality’. I will 
argue that novel knowledge is gained when this initial resistance seemingly fades as a result 
of our intervening in some way. In the case of Mendeleev’s inquiry, such interventions will 
be shown to take the form of a reconfiguration of the periodic table, but with no loss in its 
epistemic fruitfulness and capacity to promote further thought experiments. It is through 
such interventions that Mendeleev and others sought to engage in an intelligent way with 
nature’s resistance. 
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Examples of the resistance nature offered at various times include: the taxing problem of 
accommodating the rare earths element and the discovery of novel elements such as the 
noble gases. Notwithstanding Mendeleev’s success in first accommodating the sixty or so 
known elements as well as his subsequent successful predictions of the three eka-elements, 
nature was later to ‘kick back’ at his system. Nature resisted Mendeleev by presenting a 
number of elements he was at first unable to place. I will show that the periodic table 
demonstrated iconic robustness in that whilst it required reconfiguration in order to meet 
nature’s resistance, it remained productive in its capacity to suggest new lines of inquiry 
and to pose new questions. The periodic table demonstrated a capacity to push back 
against nature’s resistance as atomic weights were recalibrated and new elements 
accommodated; all might be described as the effects of nature’s kickback. To take a 
metaphor from the study of materials, the periodic table demonstrates a capacity for 
‘plastic deformation’. For example, nature kicks back in the form the newly discovered 
element argon. The subsequent new inquiry into the discovery of the noble gases involves a 
new set of experiments performed on the iconic periodic table which reveals novel 
relations between the chemical elements. The periodic table undergoes a deformation or 
change in format as a result but without fracturing completely or loss of iconicity.  
 
In an unpublished MS 693 (1904) Peirce states: ‘knowledge is a plastic, applicable stuff, - a 
putty whose solid part, the barytes or the lead, is the percepts57, of which more and more is 
worked up in the oil of reflection’. The persistence of percepts is here likened by Peirce to 
the great power of lead and the mineral barytes in resisting corrosive chemical reagents 
such as the mineral acids. With the periodic table, ‘percepts’ might be likened to those 
elements which, unable to be accommodated within the scheme, force their way into 
Mendeleev’s consciousness. The periodic table responds as ‘plastic applicable stuff’ to 
Mendeleev’s as he analyses and makes judgements on the problem of elements such as the 
rare earths; an effect of the ‘oil of reflection’. In the next section I should like to examine 
the second aspect linked to the periodic table’s iconic robustness: the epistemic approach 
adopted by Mendeleev and others as they reflected on nature’s resistance. A definition of 
iconic robustness will be offered towards the end of the chapter once the case studies have 
been explored. 
                                                          
57
 The term percept is one Peirce uses as part of his account of perception. Sandra Rosenthal 
(2004:193) explains that for Peirce ‘all knowledge begins with perception’. Thus perception is 
essential for any scientific inquiry such as Mendeleev’s. A percept, Rosenthal (2004:194) continues ‘is 
that sensory element which is presented in perceptual awareness’ which in turn ‘instigates the 
formation of perceptual judgement’. As a sensory element, a percept, Catherine Legg (2014:100) 
argues, ‘compels my thinking insofar as I cannot pretend that it is not present in my consciousness’. 
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5.3 An epistemic approach to facing nature’s resistance 
My term iconic robustness also works off Peirce’s conception of fallibilism. I will argue that, 
during the development of the early periodic table, Mendeleev demonstrates a generally 
fallibilist approach. Such an approach was also taken by William Ramsay (1852 – 1916) in 
his positioning of the noble gases into Mendeleev’s scheme. Later in the chapter and 
through the case studies I will argue that a fallibilist approach is significant to formulating a 
definition for iconic robustness. Firstly I should like to set out the concept of fallibilism as 
established by Peirce.  
 
The purpose of science, Peirce argues, is ‘to learn the lesson that the universe has to teach’. 
He likens the process to journeying across the landscape of knowledge where on occasion, 
 
[T]he solid ground of fact fails… [and]…from that moment [our] position is only 
provisional…[we] must then find confirmations or else shift [our] footing. Even if 
[we do] find confirmations, they are only partial. [We are] still not standing upon 
the bedrock of fact. [We are] walking upon a bog, and can only say, this ground 
seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay till it begins to give way. (EP2:55, 
1898) 
 
Taking up Peirce’s analogy, during the course of an inquiry we are never in a position to 
claim to have reached the epistemic equivalent of terra firma – the absolute end of inquiry. 
We must be open to new discoveries which may unsettle our position and prompt further 
inquiry. Fallibilism, claims Houser (2006:13), ‘is the understanding that no matter where we 
are in our journey and no matter how solid the ground may feel beneath our feet, at any 
time it may begin to give way’. Thus from a fallibilist position, our beliefs about the world 
are provisional in the likelihood that new facts will come to light and challenge our beliefs. 
New facts are likely to initiate a new inquiry and a subsequent revision of our beliefs.  
 
Such a fallibilist understanding can be detected in Mendeleev’s early writings on the 
periodic table. For example, Mendeleev notes that similar elements such as iron, cerium, 
palladium and platinum have very similar atomic weights, while this is not the case for 
other similar elements such as lithium, sodium and potassium which present marked 
differences in atomic weights. This caused Mendeleev (1869a:37) to question the ‘solidity 
of the ground beneath his feet’ and to recognise a need to shift his footing, for he states: 
‘[p]erhaps, as a consequence of the closer study of these groups, the system of elements 
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arranged in groups will have to be changed’. Mendeleev recognises the possibility of 
adjusting the arrangement of groups within his scheme.  
 
There are echoes here of Peirce’s view that a commitment to fallibilism ‘requires a man to 
be at all times ready to dump his whole cart-load of beliefs, the moment experience is 
against them’ (CP 1.55, 1896). The early periodic table of 1869 demonstrates the 
provisional state of Mendeleev’s knowledge. The rare earth elements were not fully 
positioned within the scheme. Later the discovery of argon and the other noble gases 
would present their own challenge to Mendeleev’s table. Peirce justifies a fallibilist 
approach when he states that ‘knowledge is never absolute but always swims, as it were, in 
a continuum of uncertainty and of indeterminacy’ (CP 1.171, 1879). Knowledge of the 
chemical elements, with the possibility of new members being discovered and adding to 
those already known, might be said to present such a case of uncertainty and 
indeterminacy. We saw in chapter four an example of Mendeleev’s fallibilist approach: he 
accepted the first attempt of 1869 was not final implying the possibility of future change. 
We shall see how as Mendeleev’s enquiry unfolds, each revised configuration of the 
periodic table is taken as provisional, a fallible representation of the relations between the 
chemical elements.  
 
During this chapter and via a series of case studies I will seek to develop the term iconic 
robustness in relation to the periodic table with respect of two factors. Firstly in relation to 
the way it pushed back against ‘uncertainty and indeterminacy’ – the effect of ‘nature’s 
resistance’ – whilst continuing to function as an iconic representation by disclosing new 
relations. Secondly in relation to the nature of the inquiry:  I will argue that iconic 
robustness is dependent upon a representation being part of a fallibilist inquiry. 
Christopher Hookway (2003:119) argues that ‘the Peircean [fallibilist] model hopes to 
account for false belief and reference by placing an individual judgement within an 
indefinitely large inclusive context of thoughts within which other (actual or possible) 
thinkers can correct and revise our current fallible opinions’. I will show how Mendeleev 
and Ramsay adopted such an approach in being prepared to correct and adapt their 
opinions on how the relations between the chemical elements are depicted 
diagrammatically. What follows are two case studies. Firstly, Mendeleev’s attempt to 
accommodate the rare earth elements. Secondly, the issues surrounding the correct 
positioning of the noble gases within Mendeleev’s scheme will be examined. These are 
contrasting studies in that the rare earths were known at the time of Mendeleev’s first 
published attempt of 1869 where the noble gases were discovered later. Through these 
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cases and in the light of Peirce’s fallibilism and supported by aspects of Chang’s (2012a) 
active (scientific) realism I will attempt to demonstrate iconic robustness as it applies the 
periodic table. Here I am referring to Chang’s (2012) operational definition of reality, which 
is his response to the debate around scientific realism58. Chang (2012:217) proposes an 
active doctrine, ‘which affirms that science should strive to maximize our contact with 
reality in order to learn as much as we can’. As we will see Chang takes reality – the world 
in which we live – as being whatever is not subject to our own will and capable of offering 
resistance to our plans and to our beliefs. I will conclude the chapter with definition of 
iconic robustness constructed via these sources. 
 
  
                                                          
58 An exhaustive account of the issues around scientific realism lies beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Anjan Chakravartty (2017) states: ‘Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude toward the 
content of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable 
aspects of the world described by the sciences.’ 
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5.4 The rare earth elements59 
As a part of the acknowledgements to his book, Episodes from the History of the Rare Earth 
Elements (1996), Christopher Evans notes that, ‘relatively few scholars [are] working in the 
subject area covered’. Perhaps the most detailed scholarship of recent times is that of 
Pieter Thyssen and Koen Binnemans (2013 and 2015). The rare earth elements were known 
at the time of Mendeleev’s first attempt (1869) at systemising the elements and presented 
a particular challenge in that they did not fit easily in to Mendeleev’s scheme. What will 
later be described as the ‘rare earth crisis’ might be taken as an example of nature’s 
resistance to Mendeleev’s scheme. By way of response Mendeleev was prepared and 
willing to adjust his scheme in an attempt to maintain the rare earths as intelligible and 
coherent elements within his system. I will argue that the periodic table remained an iconic 
representation notwithstanding the reconfiguring required to adapt to these troublesome 
elements. Furthermore I will argue that in effecting these changes Mendeleev adopted a 
fallibilist approach.  
 
5.4.1 The rare earth elements and Mendeleev’s Attempt of 1869 
The rare earths were included in Mendeleev’s first Attempt which we met in the previous 
chapter and shown again below. One of the problems Mendeleev faced was that the rare 
earth elements were difficult to extract in a pure form which made an accurate 
determination of their atomic weights problematic. Atomic weights were determined in 
part by knowing an element’s valency. The values used by Mendeleev assumed the rare 
earths to be divalent; this later proved to be incorrect. This was not a problem peculiar to 
the rare earth elements; the atomic weights of other elements such as thallium, lead and 
uranium had also been wrongly determined. 
                                                          
59
 There is an irony in the part played by the rare earths in the history of the periodic table. The 
prediction of eka-boron, and its subsequent discovery as scandium by Nilson in 1879, is often 
considered as one of the events that gave support to Mendeleev’s scheme. Today’s chemists often 
find it convenient to classify scandium as a rare earth – the very set of elements Mendeleev found so 
difficult to position. 
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The elements are arranged as six 
vertical columns in order of 
increasing atomic weight. This gives 
nineteen horizontal rows of 
elements of relatively similar 
physiochemical properties. 
At the bottom of the table are seven 
elements: indium (?In=75.6), and 
thorium (Th=118?) plus the five rare 
earths, erbium (?Er=56), yttrium 
(?Yt=60), cerium (Ce=92), lanthanum 
(La=94) and didymium (Di=95). 
The element shown as ?45 is 
Mendeleev’s prediction of eka-boron 
later to be identified as scandium 
Figure 39: Mendeleev’s first table as a single sheet handout, 17th February 1869 
Source: Persistence and Periodicity: a study of Mendeleev’s contribution to the Foundations of 
Chemistry by John Russel Smith, PhD thesis Chelsea College, University of London 1976, page 217 
 
Two months after the circulation of his Attempt, Mendeleev’s paper ‘On the Correlation of 
the Elements’ and their Atomic Weights was read to the Russian Chemical Society, and 
subsequently published in the society’s Zhurnal Russkoe Fiziko-Khimicheskoe Obshchestvo 
(1869). It is here that Mendeleev argues for atomic weight being an element’s defining 
characteristic regardless of whether that element exists in its free state (such as elemental 
magnesium) or as one of its compounds (magnesium combined with oxygen in the form of 
magnesium oxide). One piece of empirical evidence in support of Mendeleev’s first Attempt 
is that ordering the elements by atomic weight produces groups that accord with known 
sets or families of elements with similar chemical properties, such as the alkali metals (Li, 
Na, K, Rb, Cs) and the halogens (F, Cl, Br, J [I]). Mendeleev’s (1869a:35) fallibilist approach is 
evident in stating himself to be ‘quite conscious of the fact that this attempt is not final’ 
adding that ‘in many cases there still exist strong doubts regarding the place of such 
element as have not been sufficiently investigated’. In general, whilst elements of low and 
stable atomic weights had been relatively well studied, this was not so for elements of 
higher atomic weight. Unsurprisingly therefore Mendeleev (1869a:37) adds that for 
elements of less stable atomic weights, ‘there exists quite understandably, complete 
uncertainty’ as to their position within the scheme – adding that ‘among these are, for 
example, yttrium, thorium and indium’ – all three elements forming part of what will later 
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be described as the rare earth crisis (Thyssen and Binnemans, 2015). Mendeleev (1869a:30) 
demonstrates a fallibilist approach when he states that although there ‘does not exist a 
single universal principle, capable of withstanding criticism’ whereby the elements might be 
ordered, there are nonetheless some groups of elements that ‘form a whole and represent 
a natural order’ – that is, sets of element long known to have similar chemical properties. 
As examples of these natural groups Mendeleev (1869a:30) cites the ‘halogens, the alkaline 
earth metals’ adding also the rare earths which he describes as ‘the companions of cerium’. 
Whilst recognising the rare earth elements as a natural group, Mendeleev is unsure where 
to place them. He eventually settles in his first Attempt for a block at the bottom of what is 
sometimes known as the ‘long form’ of the table. 
 
Looking at the arrangement above, the positioning of these seven elements is not ideal for 
they interrupt the general increase in atomic weights on which the table is founded. The 
disruption caused by the rare earths is explained by Thyssen and Binnemans (2011:10) in 
that, if omitted completely, the sequence of atomic weights ‘would have passed from the 
unknown element with an atomic weight of 45 to titanium with an atomic weight of 50, and 
from strontium with an atomic weight of 87.6 to zirconium with an atomic weight of 90, 
completely in accordance with the gradual increase in atomic weight’. Whilst natural 
groups such as the halogens fitted Mendeleev’s scheme he found the rare earths more 
problematic to position. Throughout this early paper, and in addition to the uncertainties 
noted above, Mendeleev describes a number of possible changes that might be made to 
improve the arrangement of the elements as tabulated in his original Attempt. Notice too in 
the following discussion how Mendeleev’s table functions iconically and in accord with the 
third key aspect of iconicity from chapter four: Mendeleev’s processes of reasoning being 
predicated on the iconicity of the periodic table in proposing different arrangements of the 
elements. 
 
In the coming section I will argue that Mendeleev’s earliest periodic table (1869, figure 39) 
demonstrated  iconic robustness by undergoing change -  analogous to plastic deformation 
-  in order to absorb and accommodate the impact of nature’s resistance in the form of the 
rare earth elements. In response to the challenge offered by these elements we see 
Mendeleev engaging with his iconic representation and adjusting the structure of his table 
to establish new relations between the chemical elements. As Thyssen and Binnemans 
(2015:166) argue ‘both the transition metal groups (iron, palladium and platinum group) 
and the rare-earth groups (cerium and erbium group) exhibited a transitional function’. On 
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this basis Mendeleev suggests the following restructuring of his table as a possibility. The 
table is reproduced again (figure 40) to make the argument easier to follow. 
 
 
Mendeleev notes that the early 
elements of the fourth column (Mn, 
Fe, Co, Ni, Zn) form a ‘transition’ to 
later members of the third column (Cl, 
K, Ca). Thus the atomic weights of Co, 
Ni, Cr, Mn and Fe represent a 
‘transition’ from Cu and Zn to Ca and 
K. Having made this connection 
Mendeleev (1869a:37) states that 
‘perhaps for this reason their positions 
will have to be changed’ (emphasis 
added). These elements might be 
better placed, ‘in the lower rows 
instead of the upper rows, then one 
would obtain three columns here 
which would, in many respects, exhibit 
similarities’. This change he explains 
would give three columns of elements 
with similar properties: Co, Ni, Cr, Mn, 
Fe, also Ce, La, Di, Pl, Ru, Rh and 
thirdly Pt, Ir, Os 
Figure 40: Mendeleev’s first table as a single sheet handout, 17
th
 February 1869 
Source: Persistence and Periodicity: a study of Mendeleev’s contribution to the Foundations of Chemistry by 
John Russel Smith, PhD thesis Chelsea College, University of London 1976, page 217 
 
Here Mendeleev – reasoning by engaging with his iconic representation – is setting out 
changes that would, if carried out, result in a significant restructuring of his table. There are 
a number of other similar and far-reaching changes described in some detail by Mendeleev. 
On each of these occasions the periodic table demonstrates its iconic capacity in being 
integral to Mendeleev’s thought processes and reasoning as he attempts to assign the 
chemical relations between the rare earth elements and the wider elements in general. 
Throughout the course of these changes, brought about by the resistance offered by the 
rare earth elements to Mendeleev’s scheme, the periodic table demonstrates its iconic 
robustness: it ‘flexes’ to accommodate Mendeleev’s proposals whilst making both the new 
relations visible and inferring the possibility of new relations. 
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In commenting on the possible changes to reposition the rare earth elements Mendeleev 
adopts a fallibilist position. He also retains a belief in his iconic table’s capacity to respond 
to the changes he is proposing whilst retaining its ability to reveal new knowledge; its iconic 
robustness. Take for example this statement made by Mendeleev (1869a:37) at the time of 
presenting his first Attempt to the Russian Chemical Society in March 1869, 
 
 The system of elements proposed here is, of course, not to be considered as 
completely closed, but it appears to me to be based upon such data and such 
natural approximations, that its existence can hardly be regarded as doubtful; for 
the numbers confirm the similarities which result from the study of the compounds 
of the elements. (emphasis added) 
 
A fallibilist approach is suggested in Mendeleev recognising the scheme not to be 
‘completely closed’. To draw again from Chang’s (2012a:221) active realism: ‘[b]ut what 
reality does, or what it allows us to do, is not governed by how we explain or predict what 
happens’. Through the periodic table Mendeleev tests an aspect of reality: the relations 
between the chemical elements. Reality on the other hand is ‘not governed by how we 
explain or predict what happens’ – our descriptions are likely to be an incomplete 
representation of the world; Mendeleev accepts for his part that his table is not ‘completely 
closed’. Notice too that Mendeleev’s mention of ‘natural approximations’ and ‘similarities’ 
captures Peirce’s fallibilist approach discussed earlier in that our knowledge is never 
absolute for a degree of uncertainty and of indeterminacy always exists. Notwithstanding 
the ‘incompleteness’ of the periodic table at this stage Mendeleev continues to 
demonstrates its iconic robustness by emphasising its ability to point towards new 
relations. Put another way, by ‘the direct observation’ of his periodic table, Mendeleev is 
able to demonstrate that ‘other truths concerning its object can be discovered than those 
which suffice to determine its construction’ (CP 2.279, 1895) – the second criterion of 
iconicity developed in the previous chapter.  
 
Returning to figure 40, in the light of a number of elements with properties similar to the 
metals iron, cerium, palladium and platinum, Mendeleev (1869a:37) argues that as a result, 
‘the system of elements arranged in groups will have to be changed such that in certain 
parts of the system the similarity between members of the horizontal rows will have to be 
considered, but in other parts, the similarity between members of the vertical columns’. 
The periodic table flexes again – but Mendeleev continues to emphasise its continuing 
iconic robustness as able to reveal new truths concerning the relations between the 
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chemical elements. Mendeleev (1869a:37) proposes ‘three [new] columns which… in many 
respects, exhibit similarities’ – new (iconic) relations revealed as – ‘one column containing 
cobalt, nickel, chromium, manganese and iron; a second column containing cerium, 
lanthanum and didymium, palladium, rhodium, ruthenium and, lastly a third column 
containing platinum, iridium and osmium’. New configurations open up the possibility of 
new relations between the periodic table’s chemical objects whilst simultaneously 
demonstrating its iconic robustness, its epistemic fecundity.  
 
The critical interplay between Peirce, inquiry, the fruitful nature of scientific 
representations and iconicity is captured precisely by Chiara Ambrosio (2014:256) when she 
writes, 
 
In emphasizing the iconic nature of scientific representations, Peirce seemed to 
suggest that a key characteristic of the representative tools and practices 
constructed and used by scientists is their fundamental fruitfulness, and indeed it is 
this fruitfulness that distinguishes iconic representations from indexical and 
symbolic ones. 
 
In experimenting on his representation Mendeleev is generating new knowledge – the table 
is proving to be fruitful. By this measure Mendeleev’s periodic table is an iconic 
representation. The periodic table’s iconic robustness is evidenced by its capacity to 
respond to nature’s resistance whilst pointing towards new relations between the elements 
of its construction. 
 
5.4.2 Mendeleev’s table of 1871 - another attempt to solve the rare earth problem 
The British chemist, historian of chemistry and later head of the Caius Laboratory at 
Cambridge, Matthew Pattison Muir (1848–1931), was an undergraduate at the time of 
Mendeleev’s early publications. In the year Mendeleev died Pattison Muir described his 
paper ‘The Periodic Regularity of the Chemical Elements’ (1872) as ‘one of the most 
important contributions ever made in the advancement of accurate knowledge of natural 
phenomena’60. This particular paper was published in Liebig’s journal Annalen der Chemie 
und Pharmacie61 and it is this paper which William Jensen (2002:21) claims, ‘defined the 
periodic law and table for the rest of the 19th century and which served as a primary 
                                                          
60
 Cited Kaji, M. Kragh, H. and Pallo G. (2015:87) 
61 D. Mendeleejeff, ‘Die periodische Gesetzmässigkeit der chemischen Elemente’ (The Law of 
Periodic Regularity of the Chemical Elements), Ann. Chem. Pharm., 1872, Suppl. 8, 133-229. 
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reference for western chemists’. Also by way of recognition, in 2012 the Division of the 
History of Chemistry of the American Chemical Society’s Citation for Chemical Breakthrough 
was given to St. Petersburg State University for this particular paper of Mendeleev’s. This 
paper, explains the American chemist and historian of chemistry David Lewis (2014:4), ‘was 
a German translation… of the paper that had already appeared in the [Russian journal] 
Zhurnal62’ the year before (1871). The German journal Annalen had a much wider 
readership than its Russian counterpart. It is the English translation of Mendeleev’s Annalen 
paper that will be referred to here, as published in Jensen (2002). The historian of 
chemistry Ferenc Szabadváry (1988:71) explains Mendeleev’s new attempt at dealing with 
the problem of the rare earth elements as follows: 
 
The table which appeared in 1871 is already in the usual form. In this year 
Mendeleev performed an important change - arbitrarily - with rare earth elements: 
he assumed that they were trivalent, and correspondingly recalculated their atomic 
weights, that is, instead of YO and LaO he calculated with Y203 and La203. He then 
listed yttrium with an atomic weight of 88, lanthanum with 137 and cerium with 
138. 
 
As will become apparent Mendeleev alters the way the table is set out with the chemical 
groups appearing as vertical columns and the periods as horizontal rows – as is the case 
today. Importantly he assigns new values to the atomic weights of the rare earths which 
results in a re-positioning of these elements within the table. Having set out the rationale 
for his system Mendeleev (1872:56) states: 
 
No natural law acquires any scientific importance unless it introduces, so to speak, 
some practical consequences – in other words, unless it admits of logical 
conclusions which explain the unexplained, point to previously unknown 
phenomena, and especially if the law produces predictions which can be confirmed 
by experiment.  
 
The periodic table is the diagrammatic representation of the ‘natural law’ Mendeleev is 
referring to here. By assigning to the table such characteristics as the capacity to ‘explain 
the unexplained’, to ‘point to previously unknown phenomena’ and in ‘making predictions 
                                                          
62 D. Mendeleev, Estestvennaya sistema elementov iprimenenie ee k ukazaniyu svoistv nekotorykh 
elementov. (The natural system of the elements and it application in the prediction of the properties 
of certain elements), Zh.Russ. Fiz.-Khim. O-va., 1871(3): 25-56. 
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which can be confirmed by experiment’, Mendeleev is making a claim for the new table’s 
continuing ability to reveal unexpected truths, for its iconic nature. The periodic table will, 
states Mendeleev (1872:56), ‘stimulate the completion of the newer areas of science’, and 
lists the following four applications, 
 
To the determination of the atomic weights of insufficiently studied elements; 
To the determination of the properties of presently unknown elements; 
To the correction of the magnitude of atomic weights; 
To the completion of our knowledge of the forms of chemical combination; 
 
As Mendeleev’s table develops and reconfigures it retains its fruitful capacity to promote 
thought experiments in these four areas. This I claim is evidence for the periodic table’s 
continuing iconicity – the capacity to indicate new research questions. Some insights into 
Mendeleev’s (1875:47) thought experiments are given by his ‘determination of the atomic 
weight’ of cerium as an ‘insufficiently studied element’, which I discuss in the next section. 
 
5.4.3 Recalibrating cerium’s atomic weight – Mendeleev’s thought experiment 
The element cerium was earlier believed to have an equivalent weight of approximately 45 
– in common with lanthanum and didymium. With identical valencies this resulted in these 
rare earth elements having near identical atomic weights63. Each element is obtained from 
the same source (cerite), and difficult to extract in a pure form. As a result their atomic 
weights are difficult to assign with precision. In seeking to recalibrate cerium’s atomic 
weight Mendeleev (1872:71) offers the following thought experiment: ‘if CeO is accepted as 
the formula of the ordinary suboxide, then Ce = 92 [the value in the first table of 1869]’, 
but, ‘if one accepts the formula Ce2O3 for the suboxide, then Ce = 138 [the value in the new 
table]’. The valency of cerium changes as a result from two to three. This is an example of a 
form of change Szabadváry earlier in this chapter was seen to judge as ‘arbitrary’. As 
Mendeleev (1872:72) concedes, ‘in attributing this composition of the highest oxide one is 
still assuming an oxide of the formula Ce2O3, though this has not yet been obtained and 
none of its independent salts are known’ (emphasis added). In the case of the changes 
made to the atomic weights of ytterbium and erbium Mendeleev (1872:76) states, ‘there 
are at present no available facts to confirm the correctness of these modifications’. 
Nevertheless, by changing the valencies of the rare earth elements from two (CeO) to three 
(Ce2O3), Mendeleev’s thought experiments offered revised values for their atomic weights. 
                                                          
63 Atomic weight = equivalent weight x valence 
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These elements were then each placed within a reconfigured table – but now no longer as a 
common group as was the case in the first Attempt of 1869 but distributed between groups 
III and IV. Three of the five rare earths are positioned in Group III (Yt, 88; Di, 138, Er, 178) 
and the other two in Group IV (Ce, 140; La, 180) although the question marks against each 
of these elements indicates that uncertainty remains – as can be seen in figure 41: 
 
Mendeleev’s thought experiments on atomic weights – Group IV revised to include the 
rare earths cerium and lanthanum (indicated below) 
 
Figure 41: Mendeleev’s Table II from 1872 
Source: page 151 of D. Mendeleejeff, Die periodische Gesetzmässigkeit der chemischen 
Elemente. Ann. Chem. Pharm., 1872, Suppl. 8, 133-229. 
 
By assuming cerium’s higher oxide to be CeO2, with a corresponding valency of four and 
atomic weight of 138, Mendeleev then justifies placing cerium in Group IV as indicated in 
figure 41: Ti, Zr, Ce, La, Th. These new changes in the table’s overall configuration do not 
impair its iconic capacity to reveal novel knowledge. This can be seen in Mendeleev’s 
further thought experiments upon the new relations established by the re-positioning of 
the elements – for example the likely effectiveness of CeO2 as a chemical base. The Group 
IV dioxides – the cerium analogues – are: TiO2, ZrO2, CeO2, LaO2 and ThO2. Mendeleev argues 
(1872:72) that CeO2 is likely to be ‘weakly basic’ on the grounds that ‘it is placed in the 
fourth group after TiO2, with very indistinct basic properties, and after ZrO2, whose basic 
character is more pronounced’. Here again, notwithstanding this new arrangement of the 
elements, the revised table of 1871 demonstrates its iconic robustness: retaining its iconic 
power of pointing towards new knowledge – in this case the likely basicity of CeO2. 
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Mendeleev did not solve the rare earth crisis and after 1872 his attention turned to 
researching the properties of gases and the nature of the luminiferous ether. It is Thyssen’s 
and Binnemans’s (2015:156/170) somewhat triumphalist view that Mendeleev, ‘definitely 
grasped the essence of the subject-matter better than any other chemist at the time’ and 
that during this period he ‘loved to give his thoughts free rein and he had all faith in the 
successful future development of his system’. A system which Gordin (2004:50) summarises 
as follows: ‘In 1871 Mendeleev thought of the periodic system as a tool that not only 
formulated all of current chemistry, but also generated research questions to ground a 
research school’ (emphasis added). It is partially this generative capacity that demonstrates 
the continuing iconicity of the periodic table during this time of development and 
readjustment. It is this capacity for generating new questions within the context 
Mendeleev’s fallibilist inquiry that demonstrates the periodic table’s iconic robustness. 
Whilst Thyssen and Binnemans’s claim for Mendeleev appreciating the problem of the rare 
earth elements ‘better than any other chemist’ is perhaps rather overstated, he did develop 
a diagrammatic representation capable of prompting a number of conceptual possibilities 
as to how the rare earth problem might be solved.  
 
There are other strong Peircean connections to Mendeleev’s inquiry that are worth 
mentioning at this point. In addition to induction and deduction, Peirce argues that 
scientific inquiry also involves ‘abduction’ and characterised as ‘the process of forming an 
explanatory hypothesis’ and as ‘the only logical operation which introduces any new idea; 
for induction does nothing but determine a value, and deduction merely evolves the 
necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis’ (CP 5.171, 1903). In the seventh of his 
Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism (1903) Peirce comments on Mendeleev recognising both 
the need to alter atomic weights in order to fit some elements into his scheme, as well as 
his successful predictions of the eka-elements. By applying methods such as these to arrive 
at the periodic law, Peirce states, ‘the anticipation that such [the periodic law] might be the 
truth, not amounting to a positive assertion yet by no means sinking to a recognition of 
bare possibility, was the Abductive conclusion’ (PPM:283). There are two points here that 
relate to Mendeleev’s form of reasoning and to his overarching approach to inquiry. Firstly 
by abductive reasoning Mendeleev was able to discover his particular view of chemical 
relations: the periodic law. By abductive logic and diagrammatic reasoning – Peircean 
methods of gaining knowledge – Mendeleev sought to give a sense of meaning to his 
hypothesis through his table. Whilst his hypothesis of the periodic law continued to align 
with the empirical data, the table remained secure. Secondly Mendeleev demonstrates 
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Peirce’s fallibilist methodology in that he positions the periodic table between the twin 
outliers of ‘positive assertion’ and ‘bare possibility’. The iconic robustness of Mendeleev’s 
table is grounded in its continuing fruitfulness in pointing out new relations between the 
chemical elements within the context of his fallibilist inquiry, reconfiguring in response to 
nature’s resistance. 
 
5.5 The noble gases 
Around twenty-five years later, with the discovery of argon, Mendeleev appeared to depart 
from his fallibilist approach believing his table to be unable to accommodate this new 
element. In their essay ‘Epistemological and Ontological Status of Chemical Relations’ 
(2010), Andrés Bernal and Edgar E. Daza (2010:97) argue that Mendeleev denied argon as 
an element ‘in an attempt to protect his oeuvre’ with the main issue being ‘not whether 
noble gases could exist in absolute terms, but if they existed within the scope of chemistry’. 
By this stage the periodic table appears to have ossified, at least for Mendeleev, who takes 
a stand of protective entrenchment. Argon and the other noble gases represent a further 
instance of nature’s resistance to Mendeleev’s system. Whilst Mendeleev initially stepped 
aside from accommodating these novel elements into his scheme, William Ramsay and Lord 
Rayleigh took a different approach. Their attitude to nature’s kickback falls within Chang’s 
(2012a:216) account of how, ‘we go on learning, doing humble inductions, but also 
expecting that something can always go wrong and eventually will; when it does, that will 
be the start of another episode of inquiry’. This new episode of inquiry forms the next 
section. 
 
5.5.1 Argon: a new element makes its first appearance 
An early indication of nature’s resistance to the periodic table in the form of the noble 
gases is given in Rayleigh’s letter published in the journal Nature (1892). Here Rayleigh 
reports his work on the density of nitrogen. In particular he comments on the discrepancy 
he discovered in the density of nitrogen when produced by two different methods. In the 
first nitrogen is extracted from the atmosphere by removing first the oxygen with heated 
copper and then the carbon dioxide by reacting it with potash (potassium carbonate). The 
remaining gas, thought to be impure nitrogen, was then dried, passed through the cycle 
again and finally dried in turn by sulphuric acid, potash and phosphoric anhydride. Great 
care was taken to ensure the final volume of gas collected was considered to be pure 
nitrogen and free from oxygen, carbon dioxide and water vapour.  
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The second method, which Rayleigh attributes to Ramsay, is similarly exact but in place of 
the heated copper the air is mixed with ammonia which in turn reacts with atmospheric 
oxygen to yield nitrogen and water. The resulting product is dried and is a sample of 
nitrogen gas from two sources: the atmosphere and the product of the reaction between 
oxygen and ammonia. The samples of nitrogen from each method should have the same 
density. In his letter Rayleigh (1892:512) notes two different values, ‘the relative difference, 
amounting to about 1/1000 part’ which he comments, ‘is small in itself; but it lies entirely 
outside the errors of the experiment, and can only be attributed to a variation in the 
character of the gas’. The density of the nitrogen prepared by the second method was 
found to be 1/1000 less than the value for the first, where the sole source of the nitrogen is 
atmospheric air. It is in such surprising results – in clashes with reality - that Chang 
(2012:xix) offers the pragmatist’s standpoint whereby ‘reality offers resistance to our ill-
conceived schemes’ and that this sometimes led to the creation of knowledge, in this case 
the discovery of a new chemical element. 
 
We see here too Peirce’s continuing interest in chemistry and in argon in particular. In an 
unpublished paper on the noble gases Peirce, in admiration of Rayleigh’s achievements, 
asks the following rhetorical question: ‘[w]hat, please dear reader, would any but a very 
superior man have done about that minute discrepancy? He would have pooh-poohed it, 
minimising it, tried to ague it away’. After describing Rayleigh’s approach – the very reverse 
of trying to argue away discrepancy - Peirce concludes that ‘it follows that the atomic 
weight of argon is 40 or thereabouts; or very nearly the same as potassium. It is, thus, very 
unlikely that it is nitrogen’ (MS1037 c1890). This surprising if small discrepancy in the 
density of nitrogen discovered by Rayleigh also connects to two other Peircean themes. 
Firstly in his essay ‘The Fixation of Belief’ (1877) Peirce explains how inquiry is prompted by 
such a surprise result which in turn fosters a sense of doubt. For, as Peirce states, ‘the 
irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief’ adding, ‘I shall term this 
struggle inquiry’ (EP1:114). The purpose of inquiry is, Peirce continues, to overcome such 
doubts as a means of ‘settling belief’ (EP1:116). The further inquiry into the noble gases by 
Ramsay, Rayleigh and others might be interpreted being in search of ‘settling’ their belief in 
the composition of the atmosphere and eventually in a new group of chemical elements. 
Secondly in his classification of signs, Peirce argues that one way indexical signs function is 
by compelling our attention: 
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A rap on the door is an index. Anything which focusses the attention is an index. 
Anything which startles us is an index, in so far as it marks the junction between 
two portions of experience. (CP 2.286, 1897) 
 
The ‘surprising’ discovery of the differences in density of nitrogen, according to how it had 
been generated, acted as an indexical sign by drawing Ramsay’s attention to the possibility 
of a new and undiscovered gas. With hindsight it is possible to explain Rayleigh’s two 
different results in terms of the existence of argon in the atmosphere. In the second 
method ‘nitrogen’ is prepared as from the atmosphere contaminated with argon to which 
nitrogen from the chemical reaction of ammonia and oxygen has been added. This sample 
contains proportionately more nitrogen than that produced by the first method and so has 
a lower density given that the density of argon is approximately 1.4 times that of nitrogen. 
 
Some two years after Rayleigh’s letter appeared in Nature, Ramsay and Rayleigh made a 
public announcement of their discovery of argon in August 1894 at the British Association 
meeting in Oxford. On hearing of their discovery, Michael Gordin (2004:210) records 
Mendeleev telegramming Ramsay, ‘[d]elighted at the discovery of argon. Think molecules 
contain three nitrogen bound together by heat’. It is Gordin’s view that Mendeleev had 
‘resisted a novel discovery in chemistry that could be interpreted as violating his periodic 
law’. Mendeleev’s table was at that time unable to accommodate an element with an 
atomic weight of 40. If the atomic weight proved correct argon would need to be placed 
between chlorine and potassium. Such a position didn’t exist, for unlike the famous three 
successful eka-elements, Mendeleev had made no prediction for an element of atomic 
weight 40.  
 
Mendeleev’s response, if Gordin’s view is accepted, is an attempt to face down nature’s 
resistance to his scheme in the form of this newly discovered element. To be fair to 
Mendeleev, his suggestion of ‘three nitrogen’ or N3 (an analogue to ozone, O3) was not a 
unique position to hold with respect to argon. The chemist and historian John Wolfenden 
(1969:570) has pointed out that the suggestion that argon was an allotropic form of 
nitrogen (N3) had also been made by the Scottish chemist and physicist James Dewar (1842 
– 1923) in a letter to the Times published on 16th August, 1894.  In fact Dewar wrote two 
letters dated 15th and 16th August 1894 which were subsequently reprinted in Chemical 
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News (1894) where he makes the case for ‘argon’ as triatomic nitrogen. In the second 
letter64 Dewar concludes, 
 
It is not for the first time that chemists and physicists have been tempted to believe 
in the production of an allotropic form of nitrogen, and to accept it as explaining 
certain curious phenomena, but hitherto the assumption has always broken down 
on more careful investigation. This time we may be permitted to hope that the 
elusive allotropic form has been fairly captured.  
 
Unlike Mendeleev, Dewar was probably less concerned with the problem the discovery of 
argon might present for the periodic table but with his own experiments on the liquefaction 
of air. In a presentation to the Chemical Society later that same year, Dewar (1894:300) in a 
paper on this same topic claims that when recording the temperature at which two samples 
of liquid nitrogen evaporated, ‘[n]itrogen obtained from atmospheric air has been 
compared in this manner with nitrogen prepared from nitric oxide without any differences 
between them being detected’. Thus unlike the density differences Rayleigh first observed 
between ‘atmospheric’ and ‘chemical nitrogen’, Dewar finds their comparative boiling 
points to be the same. We might conclude that Dewar was not working to the same degree 
of accuracy as Rayleigh or perhaps, in Peirce’s words, had ‘pooh-pooed’ seemingly 
anomalous results away. 
 
News of the discovery of argon travelled to America. In a brief article titled ‘A New 
Atmospheric Element’, in the American Journal of Chemistry (October 1894), E.H Quinam 
(1894:719) cites William Crooke’s spectral analysis of argon as indicating ‘the lines differ in 
position from those of nitrogen’. Nevertheless Quinam (1894:780) also includes Dewar’s 
view, ‘that the new element may be an allotropic form of nitrogen [N3] analogous to red 
phosphorus [P4]’. These brief details on the possibility of argon being a form of nitrogen are 
given simply to demonstrate that Mendeleev’s telegrammed response to Ramsay offered a 
suggestion that sat within the context of chemical opinion at that time.  
 
Accounts of the discovery of argon are well documented in the literature (see for example 
Wolfenden 1969 and Giunta 2001) and will not be detailed any further here. What is worth 
noting however is Rayleigh’s ‘puzzlement’ and surprise in his discovery that the densities of 
the two nitrogen samples had defied his expectations. It might also be said that in this 
                                                          
64
 Reported in Chemical News 1894, volume 70 page 88 – and reprinted from The Times 16
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183 
 
surprise result Rayleigh had experienced a clash with reality - a reality independent of his 
expectations; an aspect of scientific inquiry described by Chang (2012:257) as ‘not 
everything will go to plan…that is how reality surprises us’. As we will see, Mendeleev did 
not respond initially as Chang (2012:257) would recommend, by having ‘contingencies’ and 
thereby ‘a kind of science that has the capacity for handling surprises’. For Mendeleev did 
not believe his table was able to accommodate the surprise discovery of argon. Fortunately 
Ramsay and Rayleigh were able to show that the failure of Mendeleev’s table as it was then 
constructed, to receive argon, did not herald the failure of his whole scheme as a result.  
 
5.5.2 The discovery of argon – Nature’s clash with Mendeleev’s iconic periodic table 
Again this is not the place to detail the discovery of argon, or later in the account the other 
noble gases. Details will be given on how argon lends support to the iconic robustness of 
Mendeleev’s table in confronting the resistance of Nature presented by these novel 
elements. 
 
In January 1895 Rayleigh and Ramsay presented their joint paper, ‘Argon, a New 
Constituent of the Atmosphere’, to the Royal Society. This paper set out the findings of 
their research prompted initially by Rayleigh’s surprise results concerning the density of 
nitrogen and described earlier. A measure of Ramsay and Rayleigh’s (1895:208) 
determination to settle the question of argon as a new element can be seen in their 
statement that they ‘thought it undesirable to shrink from any labour that would tend to 
complete [this] verification’. In formulating their conclusions Ramsay and Rayleigh 
(1895:235) refer again to the surprising result – the discrepancies in the densities of 
nitrogen referred to in Rayleigh’s letter to Nature – when they state, ‘if the newly 
discovered gas [argon] were not in the atmosphere, the discrepancies in the density of 
"chemical " and "atmospheric" nitrogen would remain unexplained’. The clash with reality 
instanced by Rayleigh’s original ‘discrepancies’ has prompted a new inquiry in order to 
settle belief. Nature’s initial resistance has generated new knowledge in the existence of 
argon. At the beginning of the chapter we referred to Chang’s (2012a:216) account of 
active realism where he accounts for knowledge as being, ‘a state of ability to do things 
without being foiled by significant resistance from reality’. In the work of Rayleigh and 
Ramsay new knowledge is produced by confronting nature’s initial resistance to a particular 
state of affairs and through the process of inquiry. 
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The copy of Mendeleev’s table in figure 42 is dated February 1895, the year of Ramsay and 
Rayleigh’s publication on the isolation of argon as presented to The Royal Society in 
January.  
 
 
This table Smith 
(1974:202) states 
as being published 
in an 1895 Russian 
edition of 
Mendeleev’s 
Principles of 
Chemistry and 
headed 
‘arrangement of 
the elements by 
groups and series’. 
Mendeleev makes 
no provision for an 
unknown element 
with an atomic 
weight of 40 –  
argon’s value 
according to 
Ramsay and 
Rayleigh (1895) 
Figure 42: Mendeleev’s periodic table from 1895 
Source: Persistence and Periodicity: a study of Mendeleev’s contribution to the Foundations 
of Chemistry by John Russel Smith, PhD thesis Chelsea College, University of London 1976, 
page 275 
 
Argon’s atomic weight remained a matter of speculation when Ramsay and Rayleigh 
(1895:236) published their paper, 
 
Argon is approximately 20 times as heavy as hydrogen, that is, its molecular weight 
is 20 times as great as that of hydrogen, or 40. But its molecule is monatomic, 
hence its atomic weight, or, if it be a mixture, the mean of the atomic weights of 
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the elements in that mixture, taken for the proportion in which they are present, 
must be 40. 
 
On balance argon was thought to be a monatomic gas with an atomic weight of 40. 
Furthermore Ramsay and Rayleigh’s (1895:234) investigations had shown that argon would 
not combine with any other element finding it to be ‘a most astonishingly indifferent body, 
inasmuch as it is unattacked by elements of very opposite character, ranging from sodium 
and magnesium on the one hand, to oxygen, chlorine, and sulphur on the other’. In forming 
no compounds argon must be considered to have a valency of zero. This presented an 
additional problem for Mendeleev who had not conceived of zero-valency elements when 
constructing his system. The impact of nature on the periodic table by the existence of an 
element with an atomic weight of 40 was expressed by Arthur Rucker, President of the 
Physical Society, in the discussion immediately following Ramsay and Rayleigh’s paper65, 
 
I can only, in conclusion, say that, whatever the effect may be upon the great 
chemical generalization of Mendelejeff, that is, after all, an empirical law which is 
based, at present, upon no dynamical foundation. If it holds its own in this case, it 
will, of course, strengthen our belief in it, but, on the other hand, I do not think that 
it stands on the footing of those great mechanical generalizations which could not 
be upset without upsetting the whole of our fundamental notions of science. 
 
The periodic table has encountered Nature’s resistance in the discovery of argon. If 
sufficiently stable and able to accommodate and to sustain the existence of this new 
element, then the standing of Mendeleev’s scheme will be enhanced. If not, then it will fall 
– but as the physicist Rucker explains – without shattering the edifice of science – as might 
be the case if Newton’s dynamical laws were to suffer a similar fate. Both Ramsay and 
Rayleigh are far more optimistic about the capacity for Mendeleev’s iconic scheme to 
withstand the discovery of argon and to assimilate it within a new structure yet to be 
determined. Elements with an atomic weight of around 40 are: chlorine (35.5), potassium 
(39.4), calcium (40.0) and scandium (44.0). But to position argon anywhere within this set 
of elements would be to displace them away from the family or group of elements they 
each share some chemical similarity with. However unlike Rucker, Ramsay and Rayleigh 
(1895:236) appear to assume that Mendeleev’s scheme would in time cope. 
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If argon be a single element, then there is reason to doubt whether the periodic 
classification of the elements is complete; whether, in fact, elements may not exist 
which cannot be fitted among those of which it is composed. 
 
Both Ramsay and Rayleigh accepted the possibility that the periodic table as it then stood 
might be incomplete; there is no suggestion here that the discovery of argon marks its 
demise. This was not the case for all commentators at the time who foresaw Mendeleev’s 
scheme as being unable to push back successfully against Nature’s resistance.  
 
In an article in Chemical News (1895) the Prague chemist Bohuslav Brauner writes in 
support of argon being tri-nitrogen (N3). This was motivated in part by his view of the 
fixedness of Mendeleev’s table as it was then constructed, being unable to accommodate 
argon in some newly reconstructed form. As part of their investigations into argon, Ramsay 
and Rayleigh claimed that specific heat data indicated argon to be a monatomic gas, 
thereby ruling out the possibility of triatomic nitrogen N3. This Brauner (1895:79) attempts 
to overcome by suggesting that the three nitrogen atoms in lie ‘very close to each other in 
the molecule’ and that this would explain ‘its [N3] great inertia’ and so ‘might be assumed 
to behave physically like a single atom’ (emphasis in the original). Interestingly Brauner 
(1895:79) suggests that microorganisms, then known to convert the nitrogen compound 
ammonia into nitric acid, might offer a successful method to separate the three nitrogen 
atoms in ‘argon’ as N3  - for he asks, ‘is it not possible that such a source might have some 
action on ‘argon’’. As with other chemists at the time Brauner accepted Mendeleev’s 
system but felt it to be a fixed structure, by implication lacking the necessary flexibility 
required to survive the readjustment needed to accommodate a novel element. This 
attitude is apparent when Brauner (1895:79) states that ‘as an orthodox Mendeleeffian, I 
find great difficulty in assuming the existence of a new elementary gas having the atomic 
weight 29 or 40 or 80, its boiling point being -1870’. Such a boiling point, argues Brauner 
(1895:79), ‘would better correspond to a gas similar in its nature to nitrogen’. In his 
Mendeleevian ‘orthodoxy’ Brauner is unable to conceive of Mendeleev’s system 
readjusting to accommodate argon – but Mendeleev’s iconic form was to prove to be more 
adaptable than Brauner and similarly orthodox Mendeleeffians supposed. Brauner’s self-
confessed orthodoxy indicates him to be no fallibilist in this context. 
 
Just three months after Ramsay and Rayleigh presented their paper to The Royal Society 
Mendeleev addressed a meeting of the Russian Chemical Society (March 14, 1895) where 
he rejected the existence of argon as a monatomic gas with an atomic weight of 40. Instead 
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Mendeleev argues for a polyatomic molecule of some sort – such as Ar2 or Ar3 (using 
today’s symbol for argon). Where Ramsay and Rayleigh had used specific heat data to argue 
against the possibility of a polyatomic entity, Mendeleev claimed that polyatomic argon’s 
great chemical inertness might result in the same specific heat characteristics as a 
monatomic gas. Of particular interest is the statement Mendeleev (1895:543) makes in 
defence of the existing structure of his periodic table as being inviolate: ‘if we admit that 
the molecule of argon contains but one atom, there is no room for it in the periodic 
system’. By not slotting into the periodic table as it was then constructed Mendeleev 
(1895:543) claims that is seems therefore ‘very unlikely that the atomic weight of argon 
might be about 40’. Here Mendeleev is sufficiently sure of the format of the table as it was 
then constructed to use it as a framework to judge the likelihood of argon having an atomic 
weight of 40. The table comes first and argon must fit within it. There is no sense that his 
table might be sufficiently adaptable to accommodate argon within a revised format 
without violating the general principles upon which it is founded: an arrangement of the 
chemical elements in order of increasing atomic mass where elements of similar 
physiochemical properties recur periodically. This is in stark contrast to the way Mendeleev 
experimented with different formats of his scheme in order to accommodate the rare earth 
elements. In the case of the noble gases Mendeleev’s earlier fallibilist approach seems to 
have deserted him. We will see later however, that Ramsay adopts a fallibilist approach 
into how argon fits into Mendeleev’s scheme.  
 
The possible threat argon presented to Mendeleev’s table in an unreconstructed form was 
expressed by the American chemist from Johns Hopkins University Ira Remsen66. In a review 
of Ramsey and Rayleigh’s 1895 paper, Remsen (1895:310), whilst conceding that more 
research was necessary to confirm the nature of argon adds, ‘if the time should ever come 
when Mendeleeff's table has to be given up, something better will take its place’. In 
refusing to concede argon to be a monatomic gas with an atomic weight of 40 Mendeleev 
was in part defending his table against the possibility of being ‘given up’. The possible fall of 
the periodic table as a result of the discovery of argon was also alluded to in an editorial in 
Nature (February 1895), and soon after Ramsay and Rayleigh’s presentation to The Royal 
Society. In a lengthy review the author comments (Nature 1895, volume 51 page 337) ‘the 
periodic classification of the elements cannot, and ought not, to be abandoned at the first 
challenge’. Whilst the writer encourages further inquiry into the experimental evidence 
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around Ramsay and Rayleigh’s work on argon the point is made: possible abandonment of 
the periodic table should argon have the properties they had suggested. 
 
Taking Chang’s (2012a:203) position on reality ‘as whatever is not subject to one’s will’, and 
knowledge as ‘an ability to act without being frustrated by resistance from reality’, then 
Mendeleev is demonstrating here some frustration at nature’s resistance to his periodic 
system by attempting to subject the atomic weight of argon to the ‘will’ of his periodic 
system. He does not accept, at this time at least, that his iconic table is sufficiently 
compliant to accommodate a novel and unexpected element. There is instead, Mendeleev 
(1895:543) argues, much to favour the hypothesis that ‘the molecule of argon contains 
three atoms, its atomic weight would be about 14, and in such a case we might consider 
argon as condensed nitrogen, N3’ – which of course would fit neatly into the framework of 
the periodic table as it then was.  
 
5.5.3 The discovery of terrestrial helium67 
Approximately two months after Ramsay and Rayleigh’s paper on argon, Ramsay then 
discovered helium in the mineral cleveite. In a short statement in Nature (March 1895) 
Ramsay describes how in his search for possible compounds of argon his attention had 
been drawn to the mineral cleveite which, earlier studies had noted, evolved a small 
amount of nitrogen when warmed with sulphuric acid. His idea, Ramsay (1895:512) explains 
is, ‘if the so-called nitrogen turned out to be argon, to try if uranium could be induced to 
combine with argon’. After further purification, an excited Ramsay (1895:512) reports that 
the gas ‘consists of a mixture of Argon and Helium!’ In a paper to The Royal Society on 
helium in April 1895 Ramsay (1895a:88) offers what he describes as a remark ‘of a 
speculative nature’, that ‘the general similarity of helium…to argon, in not being affected 
either by red-hot magnesium or by sparking with oxygen in presence of potash, makes the 
inference probable that they belong to the same natural group’. The problem is of course 
that Mendeleev’s table as then constructed has no suitable group for these two new 
elements. Nature’s resistance to the periodic table appears to have increased with the 
discovery of helium. 
 
Approximately a quarter of a century had passed since between Mendeleev’s first periodic 
system in 1869 and the discovery of argon and helium. In that time Mendeleev’s table had 
become for many chemists an established part of their discipline. The Canadian chemist 
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W.W Andrews perhaps spoke for those who believed Mendeleev’s table to be sufficiently 
secure to survive these two elements. In commenting on the dilemma posed by argon and 
helium Andrews (1895:235) offers the following plea to fellow chemists, 
 
Let us imitate the sublime faith of Mendeleeff, and we may rest assured that the 
order and multiplied analogies revealed by the Periodic Classification form a basis 
of fact which is not to be shaken. Argon and helium will drop into their places and 
open up new vistas of analogy and suggestion. 
 
Firstly Andrews’s comment is not in the spirit of fallibilism when he speaks of ‘sublime faith’ 
in Mendeleev and his scheme as a ‘fact which is not to be shaken’. Nevertheless, note the 
iconic and epistemically fruitful claims for the periodic table in Andrew’s claim of ‘analogies 
revealed’. In particular the final sentence is highly reminiscent of the case made for the 
iconic nature of the periodic table in an earlier chapter. In two more years we will see 
Ramsay relying on the iconic nature of the periodic table to reveal just such ‘new vistas of 
analogy’ in the suggestion of the undiscovered noble gas neon.   
 
Not all chemists however were as hopeful, being more of the opinion expressed by RM 
Deeley (1895:279) in an article in Chemical News (1895) where he states that the discovery 
of argon and neon ‘has undoubtedly had the effect of shaking the confidence of chemists in 
the periodic classification of the elements’. The atomic weights of argon and helium had 
been calculated on the basis of their densities and also on their specific heat ratios which 
gives an indication of atomicity. Whilst in their original paper Ramsay and Rayleigh 
accepted that the value they had calculated was perhaps inconclusive; nonetheless on 
balance they considered both helium and argon to be monatomic. As has been described 
earlier, other chemists speculated that given the chemical inertness of both gases, a 
different state of molecular dynamics might exist supporting other possible atomicities. On 
this point Deeley’s (1895:279) belief in the iconic robustness of Mendeleev’s system is 
expressed in his concluding sentence when he writes that given this uncertainty ‘would it 
not be well to follow the indications of the Periodic Law…rather than a doubtful theory 
concerning the dynamics of the molecule?’ 
 
In place of such speculations and in a rather more practical way Ramsay too shows his 
belief in Mendeleev’s iconic system. In his text The Gases of the Atmosphere, published in 
1896 and a year after the discovery of helium Ramsay (1896:218/9) makes a speculative 
‘drop’ of argon and helium into their places within the table, 
190 
 
 
Figure 43: Ramsay’s arrangement of the elements as a periodic system 
Source: Ramsay’s The Gases of the Atmosphere (1896) page 218/9 
* Note that neon has been pencilled in by a later reader of the book: ‘Neon 20’ 
  
Here Ramsay presents argon and helium as monatomic, inert gases with atomic weights of 
39.9 and 4.2 respectively and as a new group on the far right of the table. By positioning 
argon (39.9) between chlorine (35.5) and potassium (39.1) Ramsay adds another 
irregularity in the atomic weight sequence to that shown by the reversal of tellurium and 
iodine68 in Mendeleev’s original table of 1869. What is important is Ramsay’s (1896:240) 
inherent belief in the iconic robustness of Mendeleev’s scheme to accommodate these two 
new elements and to suggest new research questions, whilst at the same time being aware 
‘that these suggestions are of a wholly speculative nature’ adding also his ‘firm conviction 
that no true progress in knowledge has ever been made without such speculations’.  
 
5.5.4 Ramsay’s prediction of neon and the nature of the periodic table’s iconicity 
Now in possession of new evidence - the chemical similarity of helium and argon - Ramsay 
is prompted to add an entirely new group of elements to his table: helium followed by a 
gap and then argon. In a way similar to Mendeleev’s earlier predictions of the eka-elements 
Ramsay (1897:380) states his predictions for the missing element between helium and 
argon as, 
 
There should, therefore, be an undiscovered element between helium and argon, 
with an atomic weight of 16 units higher than that of helium, and 20 units lower 
than argon, namely 20. 
 
Susan Haack (1971:41) characterises Peirce’s fallibilist position as follows: ‘we should 
always be willing to revise our beliefs in the light of new evidence’. This statement I believe 
captures Ramsay’s approach to the noble gases in relation to the periodic table. We also 
see Andrews’s earlier hope that the (iconic) periodic table would ‘open up new vistas of 
                                                          
68
 Tellurium and iodine are covered over in the above table by the folded section of the page 
indicated 
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analogy’ being fulfilled in Ramsay’s speculations. By assuming the continuing iconic nature 
of a reconfigured periodic table Ramsay (1897:379) takes the opportunity of ‘indulging in 
the dangerous luxury of prophesy,’ in predicting the atomic weight of a yet undiscovered 
member of the group.  
 
5.5.6 The discovery of neon, krypton and xenon 
By September 1898 Ramsay had discovered neon, krypton and xenon. In a later paper to 
The Royal Society (1901) Ramsay, with Morris Travers, set out in detail the physiochemical 
properties of the first four members of the group we know today as the noble gases. If 
these four noble gases are monatomic, claim Ramsay and Travers (1901:83), ‘they would 
form a group by themselves, Helium (4), Neon (20), Argon (40), Krypton (82), Xenon (128)’. 
At the end of their paper and to illustrate how the noble gases fit into the periodic 
arrangement Ramsay and Travers (1901:89) offer the following graph of atomic volume69 
(vertical axis) plotted against atomic weight (horizontal axis): 
 
Figure 44: Graph of atomic volume against atomic weight for the elements hydrogen to 
caesium  
Source: Ramsay, W and Travers, M. 1901. ‘Argon and Its Companions’. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London. 197 pages 47 and 47 
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 Atomic volume is the volume in cm
3 
occupied by the atomic weight of an element expressed in 
grams – for example the volume occupied by 12g of carbon (3.4 cm
3 
for the allotropic form of 
diamond) 
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Looking at the graph small arrows indicate the noble gases He, Ne, Ar, Kr and Xe. There is a 
general periodic trend: a general increase in atomic volume across a period70 with the alkali 
metals (Li, Na, K, Rb, Cs) occupying the maximum values for their respective periods. 
Ramsay and Travers (1901:88) note that ‘[t]he periodicity of the inactive [noble gas] 
elements is obvious’. It is worth quoting at length Ramsay and Travers’s (1901:89) position 
on the periodic scheme, now enlarged by the noble gases, 
 
[A] study of this arrangement, it must be allowed, is a somewhat tantalising 
pleasure; for, although the properties of elements do undoubtedly vary 
qualitatively, and, indeed, show approximate quantitative relations to their position 
in the periodic table, yet there are inexplicable deviations from regularity, which 
hold forth hopes of the discovery of a still more far-reaching generalization. What 
that generalization may be is yet to be divined; but that it must underlie what is 
known, and must furnish a clue to the explanation of irregularities cannot be 
disputed. 
 
Firstly notice the description of their inquiry into the chemical elements as ‘a somewhat 
tantalizing pleasure’ and how this echoes Peirce’s own judgement of ‘I need not point out 
the tantalising appearance of relations among the atomic weights which are wanting in 
exactitude for this speaks for itself; and the more it is studied the more perplexed it shows 
itself to be’ (MS 693:440, c1900, emphasis added). Also Peirce’s own unsuccessful search 
for an exact mathematical framework to the periodic table, seen in chapter three and again 
later in chapter six, is echoed by Ramsay and Travers above in their observation of the 
approximate relations between the elements and their atomic weights and ‘yet there are 
inexplicable deviations from regularity’. Importantly for this chapter however, is Ramsay 
and Travers’s hope that some ‘still more far-reaching generalization’ – a re-emerged form 
of Mendeleev’s table - ‘must furnish a clue to the explanation of irregularities’; a belief in 
the periodic table’s continuing epistemic fruitfulness – a belief in its continuing iconicity. 
Finally throughout the course of their inquiry into the noble gases and their relation to 
Mendeleev’s periodic table, Ramsay and Travers demonstrate Peirce’s fallibilist 
methodology as captured by Hookway (2003:48): ‘[a]lthough responsible inquirers are 
destined to reach a point at which their opinions will not be disturbed by further inquiry, 
there is never any absolute guarantee that this position has been reached. No matter how 
confident we are that we have the truth, further experience could surprise us’. 
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5.5.7 Mendeleev accepts the noble gases in to his scheme 
It was, as Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent (1986:16) describes, ‘thanks to their sound belief in 
the regular periodic function’ that in 1900 Ramsay and Rayleigh proposed that a new group 
be added to the periodic table – to the left of the first group of alkali metals. During 1900 
Mendeleev and Ramsay met in Berlin where, states Scerri (2007:156), Mendeleev received 
the noble gases as a new group within the periodic table ‘favourably’. Two years later 
Mendeleev (1902:30) writes that ‘a zero group of chemically inactive elements must now 
be recognised’ which he attributes to ‘Ramsay’s exemplary researches’. The 1901 English 
edition of Principles of Chemistry omitted the noble gases but as Masanori Kaji (2002:12) 
states, by the seventh edition of 1902-1903 Mendeleev had abandoned N3 and fully 
accepted the noble gases’. Thus by the beginning of the twentieth century Mendeleev had 
accepted the noble gases as part of his periodic scheme, as shown below: 
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This short form of the table is from 
Mendeleev’s Russian 1903 edition 
Principles of Chemistry and is 
headed Periodic system of the 
elements by groups and series.  
 
The five noble gases have been 
added as ‘Group 0’ to the extreme 
left-hand side of the table. 
Mendeleev has now dropped his 
objection to argon as being tri-
nitrogen.  
 
Interestingly though to avoid 
further atomic weight inversions 
Mendeleev states argon – 
positioned between chlorine 
(35.45) and potassium (39.1) – to 
have an atomic weight of 38. For 
Mendeleev believed that further 
inquiries into atomic weights 
would remove all inversions.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 45: Mendeleev’s periodic table of 1903 
Source: Persistence and Periodicity: a study of Mendeleev’s contribution to the Foundations 
of Chemistry by John Russel Smith, PhD thesis Chelsea College, University of London 1976, 
page 279 
 
Writing in An Attempt Towards a Chemical Composition of the Ether (1904) Mendeleev 
(1904:19) explains that, ‘many reasons that induced me to accept firstly argon as an 
element…[chiefly]…the density of argon is certainly much below 21, namely about 
19…while the density of N3 would be about 21’. The further discovery of more chemically 
inactive noble gases supported by spectral evidence, as well as their gradation in physical 
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properties with atomic weight, also helped to convinced Mendeleev of this new group of 
elements. Having finally accepted the noble gases Mendeleev (1904:22) states their 
accommodation within his scheme to be ‘a critical test for the periodic law’ claiming that it 
‘stood the test with perfect success’, a view also endorsed by Peirce in stating, ‘the 
classification of the elements has been laid bare [for all to see], the group of helium-argon 
elements has been added’ (CP 8.196, 1905). Taking up these words, in passing this ‘critical 
test’ nature’s resistance was overcome whereby ‘the group of helium-argon elements has 
been added’ to Mendeleev’s scheme; the periodic table again has demonstrated its iconic 
robustness.  
 
5.6 Conclusion  
Using the two case studies of the rare earth and the noble gas elements, I have attempted 
to argue a case for the iconic robustness of the periodic table. This in conjunction with 
Peirce’s fallibilism and Chang’s account of resistance to nature as featured in his account of 
active realism. I would claim that the periodic table demonstrated iconic robustness by 
retaining its capacity to promote thought experiments and to generate new knowledge 
whilst undergoing structural changes in response to nature’s resistance in the form of new 
and existing sets of elements. 
 
Mendeleev recognises the rare earths as a natural group of elements but is initially unsure 
where to place them within his scheme. These elements might be thought of as nature or 
reality resisting or pushing back against Mendeleev’s scheme. He settles initially for a block 
at the bottom of his ‘long form’ table of 1869. By adopting a fallibilist approach Mendeleev 
accepts his scheme is not completely fixed. Through a process of reasoning, integrated with 
and dependent on the iconicity of the periodic table, Mendeleev conducts a number of 
thought experiments which entail significant changes in the structure of his table. 
Nevertheless, new knowledge continues to be generated such as the revised atomic weight 
for cerium. Thus the periodic table continues to prove fruitful, demonstrating its iconic 
robustness by pushing back against nature’s resistance - the rare earth elements. The 
scheme was able to accommodate these novel substances whilst also indicating new 
relations between the chemical elements.  
 
In Chang’s (2012a:215) terms Ramsay and Travers were successful in revealing the family of 
noble gases because ultimately, ‘nature or reality [did] not prevent what [they] were trying 
to achieve’. I have argued that Mendeleev did not adopt a fallibilist approach to the noble 
gases in relation to their eventual placement in his scheme. By contrast Ramsay and Travers 
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took a more fallibilist line. Whilst unable to formulate a mathematical expression, one 
based on the order of the elements within the periodic table, to predict the atomic weights 
of the noble gases Ramsay and Travers (1901:89) state that whilst, ‘[i]t is possible that such 
expressions exist…[we]...hope that others, more mathematically gifted than we are, may 
succeed where we have failed’. In this expression of their hope Ramsay and Travers capture 
an aspect of Peirce’s fallibilism in that there is never any absolute guarantee of the end of 
an inquiry, for further experience could surprise us. During this particular inquiry the 
periodic table as an iconic representation showed itself, in Peirce’s words, to be ‘plastic 
[and] applicable’ (MS 693) and able to overcome nature’s resistance as presented in the 
discovery of the noble gases. In arguing for the noble gases as monatomic elements from 
which their individual atomic weights might be assigned, Ramsay and Travers (1901:83) 
generated this knowledge through a process of reasoning with the periodic table and 
arguing that ‘they form a group in themselves’. By embracing this novel group of elements 
into its structure the periodic table again demonstrates its iconic robustness: the continuing 
capacity to generate knowledge of novel relations between the chemical elements without 
being thwarted by nature’s resistance and within the context of a fallible inquiry.  
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Chapter Six  
The Periodic Table: iconicity as an alternative view from practice 
to the debate around accommodation and prediction. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will argue that taking the periodic table as an iconic sign, with a focus on 
Mendeleev’s practice of representing, offers a new insight into its epistemology: one that 
moves beyond the debate around whether the prediction of new elements had a greater 
impact on the chemical community than the accommodation of exiting elements (Brush 
1996, Maher 1988, Scerri and Worrall 2001). This project has already brought together 
aspects from the ‘accommodation’ and ‘prediction’ sides of this debate. In chapter four I 
presented Mendeleev’s periodic table as an iconic sign which might be broadly 
characterised within the terms ‘accommodation’ and ‘prediction’. Firstly Mendeleev’s table 
represented the physiochemical relations of the existing elements accommodated within 
the scheme. Secondly the periodic table proved to be epistemically fruitful in pointing 
towards predicting new relations – new knowledge - such as revised atomic weights and 
novel elements. In addition chapter five introduced iconic robustness, an attempt to 
capture the periodic table’s continuing iconic fruitfulness – its ability to predict – against 
nature’s resistance to the pattern of relations between elements accommodated within the 
scheme. 
 
The philosopher David Harker (2008:429) surveys the landscape of this long-running debate 
in the philosophy of science as follows: 
 
Scientific theories are developed in response to a certain set of phenomena and 
subsequently evaluated, at least partially, in terms of the quality of fit between 
those same theories and appropriately distinctive phenomena. To differentiate 
between these two stages it is popular to describe the former as involving the 
accommodation of data and the latter as involving the prediction of data. 
 
The debate centres on whether a particular scientific theory is better supported by the 
successful prediction of previously unknown facts or by accommodating data available at 
the time. This is a long-standing (Musgrave 1974) and somewhat polarised debate where, 
as Harker (2008:444) states, ‘examples and counterexamples fuel, but don’t settle, the 
debates’. The periodic table has featured often in these conversations (Scerri and Worrall 
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2001). Nevertheless the attendant claims and counter-claims fail to capture a coherent 
view of Mendeleev’s practice – the heuristic aspects of his creative inquiry. Rather than use 
this project to enter one or other side of the debate I should like to take together some of 
the arguments used by the various protagonists to gain an insight into Mendeleev’s 
representational practice and in that respect to go beyond the current debate. In support of 
this approach I will draw on some of the ideas developed around representational practice 
by the philosopher of science Andrea Woody (2004 and 2014) and set within the 
framework of Peirce’s iconicity. 
 
In her analysis of representational practice Woody (2004:782) claims that, ‘the ultimate aim 
of most representational practices is to achieve an articulated awareness of the nature of 
the objects and relations constituting that particular domain’ (emphasis in the original). 
Marion Vorms (2010:551) elucidates Woody’s point as follows, 
 
[B]ecoming an expert consists in acquiring an “articulated awareness” of the 
representations used in [a particular] field’. The more expert you are, the more 
easily you draw inferences with these representations. Moreover, in addition to 
solving problems more quickly, the expert has a deeper understanding of the very 
content of theories, namely of the deductive relationships between the various 
hypotheses this theory consists in. 
 
 
Following Vorms’s sequence, Mendeleev’s articulated awareness of the physiochemical 
relations between the chemical elements is manifested in two ways. Firstly he was able to 
use the periodic table to draw inferences, such as projecting the properties of novel 
elements; the periodic table’s predictive capacity. Secondly, Mendeleev by devising his 
scheme demonstrates a deep understanding of the physiochemical relations between the 
chemical elements and the possibilities this offers for inferential thought. I will show that 
Mendeleev achieved an articulated awareness of the relations between the chemical 
elements through his practice of representation, engaging via the iconic periodic table with 
aspects sometimes listed separately under the headings of ‘accommodation’ and 
‘prediction’.  
 
By representing the physiochemical relations between the chemical elements in the form of 
a table, Mendeleev was providing what Woody (204:782) describes as, ‘structure to the 
inferential landscape, enabling the otherwise daunting task of mapping some domain of 
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knowledge’. Mendeleev’s representational practice mapped the relations between the 
chemical elements – the ‘inferential landscape’ - as the periodic table. I will argue that 
approaching Mendeleev’s practice through the lens of Peirce’s theory of iconicity sets out 
how he developed an articulated awareness of the relations between the chemical 
elements. Such an approach cuts across the two categories of ‘accommodation’ and 
‘prediction’ by bringing them together within a single approach and offers a novel insight 
into the periodic table’s epistemology.  In her re-examination of the periodic law Woody 
(2014:126) stresses the value of, ‘highlighting an aspect of practice that has been curiously 
neglected: namely, the explicit representational choices made in expressing the periodic 
law’. Our approach here focusses on Mendeleev’s representational choice in depicting the 
periodic law in diagrammatic form as the periodic table. Other inquirers made different 
choices – Lothar Meyer for example displayed the relations between the chemical elements 
in one form as a graph of atomic volume plotted against atomic weight. In her study of 
representation Vorms (2011:287) argues that, ‘if one takes seriously the idea that a study of 
theorising has to concentrate on the concrete practices of scientists…one has to focus on 
the cognitive interactions between agents and the representational devices they reason 
with and manipulate’. In this chapter I focus on Mendeleev’s practice of representing as the 
means by which he engaged with his ‘representational device – the periodic table - in order 
to understand the relations between the chemical elements. To begin with, however, it 
would be useful to set out aspects of the discussion around ‘accommodation’ and 
‘prediction’ to be found in the literature. 
 
6.2 Prediction and accommodation  
The epistemic value placed on predictive power has featured in the philosophy of science 
since early times. For example Alan Musgrave (1974:1) notes that the early seventeenth 
century Jesuit mathematician and astronomer Christopher Clavius argued in favour of 
Ptolemaic astronomy on the grounds that, 'not only are all the appearances already known 
accounted for, but also future phenomena are predicted'. As part of his historical survey of 
what he terms the Logical versus Historical Theories of Confirmation, Musgrave (1974:2) 
records the nineteenth century debate between William Whewell and John Stuart Mill, 
 
Mill [was]amazed at Whewell's view that 'an hypothesis [...] is entitled to a more 
favourable reception, if besides accounting for all the facts previously known, it has 
led to the anticipation and prediction of others which experience afterwards 
verified. Such predictions and their fulfilment are, indeed, well calculated to 
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impress the uninformed [...] But it is strange that any considerable stress should be 
laid upon such a coincidence by persons of scientific attainments. 
 
In his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Whewell (1840:62) argues that a successful 
hypothesis whilst explaining known phenomena should go beyond this and, ‘foretell 
phenomena which have not yet been observed’ (emphasis in the original). In Whewell’s 
(1840:63) account, a successful hypothesis will both correctly explain current phenomena 
and ‘predict the results of new combinations’; both being necessary as the means by which 
the hypothesis is ‘verified as right and proper’. In support of his argument Whewell 
(1840:64) offers Lavoisier’s ‘Oxygen Theory’, which whilst able to accommodate the results 
from known reactions such as hydrogen with oxygen or steam with iron, also ‘enabled 
chemists to foresee such facts in untried cases’ (emphasis in the original). It was to 
Whewell’s emphasis on the importance of such predictions that Mill objects in the earlier 
quotation. In the Logic of Science, Mill (1882:356) argues against Whewell’s position 
whereby, ‘the coincidence of results predicted from  an hypothesis with facts afterward 
observed, amounts to conclusive proof of the truth of the theory’. In chapter 2 we saw how 
Peirce opposed Mill’s argument for inductive reasoning. Peirce’s preference for Whewell’s 
approach is clear when he states, ‘Whewell's views of scientific method seem to me truer 
than Mill's’ (CP 1.404). Writing after all three eka-elements became known, Peirce uses the 
success of their predictions as an endorsement of Mendeleev’s scheme when he states, 
[t]he discoveries of Gallium, Germanium, and Scandium have proved that there is some 
truth in one part of Mendeléef's theory’ (EP2:111, 1901).  
 
The philosopher of science Carl Hempel (2013:428) argues, ‘it is highly desirable for a 
scientific hypothesis to be confirmed also by “new” evidence – by facts that were not 
known or taken into account when the hypothesis was formulated’. To demonstrate a 
theory justified by the discovery of new phenomena Hempel chooses the Balmer formula 
for the line emission spectra of hydrogen. In 1885 the Swiss school teacher J. J. Balmer 
(1825-1898) calculated that the wavelengths (λ) of the four lines in the hydrogen spectra – 
named alpha, beta, gamma and delta – corresponded closely to the following formula, 
where n has values of 3, 4, 5 and 6 and b is a constant.  
 
As Hempel explains, Balmer derived his formula from the four lines in the hydrogen spectra 
of which he had prior knowledge of. Further investigations revealed a total of thirty-five 
lines in the spectra, all of which agreed well with Balmer’s formula. Whilst the additional 
201 
 
thirty-one lines might be said to offer confirmatory evidence for Balmer’s formula, Hempel 
(2013:429) asks ‘a puzzling question’: what if ‘Balmer’s formula had been constructed only 
after all the 35 lines now recorded in the series had been fully measured’? In this fictitious 
case would the Balmer formula be less well confirmed being derived from thirty-five data 
points compared to being formulated on the basis of four known lines and subsequently 
confirmed by thirty-one subsequent findings? The difference between the two cases rests 
on the historical order in which the findings were made – four before Balmer’s formulation 
of his formula and thirty-one after. But if confirmation is considered in terms of how the 
evidence ‘fits’ with the theory then why should the historical sequence by which the 
evidence is accumulated matter? On what basis if any should later successful predictions be 
counted as offering greater confirmatory weight than the successful accommodation of the 
data points a particular hypothesis was founded on?  
 
There is a parallel here with Mendeleev’s periodic table. The original table of 1869 was 
constructed using the atomic weights and chemical properties of sixty two known 
elements. The three eka-elements once discovered conformed to Mendeleev’s 
arrangement. So too the thirty-four spectral lines in hydrogen emission spectra later 
conformed to the Balmer formula. In the case of Mendeleev’s periodic table, to what 
extent if any, should the successful prediction of the three eka-element lend greater 
confirmatory weight compared to the accommodation of the original sixty-two (later sixty-
five) elements? The confirming advantage of data discovered after the hypothesis argues 
Hempel (2013:429) is that whilst for ‘any set of quantitative data, it is possible to construct 
a hypothesis that covers them… [w]hat is remarkable, and does lend weight to a 
hypothesis, is its fitting “new” cases’ (emphasis in the original). From this perspective data 
unknown at the time, but subsequently found to agree with a particular hypothesis, might 
be taken as successful tests of the original hypothesis. The thirty-four spectral lines 
discovered after Balmer proposed his formula as well as Mendeleev’s three successful eka-
predictions can from this perspective be seen as successful confirmatory tests of their 
respective hypothesis.  
 
A case against the predictive thesis is offered by Laura Snyder (1998:460) when she argues 
that whilst our ‘‘intuition’ that ‘predictions of new phenomena are extremely impressive 
and seem to endow scientists with a kind of mystical power to foretell the future’, this is 
not the way scientists use evidence. Scientists, argues Snyder (1998:467), use evidence ‘in 
the impersonal sense’… 
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‘When a scientist publishes experimental results, claiming that these constitute 
evidence for a certain theory, she is not claiming merely that these results 
constitute her personal (factual or normative) reason for believing the theory. 
Rather, the scientist is claiming that the results constitute a reason—a reason for 
anyone—to believe the theory'. 
 
Snyder (1998:469) associates this impersonal use of evidence with what she describes as 
the ‘Objective Concept of Evidence: whether e is evidence for h [hypothesis] does not 
depend upon anyone’s beliefs or knowledge about e, h, or anything else. Hence if some e is 
evidence for h, it is so regardless of what any person knows or believes’. By way of 
illustration Snyder considers the case of a person suffering an outbreak of spots of a 
particular kind. This is evidence for a case of measles – even if no one has seen the spots. 
That is to say no one knows that the evidence is true. On the basis of Snyder’s objective 
concept of evidence, even if no one ever gets to know of the spots, they remain as evidence 
for a case of measles. Thus if the evidence need not be known in order to confirm the 
hypothesis – ‘a case of measles’ – then, as Snyder (1998:470) argues, [c]learly if e 
[evidence] does not need to be known in order to confirm h [hypothesis], then it makes no 
sense to require that it must be known either before or after h is invented, in order to 
confirm it’. Balmer based his formula on the known wavelengths of four lines in the 
hydrogen spectrum. A further thirty-one lines were subsequently found with wavelengths 
that agreed with his formula. From Snyder’s perspective, whether the spectral data was 
known before or after Balmer proposed his formula, is irrelevant to whether the data is 
evidence for his hypothesis. For as Snyder (1998:477) concludes in ‘paraphrasing Gertrude 
Stein: “evidence is evidence is evidence”. The time at which some information is known 
relative to the forming of a theory is as relevant to its evidential value as is the time of day a 
rose is smelled to its status of being a rose’. The economist John Maynard Keynes 
(1921:349) captures this point when he states71, 
 
The particular virtue of prediction or predesignation is altogether imaginary. The 
number of instances examined and the analogy between them are the essential 
points, and the question as to whether a particular hypothesis happens to be 
propounded before or after their examination is quite irrelevant.   
 
                                                          
71
 Cited in Achinstein (1998:491) 
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Applying both Keynes and Snyder’s objective stance on evidence to the periodic table, it is 
the combination of Mendeleev’s prior knowledge of sixty or so existing elements, taken 
together with the three eka-elements, that lends weight to his scheme. That is to say 
evidence taken as a whole and independent of before or after the scheme was proposed. 
Chang (2016:89) concedes that ‘it is quite difficult to argue against the general point voiced 
by Snyder, Mill and Keynes’, citing sciences such as geology and cosmology which offer little 
in the way of testable novel predictions. Nevertheless, whilst agreeing that novelty is 
valuable because of its independence from the evidence used in formulating the original 
hypothesis, Chang (2016:91) concludes: ‘Novel prediction is not the only way to achieve 
variety of evidence; it is merely a very striking way’.  
 
6.3 The accommodation-prediction debate and the periodic table 
This section focusses on how the periodic table appears in this debate. A number of 
scholars have used Mendeleev’s periodic table to argue the relative epistemic merits of 
prediction of unknown facts versus accommodation of known facts, (Maher, 1988; Lipton, 
1991; Scerri & Worrall,2001; Akeroyd, 2003; Brush, 2007; Scerri, 2007). One of the main 
purposes of this chapter is to argue that taking the periodic table as an iconic sign offers an 
alternative epistemological perspective by bringing together arguments often separated by 
the polarising nature of the accommodation-prediction debates. This further develops the 
case made in chapter six where the iconic robustness of the periodic table was argued in 
terms of its fruitful capacity to promote thought experiments whilst also undergoing 
reconfigurations in response to new elements as well as to various false predictions – that 
is against Nature’s resistance or kickback. The iconic robustness of the periodic table 
combines the table’s capacity to accommodate in terms of novel elements – nature’s 
resistance – as well as its capacity to generate new knowledge. It will be helpful to begin by 
summarising some of the detail of the recent contributions to the ‘accommodation-
prediction’ debate as it applies to the periodic table.  
 
6.3.1 Mendeleev’s periodic table: the case for novel predictions. 
A novel prediction relates to phenomena unknown at the time of the prediction – such as 
Mendeleev’s three eka-elements. The significance of novel predictions was expressed by 
Imre Lakatos (1978:114) in stating that it is, ‘the successful predictions of novel facts which 
constitute serious evidence for a research programme’. The reaction of nineteenth century 
chemists to Mendeleev’s periodic table in the light of his novel predictions can be gauged 
by looking at its treatment in chemistry texts of that period. The first of Mendeleev’s three 
eka-elements to be discovered was gallium (eka-aluminium) in 1871 by Paul Emile Lecoq de 
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Boisbaudran. The chemist Adolphe Wurtz (1880:155) in his influential text The Atomic 
Theory (1880), published before the remaining eka-elements were known72, comments on 
de Boisbaudran’s discovery as ‘a remarkable fact that one of these gaps [the eka-elements] 
has since been filled up’. Although Wurtz (1880:155) describes Mendeleev’s periodic table 
as a ‘synthesis’ and ‘a powerful one’ he nevertheless remains cautious. In pointing out that 
there is a generally periodic relationship between physiochemical properties and atomic 
weight, he notes that the change in atomic weight across a period is irregular and variation 
in property is not related to this difference – something that also frustrated Peirce. It is 
Wurtz’s (1880:162) view that both these factors present ‘real difficulties’ for Mendeleev’s 
system. Other difficulties include elements such as copper and nickel, with near identical 
atomic weights, which suggest the impossibility of providing gaps for unknown elements 
with atomic weights close to known elements. Finally returning to the discovery of 
Mendeleev’s eka-element gallium, Wurtz (1880:163) notes the atomic weight as 
determined by de Boisbaudran ‘is sensibly different to that which was predicted by 
Mendelejeff’. What Wurtz does not comment on is that de Boisbaudran noted Mendeleev’s 
predicted density for what was now known to be gallium at 5.9 or 6.0, but as the historian 
Stephen Brush (1996:604) notes, on redetermination corrected his original density from 4.7 
to 5.935 thereby confirming Mendeleev’s predicted value. Towards the end of the 
nineteenth century and after the successful discovery of the two remaining eka-elements, 
the historian of chemistry F.P. Venable (1896:107) claims that whilst the periodic law 
attracted the attention of chemists at the time, ‘it was only the lucky discovery of some 
new elements, thus fulfilling certain predictions of Mendeleeff, that brought it prominently 
before the chemical world’.  
 
The importance of Mendeleev’s successful predictions in bringing the periodic table 
‘prominently before the chemical world’ is supported by Stephen Brush’s (1996:617) 
extensive research into the reception of Mendeleev’s periodic table by ‘spending 
considerable time perusing the crumbling pages of late nineteenth-century chemistry 
journals and textbooks’ and having confirmed , ‘Mendeleev's periodic law attracted little 
attention (at least in America and Britain) until chemists started to discover some of the 
elements needed to fill gaps in his table and found that their properties were remarkably 
similar to those he had predicted’. Writing more recently Brush (2015:167) concludes that 
there were three reasons for the acceptance of Mendeleev’s periodic law and in order of 
importance, 
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 Scandium (eka-boron) 1879 and germanium (eka-silicon) 1886 
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1. it accurately describes the correlation between physicochemical properties and 
atomic weights of nearly all known elements; 
2. it has led to useful corrections in the atomic weights of several elements and has 
helped to resolve controversies such as those about beryllium; 
3. it has yielded successful predictions of the existence and properties of new 
elements. 
 
Brush’s conclusion here is that whilst Mendeleev’s successful predictions were important – 
particularly in bringing the periodic law to the attention of chemists at the time – the 
successful accommodation of existing data was of greater importance in establishing the 
law’s acceptance.  
 
In his book Inference to the Best Explanation, Peter Lipton describes how the case for 
accommodation rests on a hypothesis being formulated to fit pre-existing evidence. A 
successful prediction is deduced and verified by observation after the theory has been 
constructed. Whilst Lipton (2004:165) argues that most people are ‘more impressed by 
predictions than accommodations’, he offers no evidence for what might be described as 
the psychological attraction of predictive effects. Lipton (2004:165) cites Mendeleev to 
support his predictive thesis: ‘when Mendeleev produced a theory of the periodic table that 
accounted for all sixty73 known elements, the scientific community was only mildly 
impressed. When he went on to use his theory to predict the existence of two unknown 
elements that were then independently detected, the Royal Society awarded him its Davy 
Medal’. The two unknown elements were gallium in 1875 (eka-aluminium) and scandium in 
1879 (eka-boron). The Davy Medal (1882) was shared between Mendeleev and Julius 
Lothar Meyer. Lipton (2004:165) considers the decider for the award as being ‘sixty 
accommodations paled next to two predictions’ – although he offers no historical evidence 
to support why these two successful predictions were so significant to chemists at the time. 
It could also be argued that the correct placing of gallium and scandium into the periodic 
table gave an additional two accommodations thereby further securing the validity of 
Mendeleev’s claims. 
 
The predictivist argument is also advanced by Patrick Maher who uses Mendeleev to 
support his case. Here Maher (1988:275) argues that, ‘if scientists accord no special 
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 There were in fact sixty two known elements at this time 
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confirmatory value to predictions, then it is quite inexplicable why their confidence in 
Mendeleyev's predictions should have increased substantially after one or two of those 
predictions had been verified’. Both Lipton and Maher stress that the acceptance of the 
periodic table was due to chemists being convinced by the verification of Mendeleev’s 
predictions and not the accommodation of new and previously existing elements.  
 
From his extensive research of nineteenth century chemistry books Brush (1996:609) 
rejects Lipton and Maher’s emphasis on prediction in that ‘unfortunately, [they] give no 
documentation for their proposition’. Nonetheless Brush (1996:609) does not dismiss the 
value of the predictive support offered by the discovery of new elements, as ‘many 
chemists did give some credit for novelty’ but ‘not thirty-one times as much!’ There is no 
attempt to deny that Mendeleev’s successful predictions played an important role – what 
Eric Scerri and John Worrall (2001:410) in their extensive paper ‘Prediction and the Periodic 
Table’ describe as the ‘special psychological effect’ on chemists at the time. Such an effect 
would have raised the profile of Mendeleev and his periodic table.  
 
The case of the Davy Medal is a point of contention for scholars. The citation to the award 
reads74, ‘for their discovery of the periodic relations of the atomic elements’ – with no 
mention of successful predictions. Lothar Meyer’s work focussed not on predictions but on 
Avogadro’s hypothesis, atomic weights and atomic volumes; he made no predictions. Both 
Mendeleev and Lothar Meyer produced very similar versions of the periodic table with only 
Mendeleev leaving gaps for future discoveries. If predictive success was important to the 
Society, then why include Lothar Meyer? These inconsistencies, in the opinion of Scerri and 
Worrall (2001:416), ‘pose a problem for the predictivists’. They point out that the citation 
emphasises the value of Mendeleev and Lothar Meyer’s classification of the elements ‘in 
the empirical order of their atomic weights’ and for the ‘marvellous regularity’ their 
arranging of the elements gave. The only tilt towards prediction might be taken from the 
closing lines: ‘this periodic series not only enables us to see clearly much that we could not 
see before; it also raises new difficulties, and points to many problems which need 
investigation’. It is the view of Scerri and Worrall (2001:417) that the wording of the 
citation is an embarrassment ‘for those defending the story about the crucial role of the 
new elements’.  
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A number of scholars responded to Scerri and Worrall’s paper. The absence of any 
reference to prediction, replied Michael Akeroyd (2003), was due to the Society’s sensitivity 
towards a priority dispute that existed between Mendeleev and Lothar Meyer. In addition 
Mendeleev was thought to be critical of Meyer for, as Akeroyd (2003:341) describes, not 
fully comprehending ‘the deeper meaning of the periodic system’. The absence of any 
mention of ‘predictive success’ is presented as the Society’s desire to ameliorate any ill 
feeling existing between Mendeleev and Meyer – what Akeroyd (2003:341) describes as the 
‘social factors’ at work. Also in response to Scerri and Worrall (2001), Eric Barnes 
(2005:808) claimed that ‘the historical facts demonstrate the truth of predictivism’ and that 
‘the success of a comparatively small number of predictions’ culminated ‘in Mendeleev’s 
receipt of the Davy Medal by the Royal Society in 1882’. Again no evidence is offered - 
Barnes appears to assume the Society’s motives in privileging predictive success. It is 
difficult to reconcile Akeroyd and Barne’s position to the Society’s celebration of 
‘marvellous regularity’ as stated in the citation. If we are to take the wording at face value 
then, as Brush (1996:609) makes clear, ‘the Davy Medal was awarded for accommodation, 
not for prediction.’  
 
The periodic table was the subject of a long-running priority dispute between Lothar Meyer 
and Mendeleev. In his account of this conflict, the Mendeleev scholar Michael Gordin 
(2015:76) argues that the Royal Society by awarding the Davy Medal jointly was seeking to 
bring the dispute to an end by acting as a ‘nonpartisan national organization opting for a 
middle path’ thereby seeming ‘to codify a consensus developing even among nationally 
committed observers’, the consensus being that the credit for the periodic table was due to 
both Lothar Meyer and Mendeleev. It is Gordin’s (2015:76) view that the royal Society’s 
decision ‘seemed to have calmed matters considerably’ and quotes Lothar Meyer’s 
associate, Karl Seubert, describing this as ‘a most just and beautiful decision’.  
 
6.3.2 The case for accommodation 
The focus of this section is on the accommodation of elements known at the time of 
Mendeleev’s first periodic table (1869). This account will also include the accommodation 
of the noble gases. As set out earlier in chapter five, the unreactive gases argon and 
helium75 were isolated by Sir William Ramsay in 1895 - the first members of a family of 
elements later to be known as the inert gases. The lack of chemical reactivity made these 
gases difficult to characterise. Furthermore there were no gaps for them in the periodic 
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 Helium had been previously discovered in 1868 and before Mendeleev first periodic table in 1869, 
by Pierre Janssen during a spectral analysis of a solar eclipse. (Nath (2013:257)) 
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table – they were not one of Mendeleev’s predictions – and so needed to be 
accommodated within his scheme.  The atomic weights of helium (4) and argon (40) were 
later assigned by Ramsay and Lord Rayleigh. Positioning argon into Mendeleev’s scheme 
proved to be particularly difficult. With an atomic weight of forty, argon should have been 
placed between potassium in the first group and calcium in the second – but there was no 
position available. Mendeleev, much distressed as the whole edifice of his scheme became 
threatened, suggested that argon was not a new element but a triatomic form of nitrogen, 
N3. It was, as Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent (1986:16) describes, ‘thanks to their sound 
belief in the regular periodic function’ that in 1900 Ramsay and Rayleigh proposed that a 
new group be added to the periodic table – to the left of the first group of alkali metals. 
They left a gap below helium and above argon for an element yet to be discovered (later 
neon) and were obliged to accept the irregularity of atomic weight sequence: Ar (40), K 
(39.1), Ca (40).  This has all the hallmarks of Peter Lipton’s (2004) criticism of 
accommodation - ‘fudging’ - where new information is made to fit in with a particular 
hypothesis. This new family of elements was named group 0. Ramsay and Rayleigh’s 
boldness (their ‘fudging’) was repaid as other inert gas elements such neon and xenon76 
were later isolated and took up their allocated positions within the new group. 
Mendeleev’s scheme was shown to accommodate this new group of elements successfully. 
 
It is worth mentioning at this point that Mendeleev accepted the noble gases into his 
periodic scheme as group 0, as can be seen from this copy of the periodic table printed in 
the third edition (1902) of his Principles of Chemistry: 
  
                                                          
76
 Neon was discovered in 1898 by Sir William Ramsay and Morris Travers, shortly after their 
discovery krypton (Wolfenden (1969:572)) 
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Whilst Mendeleev accepted this 
arrangement, he resisted for some time 
the addition of the new group of noble 
gases. One reason for this resistance, 
Bensaude-Vincent (1986:16) argues, is 
that the earlier and more symmetrical 
arrangement of reactive alkali metals and 
halogens at either side of the system was 
‘disturbed by the group of inert gases’. 
 
Note that Mendeleev sets the atomic 
weight of argon at 38 and not 40 as 
determined by Lord Rayleigh and Ramsey 
(1895). With an atomic weight of 38, 
argon does not disrupt the numerical 
sequence passing from chlorine (35.45) to 
potassium (39.1). 
 
 
Figure 46: Mendeleev’s periodic table of 1902 
Source: Jensen, W. 2002. Mendeleev on the Periodic Law: Selected Writings, 1869–1905. 
Dover Publications, Mineola, NY. page 248 
 
In placing the inert gases, Ramsay and Rayleigh had both accommodated the new elements 
and predicted the existence of one yet to be discovered – neon. The practice of these two 
scientists – their method of practical inquiry – encompassed both the predictive and 
accommodation processes and was driven in part by their belief in and commitment to 
Mendeleev’s system. By its part in Ramsay and Rayleigh’s project the periodic table 
demonstrated its iconicity in pointing towards a novel element (neon). We see too the 
periodic table’s iconic robustness as it flexes and pushes back against nature’s resistance in 
the form of this newly discovered element, an element without a prearranged place in 
Mendeleev’s table. I believe this particular episode in the history of Mendeleev’s scheme 
illustrates the shortcomings of arguments that attempt to polarise methods of theory 
construction along one or other approach, a point emphasised by Scerri and Worrall 
(2001:447) when they write that there is ‘again no support in the historical record for the 
idea that the prediction of neon played any particularly ‘crucial’ role here or that it counted 
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for any more than the ‘accommodation’ of argon—if anything, the contrary’. In their view 
the accommodation of the noble gases casts great doubt on any serious distinction 
between accommodation and prediction. As we will see later, taking the periodic table as 
an iconic sign draws together the detail offered by these two positions as a single account, 
without the need for drawing a distinction in their epistemic value. 
 
One final point on the case of the noble gases: Mendeleev’s resistance to accepting these 
particular novel elements into his scheme shows how the format of his representation of 
the relations between the chemical elements affected his thought processes. For example 
the very nature of what it meant to Mendeleev to accept argon as an element into his 
scheme was directed by his conception of how the table should be constructed. As Andrea 
Woody (2014:137) argues, for Mendeleev ‘[c]ertain possibilities seem almost preordained, 
while to recognize others, even as possibilities, strains tremendously against intuitions 
cultivated by the representational tools we habitually employ’. 
 
The accommodation of all new elements did not always follow this successful path. For 
example the rare earth ytterbium was first isolated in 1878 and positioned into the table in 
1881 and some four years before the addition of germanium. Mendeleev could 
accommodate ytterbium (atomic weight 178) only by removing erbium and its place 
allocated to ytterbium. Mendeleev attempted to reclassify the atomic weight of erbium at 
178 in order that it might fit his table one space to the right of ytterbium. This value was 
contested by some of his contemporaries. Also erbium sat uneasily in this new position in 
relation to zirconium. Copies of the periodic table dated 1871 include erbium but it has 
disappeared ten years later in 1881 - a ‘Lipton fudge’! Between 1878 and 1882 Mendeleev 
was successful in predicting the existence of gallium and scandium which both fitted neatly 
into his scheme as well as positioning ytterbium. At the same time during these five years it 
proved impossible to accommodate five rare earth elements: erbium, gadolinium, 
holmium, thulium and samarium. That is to say three successes and five failures in the 
space of five years. It is Akeroyd’s (2003:349) opinion that, ‘the detailed successful 
predictions of the properties of gallium and scandium were essential to counterbalance the 
discovery of the rare earths’. These failures in accommodation were outweighed by the 
earlier predictive successes to such a degree that, Akeroyd (2003:349) argues, had 
Mendeleev proposed his original table as late as 1878 then ‘it would never have achieved 
any theoretical respectability’. The rare earths presented this problem due to the very slight 
differences in their atomic weights and similar chemical properties.  
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The philosophical debate around the relative significance of prediction over 
accommodation will no doubt continue both for the case of Mendeleev’s periodic table and 
for scientific laws in general. Scerri and Worrall (2001:410) conclude that, 
 
There is no real sign of a ‘dramatically altered attitude’ towards Mendeleev’s table 
and its underpinnings between, say, 1871 and 1874; there seems instead to have 
been a gradual process of diffusion and ‘acceptance’ (though this term too hides 
important complexities)—a process in which certain ‘corrections’ of previously 
accepted ‘data’ (about atomic weights of known elements) and certain 
‘accommodations’ of already known evidence played equally significant roles 
alongside the predictive successes. 
 
The accommodation of a number of elements into Mendeleev’s scheme was only made 
possible by him ‘correcting’ the values for their atomic weights. This was not particularly 
unusual as values were occasionally subject to revision at that time. One such ‘correction’ 
was made to beryllium which up to that time had an atomic weight of either 9 or 14. 
Mendeleev assigned its value at 9 in order that it would fit into the second group of his 
table with a valency of two.  
 
An interesting point arises here in how Mendeleev projected new knowledge on the basis 
of the periodic table. In what sense is correcting the atomic weight of a known element 
different from predicting the atomic weight of an element yet to be discovered? It is 
Brush’s (1996:599) view that Mendeleev’s predictions of the properties of previously 
unknown elements as well as his corrections to existing atomic weights should both be 
considered as ‘novel predictions’. To differentiate between correcting incorrect data such 
as atomic weight from giving a property of a previously unknown element Brush (1996:600) 
introduces the term ‘contraprediction’. Mendeleev made a number of successful 
contrapredictions, including the atomic weights of yttrium, cerium and uranium, which 
ensured that these elements were accommodated within his scheme. These values were 
later corroborated independently.  
 
Brush (1996:600) notes the position of a number of philosophers of science that, ‘a 
prediction based on a new hypothesis should disagree with what one would expect on the 
basis of the knowledge available before the hypothesis was proposed’. On this basis, in the 
discussion of contrapredictions – such as correcting the atomic weight of uranium from 120 
to 240 – Brush (1996:600) takes this further in arguing, ‘that if successful novel predictions 
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are better evidence than retrodictions, successful contrapredictions are better yet’. Quite 
why correcting the atomic weight of say beryllium from 14 to 9 is better evidence for the 
acceptance of the periodic table than predicting the atomic weight of eka-boron (later 
scandium) at 44 Brush does not say.  Nonetheless Brush (1996:600) is clear in his view that 
contrapredictions, ‘cast doubt on the orthodox view that theories are tested by 
observations’. This is because such earlier observations as the atomic weight of beryllium as 
14, ‘themselves are subject to test by contrapredictions’. Although first written some years 
ago, Brush affirms his commitment to these claims by effectively reprinting the 1996 paper 
in a more recent book – Brush (2015:156 – 169). As the values of Mendeleev’s atomic 
weights assigned to his ‘contrapredictions’ were later corroborated by independent 
experiment, Scerri and Worrall (2001:430) argue that Brush’s view on contrapredictions as 
being ‘better yet’ is ‘un-contestable in view of the just emphasised fact that the corrections 
of atomic weights were independently supported rather than made simply so as to fit the 
table’.  
 
This account gives some flavour of the disagreements around the periodic table that 
continue to exist about the epistemic value of accommodation of compared to novel 
predictions. Such disagreements are likely to continue for, as the historian of science 
Mansoor Niaz (2009:62) argues, ‘historians and philosophers of science [will] continue to 
debate as to what was crucial for the acceptance of the periodic law by the scientific 
community: accommodation of the existing elements or the prediction of new ones’. As we 
have seen, in terms of the periodic table these claims and counter-claims focus on the 
relative epistemic merits of the accommodation of existing phenomena – elements known 
at the time – set against successful predictions of new phenomena – the three eka-
elements. Such a polarised view is rejected by Lipton (2004:165) who argues, ‘successful 
theories typically both accommodate and predict’. The purpose of the coming section is not 
to argue for one particular side of this debate but to view the substance of the arguments 
from a different perspective: I will argue that the iconic nature of the periodic table 
provides an opportunity to go beyond the debate around accommodation and prediction 
outlined in this chapter. The hope is to offer a new perspective on Mendeleev’s epistemic 
endeavour. That is one from the perspective of Mendeleev’s representational practice and 
from the viewpoint of Peirce’s iconicity.   
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6.4. Accommodation and prediction: re-characterising the arguments in terms of practice 
Some encouragement in seeking to look beyond the accommodation-prediction debate is 
offered in recent scholarship, which casts doubt on whether the periodic table sits easily 
within the ‘accommodation-prediction’ framework. For example Andrea Woody (2014:147) 
argues that her extensive researches into the periodic law, ‘reveals some naiveté in the 
literature concerning the role of accommodation versus prediction in theory acceptance’. 
Part of Woody’s reasoning here is that the periodic law, represented by its corresponding 
table, is not a law in the traditional sense – not being cast as a logical conditional and rarely 
as an exact mathematical relation. This lack of mathematical exactitude, which Peirce 
sought unsuccessfully to find, is perhaps also the basis of Scerri’s (2012:328) view that the 
periodic table does not fit the traditional mode for philosophical discussion for, ‘it is neither 
a theory, nor a model nor perhaps even a law of nature in the traditional sense’ (Scerri 
offers no reasons for this view). 
 
The points Woody and Scerri make here can be illustrated by considering of the 
mathematics of periodic motion – sometimes described as simple harmonic motion – 
described by an oscillating system, such as an object suspended from a spring. An analysis 
of this periodic form of motion requires two laws, both of which are in Woody’s words, cast 
as an ‘exact mathematical relation’ – a condition that would likely satisfy Scerri’s concept of 
a traditional law. The two laws operating here are,  
 
a) Hooke’s law  
F = -kx;  
F = force, x = displacement, k = the spring constant) 
 
b) Newton’s second law of motion 
F = ma 
F = force, m = mass, a = acceleration 
 
Without delving into the mathematics, the following representation and associated 
formulae of this form of periodic motion is common to many physics texts. 
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y = displacement 
k = force constant for the 
spring 
t = time 
A = amplitude 
T = period of oscillation 
Ѡ = angular frequency 
m = mass of the object  
 
Figure 47: Simple Harmonic Motion 
Source: taken from HyperPhysics, Department of Physics and Astronomy, Georgia State 
University77 
 
When Mendeleev (1875:218) claims that the properties of the chemical elements and the 
formulae and properties of their compounds are, ‘periodic functions of the atomic weights 
of the elements’ he was alluding to the mathematically exact form of periodic motion 
demonstrated the example of simple harmonic motion shown in figure 47. Writing some 
fourteen year later Mendeleev (1888:181) makes a clear link between his periodic law and 
the laws of physics when he states, ‘[t]he periodic law has shown that our chemical 
individuals display a harmonic periodicity of properties, dependent on their masses 
(emphasis added). In his Principles of Chemistry, Mendeleev (1901:215 n321) states that, 
‘Newton laid the foundation of a truly scientific theoretical mechanics of external visible 
motion’ and that whilst ‘a Newton has not yet appeared in the molecular world; when he 
does, I think that he will find the fundamental laws of the mechanics of invisible motions of 
matter…in the chemical structure of matter’. I would suggest that Mendeleev’s use of 
‘periodic’ to describe the relations between the chemical elements arranged in order of 
atomic weight was a direct allusion to Newtonian mechanics and perhaps the beginnings of 
its emergence in ‘the chemical structure of matter’. Mendeleev (1901b:453) makes many 
references to both Lavoisier and Newton in his Principles of Chemistry; Appendix 1 being 
titled ‘An Attempt to Apply to Chemistry One of the Principles of Newton’s Natural 
Philosophy’. It is Gordin’s (1998:110) view that Mendeleev sought ‘desperately’ to be a 
successor to Newton and Lavoisier. Nevertheless, the exact form of periodicity 
demonstrated by the mechanical system of an oscillating spring, modelled with the aid of 
Hooke’s and Newton’s respective laws, is not demonstrated by Mendeleev’s periodic law. 
The atomic weights of the chemical elements as arranged in the periodic table increase but 
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 URL: http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/shm2.html last visited 20/03/2017 
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not in a regular fashion. The formulae and properties of their compounds are not a 
mathematically exact periodic function of their atomic weights. It is for reasons such as this 
- and also for reasons related to what philosophers of science usually define as a law -  that 
Woody and Scerri question the periodic law, on which the periodic table is founded, as 
being a law ‘in the traditional sense’. 
 
Whilst Scerri (2012:329) argues that the periodic table may not be grounded on a law in the 
‘traditional sense’, he accepts that ‘the periodic system is capable of rationalizing vast 
amounts of information, and capable of making successful predictions’. Debates around 
whether the periodic table is founded on a ‘traditional’ law and whether its acceptance is 
founded on its capacity to ‘accommodate’ or to ‘predict’, are likely to continue – see for 
example Niaz’s (2016) study on the reasons given in recent text books (1966 – 2002) for the 
acceptance of the periodic table. As suggested earlier, such debates are unlikely to be 
settled any time soon. However, by taking the substance of competing claims made under 
the categories of accommodation and under prediction there is, I would argue, a more 
coherent account of the periodic table to be had, if we connect these claims from the 
perspective of Mendeleev’s representational practice and by way of Peirce’s formulation of 
iconicity. In taking this approach the aim is to demonstrate Mendeleev’s articulated 
awareness of relations between the chemical elements as represented by the periodic 
table.  
 
As part of his account of the study of scientific practice Chang (2014: 67) argues ‘that a 
serious study of science must be concerned with what it is that we actually do in scientific 
work’ (emphasis in the original). I will argue in the coming section that aspects of what 
Mendeleev did are captured by his representational practice whereby he both 
accommodates and predicts the relations between the chemical elements. Furthermore 
that Mendeleev’s representational practice – or doing – is captured by Peirce’s formulation 
of iconicity. For as Chang (2014:76) argues, ‘[i]nstead of thinking about the abstract nature 
of a definition, we can consider what one has to do in order to define a scientific term’ 
(emphasis in the original): in my case by reformulating the arguments around 
‘accommodation’ and prediction’ and through the lens of Peirce’s iconicity. Furthermore 
there is further encouragement in this approach in Chang’s (2014:77) claim that, ‘[m]ost 
standard philosophical topics can receive a new lease of life by being re-conceptualized 
fully in terms of activities’.  
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In chapter four I argued that the periodic table functioned as an iconic sign which, when 
mediated by Mendeleev’s mental processes, stimulates thoughts on the relations between 
the chemical elements. Mendeleev’s engagement with the iconic periodic table was also a 
practical activity: experimenting with relations on paper in order to disclose new relations 
as evidenced by an examination of the proto forms of the periodic table (figures 36 and 37). 
In chapter three, we saw how Peirce sought unsuccessfully to fathom the mathematical 
relationship underpinning the periodic table. In this next section Peirce too can be seen to 
be engaging practically as a paper and pencil exercise in order to explore and ultimately 
reveal this relationship. In this next example of Peirce’s quest we can perhaps see a glimpse 
of the end point he was seeking in his sketch of a periodic curve similar to the one 
described above. This curve sketch follows another of Peirce’s series of calculations looking 
at the pattern of change in atomic weights for the chemical elements arranged according to 
Mendeleev’s scheme.   
 
This unpublished manuscript (MS 1039, c1898), written around five years after Peirce’s 
submission to The Nation on The Periodic Law (1892), opens as a chemistry text book might 
in describing a number of key terms such as ‘substance’ – materials where ‘their smallest 
sensible parts have the same physical properties’. In the style of a text book, Peirce 
continues to expand on other important concepts such as the nature of a chemical 
compound and atomic weights. This is followed by a couple of pages describing the 
properties of a series of potassium compounds. The descriptive chemistry then comes to an 
abrupt halt as Peirce switches his attention to a multitude of calculations on the atomic 
weights of the elements. Here is an example: 
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As the title states, Peirce is calculating 
the differences in atomic weights 
between successive elements within 
the periodic table. The data is based 
on ‘O=16 Clarke78 1897’ 
 
The differences in atomic weights are 
arranged in order of magnitude. 
Having ranked the differences Peirce 
then calculates the average difference 
between successive pairs or triads of 
ordered pairs of elements – this 
represents the second column of 
numbers.  
For example, 
Bi – Pb  1.19 
Li – Be   1.21   
Mg – Na 1.23  
Average of all three  = 1.21 
Figure 48: Peirce’s calculation of atomic weight differences 
Source: taken from Peirce’s MS 1039 v8 c1898 
 
Peirce makes no introduction to these calculations and offers no conclusions. My 
suggestion is that he broke off from his earlier descriptive account of chemistry to embark 
on one of his many searches for an exact mathematical relationship between the atomic 
weights of successive elements within Mendeleev’s scheme. This next page of calculations 
is taken from the same MS and again there is nothing by way of description to assess what 
Peirce was up to: 
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 The American chemist Frank W. Clarke, graduated from the Lawrence Scientific School in 1867 and 
later founded the American Chemistry Society published his Recalculation of the Atomic Weights in 
1882. 
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The column on the left shows the 
first twenty elements listed with 
horizontal lines between F and Na, 
Cl and K thereby identifying 
successive rows or periods of 
elements. The element Be is 
omitted from the first period. Peirce 
gives no indication of what the five-
figure decimal fractions refer to but 
the connecting lines suggest a 
search for the numerical relations 
between the elements concerned. 
The values appear to be relative to 
oxygen as the entry for oxygen is 
zero. The atomic weights (Clarke 
1897) were all relative to O=16. 
The column of data on the right lists 
the atomic weights of the elements: 
Li=7.01, G79=9.05, C=11.97 etc. 
Curiously the values do not 
correspond to the values by Clarke 
(1897:364/5) where, for example Li 
= 7.03 and G = 9.08 
Figure 49: Peirce’s calculation of atomic weight differences and periodic curve 
Source: taken from Peirce’s MS 1039 v8 c1898 
 
What is most intriguing is his sketch at the bottom of the page of a typical periodic curve – 
subject to the exact mathematical formalism Peirce is seeking – with a number of points 
marked off. Regrettably Peirce gives no indication as to how this curve – or the circular 
diagrams - relates to the atomic weight calculations. I believe however that we are able to 
make a number of speculations around Peirce’s methods here. In particular I will attempt to 
show that figure 49 is an example of Peirce experimenting on paper with the relations 
between the atomic weights of the chemical elements in order to disclose new relations. 
Looking again we can see that in addition to the periodic curve and the circular diagrams 
Peirce has divided the data in to the form of a table: a line drawn between fluorine (F) and 
                                                          
79
 G (glucinium) later renamed beryllium 
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sodium (Na) and also between chlorine (Cl) and potassium (K) separates the elements of 
what today would be known as period 1 (Li – F80), period 2 (Na – Cl) and period 3 (K – Ni81). 
It is perhaps surprising that argon and helium are not included; the manuscript is dated 
1898 and three years after Ramsay and Rayleigh published on these elements82. Before 
attempting to offer any view on how Peirce might have been using the information he has 
assembled (figure 49) it is worth recalling three points made in earlier chapters. Firstly the 
emphasis Hookway places on the capacity of an iconic representation to reveal new 
discoveries by engaging with the sign itself. Secondly Peirce’s emphasis that the process of 
reasoning is founded on the construction of iconic diagrams and that these diagrams make 
relations visible. It is through the act of representation – such as constructing tables – that 
new information is revealed. Thirdly that iconicity is intrinsically linked with the process of 
surrogative reasoning. Looking again at figure 49 we can see how Peirce has drawn 
connecting lines between several of the elements. For example lines are drawn from the 
calculations as decimal fractions associated with the first five elements (H – N) and that 
these are related to a position on the sketch of a circle. It would seem reasonable to state 
that in the act of constructing this table where periods of elements seem blocked together, 
making the various calculations and then attempting to connect points of significance and 
to transpose these in some way onto the circular and periodic curve, Peirce is trying to 
surface new relations between the chemical elements. Peirce’s practice in this case is an 
experiment on paper - the foundation of his surrogative reasoning - to disclose new 
relations between the chemical elements.  
 
Earlier in chapter four I argued that Mendeleev’s use of the term ‘periodic’ – and alluded to 
in Peirce’s curve (figure 49) – was an appeal to mathematics and the exactness of 
Newtonian mechanics. I also demonstrated how for Peirce a mathematical function is able 
to operate iconically in facilitating the disclosure of a novel relation. By taking an example 
from mathematics I should like to make an initial case for engagement with an iconic sign 
being a practical activity; one involving both the accommodation of existing information as 
well as the disclosure of novel facts.  
 
 
                                                          
80
 Peirce omits beryllium (Be) 
81
 Peirce does not include all the elements of period 3 
82
 Lord Rayleigh, Ramsay, W. 1895. ‘Argon, a New Constituent of the Atmosphere’. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London 186 :187-241 & Ramsay, W. 1895a.  ‘Helium, a Gaseous 
Constituent of Certain Minerals’. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London 58:80-89 
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Consider now the problem to show that cos(sin−1 x) = √ (1 – x2). 
One means of tackling this problem involves a couple of practical activities: 
1. Applying the rules of trigonometry we can write: let θ = sin−1 x, then sin(θ) = x, then 
2. Draw a right angled triangle and label as shown in figure 50 
 
 
There follows what might be 
characterised as a number of steps of 
mental reasoning: 
Applying the rules of  trigonometry 
sin(θ) = x/1 
Applying Pythagoras’s theorem 
AB =  √ (1 – x2). 
Applying the rules of  trigonometry 
cos(sin−1 x) = cos(θ)  
= AB/BC 
= √ (1 – x2). 
Therefore cos(sin−1 x) = √ (1 – x2).  
Figure 50: trigonometric proof for cos(sin−1 x) = √ (1 – x2) 
 
This is first a practical activity involving the mathematician first rearranging the problem 
into a more convenient form. There then follows the pencil and paper (and ruler) exercise 
of drawing out and labelling the right-angled triangle. In this way the relation embodied in 
the expression ‘sin(θ) = x’ is represented as a geometrical diagram – the right-angled 
triangle -  above (Figure 50). By the practical activity of constructing and acting on the 
diagram accompanied by mental acts of reasoning, the proof that cos(sin−1 x) = √ (1 – x2) is 
discovered. The diagram is an icon of the relations contained with the expression sin(θ) = x 
and our reasoning is grounded on the iconic representation in order to arrive at the proof. 
The iconic diagram embodies – or accommodates – the relations given in sin(θ) = x. The 
practical activity of acting on the diagram reveals new knowledge: cos(sin−1 x) is equal to  √ 
(1 – x2) – the answer being a form of newly discovered relation – analogous to a 
Mendeleevian prediction. The iconicity of the geometric diagram is revealed in the 
mathematician’s practice of experimenting on paper, on a representation of her problem, 
in the form of a right-angled triangle. By this process an answer to the original problem is 
discovered. I would argue that by analogy with this example from geometry, the periodic 
table is an icon which embodies or accommodates the physiochemical relations between 
the chemical elements and which has the capacity to reveal or predict novel facts – e.g. 
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corrected atomic weight values and the prediction of novel elements. To extend the 
analogy, for Mendeleev – as for a mathematician – this is a practical activity of representing 
existing relations on paper in order to discover novel relations. 
 
6.5 Bringing together aspects of ‘accommodation’ and ‘prediction’ from the view point of 
Mendeleev’s representational practice 
Woody (2014:123) argues that accounts that focus on practice are ‘based on [an] 
examination of the reasoning invoked by scientists in particular contexts that arise in their 
ongoing work’. I should like to consider Mendeleev’s practice by examining the reasoning 
he appealed to in an account that has not until now featured in this project: Remarks 
Concerning the Discovery of Gallium (1875). I hope to reveal Mendeleev’s representational 
practice by the way he demonstrates an articulated awareness of the nature of the 
relations operating between his chemical objects. This might be evidenced in two ways. 
Firstly in Mendeleev’s understanding of the periodic law in terms of the physiochemical 
relations existing between the elements accommodated within his scheme. Secondly, in the 
way Mendeleev used the periodic table – its iconicity – to infer novel relations between the 
chemical elements. I hope to show that by taking Mendeleev’s representational practice 
from the view point of Woody’s articulated awareness we can bring together aspects from 
the ‘accommodation and ‘prediction debate’ into a single narrative. This is offered as a 
novel attempt to go beyond this long-running dispute in the philosophy of science as it 
applies to the periodic table. 
 
In 1875 the French chemist Emile Lecoq De Boisbaudran (1875:159) reported on the 
‘indications of the probable existence of a new elementary body in the products of the 
chemical examination of a [zinc] blende…for which I propose the name of Gallium’. De 
Boisbaudran’s discovery was not, states Scerri (2006:135), ‘a result of testing Mendeleev’s 
prediction…[ De Boisbaudran]…operated quite independently by empirical means, in 
ignorance of Mendeleev’s prediction, and proceeded to characterize the new element 
spectroscopically’. Mendeleev’s (1875:144) paper, written in response to De Boisbaudran’s 
discovery, begins with a statement of the periodic law: 
 
The properties of simple substances, the constitution of their combinations, as well 
as the properties of the latter, are periodic functions of the atomic weights of the 
elements.  
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Also included is a representation of the law in the form of the periodic table (figure 51), 
evidence contributing to Mendeleev’s deep understanding – articulated awareness – of the 
relations between the chemical elements. 
 
Figure 51: Mendeleev’s periodic table of 1875 
Source: taken from Jensen, W. 2002. Mendeleev on the Periodic Law: Selected Writings, 
1869–1905. Dover Publications, Mineola, NY, page 144 
 
Drawing the reader’s attention to the table Mendeleev (1875:128) makes three claims. The 
first might be described as one of accommodation, for Mendeleev claims the 
representation of the periodic law ‘constitutes the basis of the complete system of the 
elements’. That is to say it accommodates all the known elements arranged by atomic 
weight. This is followed by Mendeleev’s (1875:128) two further claims that would fall 
within the predictivist camp as set out in the earlier discussion. The second is that the 
arrangement of the elements as represented by the table ‘requires some revision of the 
atomic weights of some metals not yet sufficiently studied’. The third of Mendeleev’s 
predictivist claims is that the gaps in the table ‘enables us to predict the properties of the 
unknown elements…eka-aluminium, El, and eka-silicon, Es’ (emphasis in the original). By 
acting on and experimenting with the periodic table as part of his reasoning process (the 
second criterion of iconicity described in chapter four) Mendeleev (1875:128) further 
predicts successfully a number of properties for eka-aluminium (El). The inferences 
Mendeleev draws here in terms of the likely need to revise a number of atomic weights and 
the likely existance to two undiscovered elements are further evidence of his atriculated 
awareness of the relations between the chemical elements. Furthermore, and echoing 
Chang’s (2012) earlier point that a serious approach to scientific practice is concerned with 
what scientists do, I would argue that a study of the practice of representation must have a 
concern for what practitioners – here Mendeleev – do with them. Here we see Menddeleev 
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using his representation of the relations between the chemical elements – the periodic 
table – to predict novel facts interms of corrected atomic weights and two more eka-
elements. These claims come with Mendeleev’s statement that the periodic law, and its 
representation, contain or accommodate all the known elements – a complete system. 
Mendeleev’s representational practice encoprporates both accommodation and prediction. 
The degree to which Mendeleev’s representational practice demonstrates an articulated 
awareness of the relations between the chemical elements might be seen by the accuracy 
of the inferences he drew for the properties of eka-aluminium (later shown to be gallium). 
The following table sums up Mendeleev’s (1875:128) predictions and compares these with 
those later determined for gallium: 
 
Property Predicted  
(eka-aluminium, El) 
Actual  
(gallium, Ga) 
Difference from 
experimental result 
Atomic weight 68 69.2  1.7% 
Atomic volume 11.5 11.8 2.5% 
Specific gravity 5.5 (‘thereabouts’) 5.9 6.8% 
Chloride ElCl3 GaCl3 Correct 
Oxide El2O3 Ga2O3 Correct 
Sulphide El2S3 Ga2S3 Correct 
Alum ElK(SO4)2  KAl(SO4)2 Correct 
Reaction with acids/alkalis Slow Slow Correct 
 
Looking at Mendeleev’s fourth column, where the degree of concurrence between the 
predicted and experimentally determined results are given, then we might agree with 
Scerri’s earlier remark that Mendeleev’s predictions are ‘astonishing’ in their accuracy.   
 
From the perspective of this particular 1875 paper I would claim that Mendeleev’s 
representational practice involves a combination of activities that fall under the previously 
described accounts of  ‘accommodation’ and of ‘prediction’. I would suggest that this view 
from practice goes beyond the bipartisan debate around accommodation and prediction 
outlined earlier. By drawing also on the work of chapter four we can take a broader view of 
Mendeleev’s practice than is afforded by a study of Mendeleev’s relatively short paper 
from 1875. Chapter four made the case for the periodic table being an icon, its iconicity 
being integrated into Mendeleev’s process of reasoning. Implicit in Mendeleev’s 
representational practice, one formulated on iconicity, are the core aspects of the 
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arguments labelled under ‘accommodation’ and ‘prediction’. In chapter three I argued for 
the concept of relations being important to both Peirce and to Mendeleev. With 
Mendeleev’s periodic table, physio-chemical relations underpin the accommodation of the 
elements of its construction. Looking back to Mendeleev’s table of 1875 (Figure 51) 
relations founded on atomic weight and valency determine an element’s position and the 
overall structure of the table. For example consider the relations between the elements 
lithium, fluorine and sodium. Sodium (Na = 23) follows on from after fluorine (F = 19). It 
makes sense to place sodium in the same group as lithium (Li = 7) as they are chemically 
similar – soft reactive metals – are both monovalent forming compounds with identical 
combining ratios (e.g. LiF and NaF; Li2O and Na2O). In recognising relations such as these, 
Mendeleev was able to accommodate the chemical elements into his iconic table. In 
chapter four I argued that an important property of an icon was its epistemic fruitfulness. 
That, as Peirce explains, by experimenting on the icon in the form of thought experiments 
novel facts can be discovered. By engaging with the iconicity of the periodic table, 
Mendeleev was able to predict the possibility of novel elements. Mendeleev’s 
representational practice, as captured by Peirce’s working of iconicity, is an integrated 
process. It involves forming an iconic diagram founded on the relations at play between the 
accommodated chemical elements and then to both mentally and physically engage (pen 
on paper) with this – Mendeleev’s representational practice - to predict novel facts. I would 
argue that Mendeleev’s representational practice brings together aspects of both 
prediction and accommodation, both aspects being unified within Peirce’s account of 
iconicity.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
From the perspective of Peirce’s iconicity set out during the course of this project I would 
argue that elements of ‘accommodation’ and ‘prediction’ have been alloyed together on 
other occasions. In chapter four we saw how Mendeleev engaged with sketched proto-
forms of the periodic table both mentally as well as practically as he experimented on 
paper in order to disclose new relations between the chemical elements. His early tables 
both accommodated existing elements and left gaps for projected novel elements. In 
chapter five the term iconic robustness was developed as an attempt to capture the 
periodic table’s continuing iconic fruitfulness against a background of nature’s resistance in 
the form of the challenge to accommodate novel elements.  
 
The way which Mendeleev arrived at the periodic table is summed up by Robin Hendry 
(2012:259) as follows, 
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First came a preliminary list of the elements by atomic weight. Next came a careful 
noting of the trends and patterns in their chemical behaviour, including the 
stoichiometry and physical properties of their compounds. Through reflective 
equilibrium83 between data and hypothesis, Mendeleev was able to revise some 
atomic weights, and to recognise where gaps must be left for undiscovered 
elements. 
 
Hendry captures something here of Mendeleev’s representational practice. Firstly in 
accommodating the available elements into his construction of the periodic table by their 
atomic weights and supported by their physiochemical properties (compounds included). 
Secondly by emphasising the table’s epistemic fruitfulness in predicting revised atomic 
weights and new elements awaiting discovery. I would argue that Mendeleev’s 
representational practice, mediated by the periodic table’s iconicity, provided a pathway or 
process that mediated between ‘data and hypothesis’ – data relating to the 
accommodation of existing elements and hypotheses that include novel predictions. This 
chapter attempted to show how Peirce’s theory of iconicity weaves together filaments from 
both sides of the accommodation/prediction debate. I believe that this approach, 
construed in terms of Mendeleev’s representational practice, offers a more holistic 
approach to the epistemology of the periodic system than the ‘accommodation/prediction’ 
debate set out earlier. The predictive power of Mendeleev’s table in discovering new 
relations between the chemical elements, and its construction through accommodating 
known elements are revealed as integrated functions of his practice of representing when 
viewed through the lens of Peirce’s formulation of iconicity. 
 
  
                                                          
83
 Hendry’s term ‘reflective equilibrium’ is one associated with Nelson Goodman (1965) and the 
moral philosophy of John Rawls (1971). In his influential Theory of Justice Rawls (1971:43) describes 
reflective equlibrium as the position, ‘reached after a person has weighed various proposed 
conceptions and he has either revised his judgements to accord with one of them or held fast to his 
original convictions’. 
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Conclusion 
 
The aim of this dissertation was to show that aspects of the works of Charles Peirce and 
Dimitri Mendeleev are illumined by the insights and perceptions of the other. My thesis 
was motivated initially by Peirce’s many references to Mendeleev’s periodic table and to 
the chemical concept of valency. I noted there was little in the secondary literature that 
connected Peirce’s philosophy to his study of chemistry. There seemed to be a widely held 
view that Peirce’s philosophy and logic are better understood within the context of his 
mathematics; any mention of chemistry was usually by way of biographical detail. I also 
noted that the literature was rich in discussions on the relative evidential weight to be 
attributed to Mendeleev’s periodic law in terms of its capacity to accommodate known 
elements against its predictive capacity. There was far less on how the periodic table 
featured as part of Mendeleev’s practice in terms of its fruitful capacity to accommodate 
existing data, assign new values, and point the way towards novel knowledge. I noted too 
that Peirce’s formulation of iconicity was rarely used in analysing how scientific 
representations function in scientific practice.  Even one rare mention – Ursula Klein in her 
study of Berzelian formula as paper tools – led to the eventual rejection of Peirce’s 
iconicity.   
 
My aim in chapter one was to set out the context of Peirce’s study of chemistry at 
Harvard’s Lawrence Scientific School under the direction of Josiah Cooke. I discussed the 
reforms Cooke introduced to the teaching of chemistry. This included Cooke’s move away 
from rote learning towards a more laboratory based problem-solving curriculum with a 
greater emphasis on mathematical rigour. With regard to Peirce’s later philosophy Cooke, 
in common with Mendeleev, framed the study of chemistry in terms of the relations 
between substances and their empirically determined properties. Secondly Cooke devised a 
diagrammatic process of reasoning to enable his students to understand the structural 
relations embodied within the study of crystallography. In chapter one I sought to establish 
that Peirce’s training as a chemist at Harvard made a contribution to his thinking on the 
epistemic and logical value of diagrams, ways of thinking diagrammatically and in terms of 
relations. 
 
 The aim of chapter two was to explore Peirce’s early publications in chemistry for an 
insight into his chemical interests and to see how these map on to his philosophical position 
at the time. I showed that Peirce shared a number of interests in common with his 
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contemporaries: the atomic theory and systemising the chemical elements by atomic 
weight. Where Peirce differed was in his readiness to ground his arguments in metaphysics. 
His contemporaries, including Cooke, tended to dismiss metaphysics as irrelevant to their 
empirical work in the laboratory. I also connected Peirce’s chemistry to his early Kantianism 
which, scholars agree, features in his wider philosophy at the time. This chapter also 
demonstrated Peirce’s interests in the value of classifying the chemical elements by their 
atomic weights, an interest that develops in to a life-long fascination with Mendeleev’s 
periodic table. Whilst publishing a diagrammatic attempt to demonstrate a degree of order 
to the chemical elements, Peirce was at the same time arguing against JS Mill’s justification 
of inductive reasoning founded on the inherent orderliness of nature.  I was able to map 
Peirce’s justification of inductive logic onto his chemistry where he sets out an orderly 
scheme for chemical elements based on their atomic weights. I argued that Peirce’s 
chemistry was not in conflict with his philosophical position at the time: Peirce does not 
deny the possible discoverability of regularities in the world; rather, the insufficiency of an 
appeal to order to justify induction. 
 
I began chapter three by exploring the connections between Peirce and Mendeleev. Whilst 
Mendeleev was most probably unaware of Peirce’s work, Peirce had a great knowledge of 
and interest in Mendeleev’s achievements in chemistry. I demonstrated that both these 
philosopher-chemists framed their approach to the periodic arrangement of the chemical 
elements in terms of the relation between their atomic weights and physiochemical 
properties. My aim in this chapter was also to examine Peirce’s reception of Mendeleev’s 
scheme. Using a number of Peirce’s published works and manuscripts I revealed his 
dissatisfaction and frustration at not being able to discover an exact mathematical pattern 
to Mendeleev’s system. A number of Peirce’s manuscripts are littered with attempts to 
discover a mathematical key to the periodic table. My aim in this chapter was also to show 
that an additional insight is afforded by viewing Peirce’s phenomenology through the lens 
of his chemistry. I examined the concept of valency as deployed in chemical graphs of the 
period as well as Mendeleev’s periodic table in relation to Peirce’s phenomenology. I was 
able to show that Peirce’s chemistry carries across to his phenomenology. Both valency and 
the periodic table are the basis for diagrammatic forms that depict relations. The periodic 
table represents the physiochemical relations between the chemical elements. Chemical 
graphs - molecular diagrams - depict relations between atoms which are in turn dependent 
upon their respective valencies. I showed how, using these visual forms from chemistry, 
Peirce created a diagrammatic pathway to an understanding of phaneroscopy. 
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In chapter four I went on to investigate Mendeleev’s periodic table as an iconic 
representation.  I began by presenting Peirce’s three orders of signs: icon, index and 
symbol. I then focussed on the icon in terms of its epistemic fruitfulness; the possibility of 
making new discoveries about an object by observing and experimenting on its iconic 
representation. Ahead of a detailed treatment of the periodic table I further developed 
Peirce’s concept of iconicity in relation to chemical graphs as developed by Edward Franklin 
and Alexander Crum Brown. I argued that chemical graphs functioned as icons by 
facilitating reasoning: the bonds affected during the course of a chemical reaction and 
assigning isomer types. By using chemical graphs I demonstrated that an icon need not 
resemble its chemical object in looks but only with respect to the relations between their 
parts. Also ahead of dealing with the periodic table I set up and then offered a number of 
counter-arguments to some of the objections to iconicity on the grounds of resemblance. 
This was followed by a detailed consideration of the different strength of relations – eg 
isomorphism and homomorphism – sometimes posited between a representation and its 
target. I argued that iconicity is founded on homomorphism – a partial but structure 
preserving mapping from source to target – which surfaces through the process of 
representing. I then took Ursula Klein’s (2001) study of Berzelian formulae, where she 
rejects Peirce’s formulation of iconicity, preferring instead her own neologism iconic 
symbol. Klein rejected Peirce’s formulation of the icon as she believed this required an 
isomorphic relationship between source (Berzelian formulae) and target (chemical 
substances). I argued that homomorphism better characterises this situation and that Klein 
missed the opportunity of using Peirce’s iconicity as part of her analysis in arriving at 
Berzelian formulae as paper tools. 
 
I set out three key functions of Peirce’s formulation of iconicity which when mapped on to 
the periodic table demonstrated its function as an icon:- 
 
a) epistemic fruitfulness 
a) surrogative reasoning 
b) a system of relations. 
 
I showed how, through a series of practical pencil-and-paper exercises, Mendeleev 
experimented on a number of early proto-sketches. Through a series of reconstructions of 
these preliminary sketch diagrams Mendeleev arrived at his first periodic table of 1869: an 
arrangement of the chemical elements in atomic weight order such that they displayed a 
periodic variation in their physiochemical properties. I argued that these early proto-
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sketches were at the heart of Mendeleev’s surrogative reasoning. I argued that the periodic 
table was a system of relations and noted how Mendeleev expressed the connection 
between the properties of the elements and their atomic weight in terms of relations. I 
argued that the iconic character of the periodic table was realised through the process of 
Mendeleev’s representative practice: in constructing his diagrammatic table, founded on 
the relations between the atomic weights and the properties of the chemical elements, it 
was possible to point towards the possibility of new knowledge: novel elements and revised 
atomic weight values. I argued that in papers published after the first arrangement of 1869, 
Mendeleev continued to exploit the fruitfulness of his table – its iconicity – in terms of the 
eka-elements and new atomic weight values. I also showed how Mendeleev’s early 
sketches and his later published schemes also acted as construals: in presenting an 
interpretation of the relations between atomic weight and chemical properties and placing 
these ideas into the wider chemical community for discussion.  
 
Having established the periodic table as an iconic representation, in chapter five I went on 
to investigate how its iconicity was affected by the problem of the rare earth elements and 
the noble gases, elements that failed initially to be assimilated within Mendeleev’s scheme. 
I began by characterising these elements as offering resistance – that is nature’s resistance 
– to the periodic table, a term borrowed from Hasok Chang’s (2012) formulation of active 
realism. I set out two case studies where the periodic table encountered nature’s 
resistance: the rare earth crisis (Thyssen and Binnemans, 2015) and the discovery of the 
noble gases and their eventual placing into the periodic table, the result of work carried out 
by Sir William Ramsay, Lord Rayleigh and Morris Travers. By combining these two case 
studies within the context of Peirce’s account of fallibilism, I argued that the periodic table 
demonstrated iconic robustness in retaining its capacity to promote thought experiments 
and to generate new knowledge, whilst undergoing structural changes in response to 
nature’s resistance. I concluded chapter five by defining iconic robustness in the context of 
the periodic table: the continuing capacity to generate knowledge of novel relations 
between the chemical elements without being thwarted by nature’s resistance and within 
the context of a fallible inquiry. This is, I believe, a term new to Peirce studies. 
 
In chapter six I built on the case for the periodic table as an iconic sign as well as 
Mendeleev’s practice of representing, so as to offer a new insight into its epistemology. My 
aim was to move beyond the long-running and dyadic debate around whether Mendeleev’s 
prediction of new elements had a greater impact on the chemical community than the 
accommodation of existing elements. I first examined the wider historiography of the 
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‘accommodation/prediction’ debate before focussing on the periodic table. I argued that 
Mendeleev’s practice of representing, mediated by the periodic table and from the vantage 
point of Peirce’s formulation of iconicity, provided a creative pathway of thought that 
brought together threads from both the ‘accommodation’ and ‘prediction’ debates as a 
single narrative. 
 
Finally, I hope to have shown that Peirce’s chemistry is worth more to the HPS community 
than as a simple biographical note: I believe it provided Peirce with a thought pathway or 
mind-set that enabled him to develop a diagrammatic approach to aspects of his 
philosophy. At the same time, through the study of Mendeleev’s periodic table, I hope to 
have demonstrated the value of Peirce’s formulation of iconicity as an analytical framework 
for scientific representations and representational practice. 
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